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Abstract 
Frustrated with the anti-intellectualism and academic conservatism of the early 
sixteenth century, Erasmus, in his lengthy commentary on “The Labors of Hercules” 
adage, attempts to justify his thankless and debilitating scholarly work by analogizing it 
to the labors of the mythic Greco-Roman strongman.  My dissertation focuses on the way 
he and other early modern educational theorists translate learning and cognitive processes 
into the materialistic, embodied masculinist terms that their male aristocratic readers 
would understand and therefore value.  Unlike the curricular-ideological analyses of 
traditional early modern education scholarship that ignore embodiment altogether or the 
analyses of more recent scholarship informed by Marxist and postmodern theories of 
embodiment, I provide a more sustained, historically contextualized analysis of those 
treatises in terms of the classically-inherited medical discourses that actually shaped 
them.  In that regard, my dissertation brings the critical orientation of early modern body 
studies (generated in large part by Gail Kern Paster’s seminal study The Body 
Embarrassed) to bear on early modern educational treatises, specifically as those treatises 
address the bodies of (male) children, in an as yet unexplored way.   
As my title suggests, masculinity in the Renaissance was not thought a biological 
given but rather a part of an anxious performative process.  Therefore, I spend 
considerable time exploring the way in which theories of women’s psychophysiological 
inferiority define and threaten male subjectivity.  Specifically, I argue that educational 
treatises are so focused on— really obsessed with— the vulnerably constituted bodies of 
male children and the health benefits of a proper diet and exercise, because they are 
haunted by the authoritative role of women during early child development.  These 
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treatises, I also argue, ironically re-construct and employ aristocratic women, specifically 
Elizabeth I, as negative-sedentary somatic ideals against which the female knowledge and 
authority of mothers, nurses, and midwives are implicitly critiqued and displaced and the 
psychophysiological superiority of aristocratic men confirmed.  While physical exercise 
as a form of performative masculinity is key to that displacement, it also importantly 
represents a crucial method by which to domesticate or civilize aristocratic men to fit, as 
Norbert Elias describes, the nonviolent exigencies of early modern court society.  Indeed, 
I argue that physical exercise is part of a disciplinary process intended to internalize 
nonviolent dispositions.  Much of the period’s literary production confronts the 
behavioral and affective implications of this process, and I conclude this study by 
exploring those implications in two literary texts: François Rabelais’s Gargantua and 
Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction: Justification for Higher Education and the Labors of Hercules 
 
 Allow me to begin this study of early modern education with a late-twentieth 
century poster1 that represents, as its luminous header boldly declares, the prevailing 
“JUSTIFICATION FOR HIGHER EDUCATION” in our own society (see Fig. 1).  
Beneath this header, we see a mansion situated atop what appears to be a sea-side hill of 
some warm-weather location.  A yacht is docked to its left; a helicopter rests on a heliport 
to its front right side; and, in the immediate foreground, five sports cars are each parked 
half-way in the individual spaces of a five-car garage.  Although the setting sun still 
shines through the palm trees in the distance, almost every light appears to be on in and 
around the mansion.  Even one of the cars appears to have its reverse lights on, as if 
someone is just about to back out.  However, despite the life and activity that that energy-
wasting illumination implies, there are actually no people represented.   
Arguably, what explains this noticeable and somewhat ironic exclusion is that the 
poster is attempting to draw or, in Althusserian terms, interpellate2 each and every viewer 
into an individualistic fantasy of materialistic abundance.  Therefore, to represent a 
particular owner or type of owner would run the risk of spoiling the mass appeal of the 
poster by limiting that visual invitation to a particular type of viewer. Rather, at the 
                                                 
1 When I began my college education at the University of Virginia in 1990, this poster was sold at the 
bookstore and adorned the walls of many first-year dorms.  Although the bookstore attendant I recently 
spoke to expressed familiarity with it, she also informed me that it is not an item she thinks they regularly 
carry.  In any event, three versions of it are readily and cheaply available for purchase on several websites, 
and its continuing popularity is suggested by a recent (January 12, 2011) customer review: “This is a great 
poster for a teen or young adult for encouragement.Statement is stay in school & the higher education you 
have the better your chances for a fun & money making job,beautiful house & hot cars can be some peoples 
dreams that can be reached.Plus a fun picture to have up.”            
2 See Louis Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards and Investigation),” 
specifically the section “Ideology interpellates Individuals as Subjects” (170-177) in Lenin and Philosophy 
and Other Essays.    
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discounted Amazon.com price of $1.74, the message is indeed intended for everyone; and 
that message is that this could all be yours— in fact, it’s waiting to be yours— if you go 
to college, work hard, and earn a degree. 
 Of course, this argument is complete and utter fantastical nonsense.  The sober 
reality for most people is that they were born on the wrong side of a destructive and 
exploitative system that makes the fantasy of the poster only a material reality for an 
infinitesimal percentage of people in the world.  That is, the vast majority of the world’s 
population— educated or not— will never see, let alone possess, this kind of wealth, 
except, of course, in the possession of the poster itself.  Despite that, the poster’s 
argument is a persistent— although not to say an inspiring— one, because it reflects an 
“American Dream” ideology of upward mobility and material prosperity that crucially 
functions to mystify the necessity of socioeconomic inequality under global capitalism.  
For instance, in 2002, the U.S. Census Bureau published a statistically supported version 
of that argument in a report entitled “The Big Payoff: Educational Attainment and 
Synthetic Estimates of Work-Life Earnings”: “People decide to go to college for many 
reasons” (1), the report begins, “[and one] of the most compelling is the expectation of 
future economic success based on educational attainment.  This report illustrates the 
economic value of an education, that is, the added value of a high school diploma or 
college degree” (1).  In relative economic terms, there is no disputing this conclusion.  
Notwithstanding the continuing disparity in earnings between white non-Hispanic men 
and everyone else, the Bureau finds that a person with a bachelor’s degree will earn $2.1 
million over a forty-year work life, which is almost twice as much as someone with just a 
high school diploma.  The report also finds considerable increases in earnings beyond the 
 3 
 
bachelor’s degree.3  However, when you do the math, $2.1 million only amounts to about 
$53,000 a year— a modest pay off, especially when we factor in taxes, the rising cost of 
education, and student-loan debt.  In poster terms, that’s worlds away from enough 
money to buy or even rent a mansion, a helicopter, or a sports car.  So much for the big 
pay off. 
While the realization that higher education is ultimately not that profitable an 
investment might in part explain why only half of the teenagers who enroll in college end 
up with a bachelor’s degree,4 I think to focus on the profit motive too neatly and 
uncritically defines education as well as current and prospective college students in the 
practical, quantifiable, and ultimately exploitable terms most conducive to the anti-
intellectual and often unethical exigencies of economic and specifically corporate 
interests.  But what about those other compelling reasons for going to college?  What 
about the woman who borrows nearly $100,000 for an interdisciplinary degree in 
religious and women’s studies?5  While one might reasonably conclude that her 
impractical investment merely represents the foolish and/or unwitting acceptance of 
values antithetical to her self-interest, it also, I think, might suggest that something else is 
driving her; that she is perhaps driven by much more than impossible fantasies of wealth 
                                                 
3  The study reports that the work-life earnings for a Master’s degree is $2.5 million, a professional degree 
$4.4 million, and a doctoral degree $3.4 million.   
4 See David Leonhardt’s September 9, 2009 -ew York Times article “Colleges Are Failing in Graduation 
Rates,” which for the most part is a review of William Bowen and Michael McPherson’s book Crossing the 
Finish Line: Completing College at American Public Universities.         
5 That woman is Cortney Munna, who is featured in a Ron Lieber’s May 28, 2010 -ew York Times article 
entitled “Placing the Blame as Students are Buried in Debt.”  While the article identifies her religious and 
women’s studies major, there is no discussion of what, beyond the degree itself, Munna feels she got out of 
her studies or why she borrowed so much money to earn an obviously unprofitable degree.  The article, 
however, concludes with her admitting that she doesn’t “want to spend the rest of [her] life slaving away to 
pay for an education . . . [she] would happily give back.”  Also, see Jeffrey Williams’s “Debt Education: 
Bad for the Young, Bad for America” for an informative historical analysis of what he terms the “post-
welfare state university,” which he describes as the carrying out of “the policies and ethos of the 
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and the likelihood of a humanities degree to realize them; she and, I venture to guess, 
many others are driven, if only intuitively, by an invaluable— we might even say 
relatively autonomous— desire to understand their individual and collective positions and 
what it means to act responsibly from those positions in an increasingly inclusive and 
therefore complex world.  This is of course the traditional justification of a liberal 
education and specifically a humanities degree in a democratic society.  However, the 
corporatization of higher education— the translation, in other words, of education into an 
expensive privatized service— reduces a liberal education to little more than polite 
cultural capital for a wealthy leisure class and, therefore, a waste of time and money for 
those, like our religious and women’s studies major, who have to borrow considerable 
amounts of money to acquire it.  
 In an instructive essay entitled “Debt Education: Bad for the Young, Bad for 
America,” Jeffery Williams warns that “debt is not just a mode of financing but a mode 
of pedagogy” (56).  That is, “debt teaches that higher education is a consumer service” 
(56); that business and other professional degrees are more valuable than those in the 
humanities; that the primary ordering principle of the world is the capitalist market, and 
that the market is natural, inevitable, and implacable” (57); that the social contract is an 
obligation to the institutions of capital” (57), not the welfare of people; that “[personal] 
worth is measured not according to a humanistic conception of character, cultivation of 
intellect and taste, or knowledge of the liberal arts, but according to one’s financial 
potential” (57); and finally debt teaches an anxious status-obsessed sensibility “reinforced 
with each  monthly [student-loan] payment for the next fifteen years” (57).  These are the 
                                                                                                                                                 
neoconservative dismantling of the welfare state, from the ‘Reagan Revolution’ through the Clinton 
‘reform’ up to the present draining of social services” (54).      
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lessons that shape students before they even step foot on campus for the first time.  And 
while there have been many and various critiques in that vein, most of them, as Williams 
suggests, are focused on and addressed to current and would-be professional academics, 
not actual students in the classroom.6  The problem is that those students are perhaps the 
most important players in what is indeed a desperate “war of position”7 against the 
ideological and practical forces of corporate interests.  With persistent budget cuts and 
the steady decrease of humanities majors, an essential task for defenders of both the 
humanities and a democratic society is first to meet students where they are materially 
and ideologically— that is, deeply inculcated in an anti-intellectual materialistic 
corporate ethos— and then figure out how to persuade them of the urgent need to engage 
ethically and critically in the world. 
Notwithstanding the obvious differences, this challenge bears a striking 
resemblance to the one faced by educational theorists of the sixteenth century.  With the 
bureaucratic complexities that came along with the consolidation of power in 
monarchical courts and the advances in military technology that rendered the martial 
skills of the individual knight-warrior obsolete, sixteenth century educational theorists 
faced the difficult task of persuading aristocratic men that their survival as a ruling class 
                                                 
6 Williams states, “Over the past decade, there has been an avalanche of criticism of the ‘corporatization’ of 
the university.  Most of it focuses on the impact of corporate protocols on research, the reconfiguration of 
the relative power of administration and faculty, and the transformation of academic into casual labor, but 
little of it has addressed student debt” (53).  In that vein, on campus and in the classroom, students are often 
implicitly if not explicitly constructed as either dangerous victims of these protocols or, even worse, 
materialistic and anti-intellectual enemies against which professors and instructors must define and protect 
themselves.  This antagonistic orientation typically manifests itself in petty complaints about student 
grammar and spelling or condescending remarks about the hopelessly ignorant assumptions that students 
reveal on assignments or in class.  That orientation also significantly manifests itself in uninspiring syllabi-
contracts that effectively eliminate the kinds of (self-critical) ethical reflections that might legitimate and 
even popularize the humanities to students. 
7 See Antonio Gramsci’s “Political Struggle and Military War” in Selections from the Prison -otebooks for 
an extended analysis of this concept.  In short, because of the centrality of cultural and ideological 
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depended on relinquishing their defining military ethos and embracing the nonviolent 
bureaucratic skills that a liberal education would give them and especially their male 
children.8  Specifically, this study explores the subtle but recurrent way in which those 
theorists both employ materializing metaphors and recommend physical exercise in their 
treatises to get aristocratic men to see learning not as a debilitating and ultimately 
effeminating sedentary activity, but one comparable to the military training and 
engagement that had always defined for them legitimate performative masculinity.   
While the poster represents a comparable visualization of these rhetorical and 
curricular strategies, the attention that early modern educational theorists pay to the body 
and gender performativity represents a key interpretive difference: a difference, as I will 
return to, which suggests an instructive potential strategy for how we might 
performatively materialize a liberal education for our students without sacrificing its 
critically and politically engaged ethical purpose.  First, however, let us further establish 
the nature of that difference by considering an iconic painting of the most significant 
scholar and educational theorists of the early modern period: Hans Holbein, the 
Younger’s 1523 portrait of Desiderius Erasmus (see Fig. 2).  In this half-length portrait, 
we see Erasmus wearing a weighty fur-lined academic overcoat, as he stands in front of a 
plain stone parapet or ledge with his hands resting on a richly-dyed red leather-bound 
folio with the Greek inscription “HPAKΛΕΙΟΙ ΠΟΝΟΙ” written along its top edge and 
                                                                                                                                                 
institutions in Western capitalist societies, Gramsci argues that the seizure of power depends on subverting 
the dominant ideology with those institutions.         
8 For historical analyses of this educational revolution see Lawrence Stone’s Chapter XII entitled 
“Education and Culture” (672-683) in The Crisis of the Aristocracy and Ruth Kelso’s Chapter VI entitled 
“The Education of the Gentleman— In General” (111-129) in The Doctrine of the English Gentleman in 
the Sixteenth Century.  Also for important analyses of the affective and professional adjustment of 
aristocratic men to this sociopolitical and technological shift as prescribed and reflected in literary texts, see 
Jon Connolly’s “The Sword and The Pen: Militarism, Masculinity, and Writing in Early Modern England” 
and Jennifer C. Vaught’s Masculinity and Emotion in Early Modern Literature.           
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“ERASMI ROTERO” written along its fore-edge: “The Labors of Hercules”— “Erasmus 
of Rotterdam.”  Although the portrait, like the poster, visually and physically materializes 
learning (the expensive bound folio;9 the other bound books on the shelf over Erasmus’s 
left shoulder; the luxurious fur-lined coat; the gold ring with a diamond centerpiece on 
his left ring finger; and the portrait itself), the representation of the aging scholar at rest in 
isolation, functions somewhat like a memento mori in that it creates an anxious 
compositional-interpretive tension that qualifies, if not subverts, the portrait’s otherwise 
bold materialization of learning as a manly activity.10 
In “Reflections on Seeing Holbein’s Portrait of Erasmus with a Renaissance 
Pilaster,” William S. Heckscher explains this qualifying or subversive tension, which he 
characterizes as both “interblending emotions” (129) and “emotions and counter-
emotions” (129), in terms of the letter that accompanied the portrait as a gift to one of 
Erasmus’s longtime friends and benefactors: William Warham, the archbishop of 
Canterbury.  “What we find in the letter [and presumably the portrait],” Heckscher 
explains, “is a mixture of quasi-humorous self-deprecation, of fully justified 
hypochondria caused by a variety of physical ailments, of real anxiety prompted by 
attacks launched and pressures exerted from without” (129).  However, while this may be 
the case, the letter also contains confident expressions of Erasmus’s considerable 
sociopolitical worth comparable to the portrait’s bold materialization and its 
                                                 
9 See Kevin Sharpe and Steven Zwicker’s “Introduction: discovering the Renaissance reader” in Reading, 
Society, and Politics in Early Modern England for an informative discussion of the interpretive implication 
of the material book.   
10 In light of the forty-one “Dance of Death” sketches that Holbein produced between 1523 and 1526, it is 
reasonable to think of this portrait as well as several others — most notably The More Family Portrait 
(1527) and The Ambassadors (1533)—  in terms of the potentially subversive tension of the memento mori 
genre.  See chapter one (“At the Table of the Great: More self-Fashioning and Self- Cancelation”) of 
Stephen Greenblatt’s Renaissance Self-Fashioning for an interesting reading of the anamorphic death’s-
head in The Ambassadors.      
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masculinizing inscription.  Specifically, in that letter, he analogizes his learning to an 
army engaged in a three-front war (against the jealousy of humanists; theologians and 
monks; and especially Lutherans) and then quotes the exact payments he has received 
from the Pope and Archduke Ferdinand of Vienna for his efforts.  He also thanks 
Warham for increasing the pension that has allowed him to decline the several lucrative 
positions that would have proved burdensome at this late stage of his life.11 
That is all to say that Heckscher’s analysis only partially explains the portraits 
compositional tension, which, it is my contention, also crucially suggests the uneasiness 
of the irenic scholar with the recognition and support of powerful men engaged in 
(potentially) violent political and doctrinal struggles.  In that light, Holbein’s portrait 
arguably brings Erasmian and more generally humanistic pacifism together with 
aristocratic militarism in such a way that suggests a nonviolent ideological compromise, a 
compromise that hinges on an association of Hercules and learning peculiar to the 
Renaissance.12  That is, in order to compensate for the long and consistent tradition of 
associating eloquence with effeminacy, Renaissance writers, as Wayne Rebhorn explains, 
found in Lucian’s Gallic Hercules (see Fig. 3) “an ultra-masculine symbol of the orator” 
(309) who significantly derives his power from rhetoric and learning instead of physical 
                                                 
11 Therefore, Heckscher concludes, “If we now look at the composition as a whole, we find that Holbein 
has depicted Erasmus in a paradoxical state of existence— frozen and yet animated, hovering between 
health and illness, mortality and power of regeneration, between scholarly triumph on the one hand and on 
the other petty Envy opposing it frivolously, and existence alternating between the justified pride of the 
prince of humanists and the dependence of the freelance writer upon those who were pleased support him 
so that he might live in style”(144). 
12 For discussions of humanistic (specifically Erasmian) pacifism, see Paul C. Dust’s Three Renaissance 
Pacifists: Essays in the Theories of Erasmus, More, and Vives; chapter three (“The ‘Pacifist’ Tradition”) of 
Paola Pugliatti’s Shakespeare and the Just War Tradition; chapter five (“Humanism, War, and the 
Emerging Peace Ethic”) of Ben Lowe’s Imagining Peace: A History of Early English Pacifist Ideas, 1340-
1560.   
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and military strength.13  Therefore, while there have been several tenable interpretations 
of Holbein’s rendering of Erasmus’s hands resting on top of the Herculean text,14 we 
might also understand it as an allegorical point of contact and synthesis illustrating the 
preeminent humanist of the sixteenth century pacifying the violently corrupt proclivities 
of the early modern world with the gentle but authoritative touch of his scholarly hands. 
If we consider the portrait in terms of Erasmus’s lengthy commentary on the 
“Labors of Hercules” adage, it becomes clear that this reading of his hands on the 
identically labeled text also implies Erasmus’s belief in the religio-political function of 
humanistic learning and specifically the role of the politically engaged scholar.  After 
establishing that the adage can mean either “continuous and great exertions” (167) or 
“tasks of the kind that bring very great blessings to other people, but almost no return to 
the man who undertakes them, except a little reputation and a great deal of ill-will [or 
envy]” (168), Erasmus specifically identifies Hercules’s struggle against the Lernaean 
hydra as the most popular allegorization of that envious ill-will and then proceeds to 
explain its broader political implications: 
Remember too that what gentile mythology conveyed under the symbol of 
Hercules is suggested to us in Jewish history, wrapped up in the story of Joseph; 
for what Lerna was to Hercules, Joseph found in the jealousy of his brothers.  
This is how Philo interprets it in the essay called Political Life.  He thinks the 
figure of Joseph represents those who hold the reins of public affairs, as is 
indicated by the fact that, while he was still a shepherd, Joseph by well-doing both 
won his father’s favour and aroused the jealousy of his brothers.  And to rule a 
                                                 
13 See Wayne Rebhorn’s “Petruchio’s ‘Rope Tricks’: The Taming of the Shrew and the Renaissance 
Discourse of Rhetoric” for a discussion of the association of rhetoric and learning with masculine sexual 
violence.  Although I offer a quite different reading of the “rope tricks” reference in chapter eight (one that 
takes it as a reference to a particular masculine exercises rather than rape), I find Rebhorn’s discussion of 
the classical and renaissance gendering of rhetoric persuasive and useful.      
14 For instance, Heckscher reads Erasmus’s hands as signposts, indicating the tome as a gift within a gift to 
Warham; Lisa Jardine suggests that they rest “proprietorially” (45) upon “Erasmus’s edition of Jerome’s 
Letters” (45); and Matthias Winner suggests that they are “passively resting” (155) on the tome and, similar 
to my own reading, that their passivity suggests a nonviolent contrast to “the tempesta and atrocitas (the 
violence and ferocity) of [Martin Luther]” (159).  
 10 
 
commonwealth is surely nothing else but to play a shepherd’s part.  Homer, too, 
who is actually cited in Philo’s work, calls a king several times ‘the shepherd of 
his people’.  No men get a more niggardly return of thanks for their good deeds 
than those who do a service to the common people.  But what Hercules achieved 
by the use of Greek fire, Joseph secured by the greatness of his public services 
and the favour of heaven . . . .   
 Princes therefore, who have public business in their hands, ought to be 
animated by this spirit, so that they follow this example and look only to the 
public good, not using their office, for all the world as if it were some kind of 
mercantile activity, as a source of profit for themselves rather than other people. . 
. .  And if public opinion grudges your actions the response that they deserve . . . 
[is] to battle on undaunted for praise that will not die [, that is, the praise of God], 
to think what you can do for others no matter how great the cost to yourself, and 
to reckon it the finest and greatest reward of virtue, if you can promote the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number, imitating in that respect, as far as any 
mortal can, the immortal deity. (169-170) 
 
This lengthy passage, I think, showcases the broad and complex intertextuality of a 
Christian scholar erudite and accommodating enough to creatively identify in classical 
mythology and Jewish history a nonviolent Christian political ethos.  In other words, 
Erasmus’s expansive learning gives him the kind of inclusive historical and intellectual 
perspective that enables him to transform the physical prowess of Hercules into the 
loving and selfless governance of Joseph; that is, into the kind of governance conducive 
to the irenic domestic and foreign policies that Erasmus and other humanists believed in 
and argued for.15   
That expansive learning also allows him to turn what begins as a dull and 
unremarkably bookish exercise into one charged with the prescriptive urgency of a hybrid 
educational-political treatise.  As defined by such hybridity, those bookish exercises 
become physical ones with physical costs, which, like the Herculean labors of a 
committed politician, go unappreciated by every level of society.  Frustrated with both 
                                                 
15 However, this is not to suggest, as Shimon Markish does in Erasmus and the Jews, that Erasmus 
managed to transcend the normative anti-Semitism of his time.  See Arthur Cohen’s “Afterword” of 
University of Chicago Press edition for a persuasive critique of Markish’s conclusion.    
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the foolish apathy “among the [half- and un-educated] common herd” (170) and the anti-
intellectual conservatism of jealous academics, Erasmus sarcastically laments, 
Here’s your chance then, here’s a splendid reward on offer for all those protracted 
nights of study, all those efforts, all those sacrifices.  Cut yourself off from the 
pleasures of human life that all men share, neglect your worldly affairs, have no 
mercy on your appearance, sleep, or health.  Never mind loss of eyesight, bid old 
age come before its time, think nothing of the life you’ve lost; and the result will 
be to arouse the dislike of very many people and the ill-will of even more, and in 
return for all those nights of toil to win a few snorts of contempt.  Who would not 
be deterred by this from undertaking labour of the kind I speak of, unless he had 
the spirit of a true Hercules, and in his zeal to help others could “do and suffer 
anything.”  (170-171) 
 
Conveyed in the sarcasm of this passage, which Holbein’s portrait arguably translates 
into a self-assured smirk, Erasmus implies and later asserts that, despite it all, his 
scholarly productivity makes him the preeminent scholar of his time.  For our purposes, it 
is interesting and indeed important to note that this bit of self-promotion centers on 
ethically linking the life of the mind to the health of the body in a counter-intuitive 
figurative re-definition of physical strength.  That is, by emphasizing the deleterious 
effects of scholarly work on the body, Erasmus, in what amounts to a sacrificial Christ-
like gesture, encourages us to see his body as an inverse reflection of the political and 
scholarly strength transferred from his once-strong-and-healthy body to physically and 
politically weighty Herculean texts like the one under his hands in the portrait.   
This embodiment of scholarly labor importantly provides Erasmus with the 
masculinizing rhetorical means by which “to make [his] reader more sympathetic” (171) 
to what it takes and what it means to be a scholar.  In this specific commentary, he goes 
on to liken the otherwise dull and debilitating process of collecting and defining classical 
Greek and Latin adages to physical exercises like swimming, running, and hunting.  In a 
representative instance he explains,  
 12 
 
[F]or adages, like jewels, are small things, and sometimes escape your eyes as you 
hunt for them, unless you keep a very sharp look out.  Besides which they do not 
lie on the surface, but as a rule are buried, so that you have to dig them out before 
you can collect them.  And who can make an adequate estimate of the infinite 
labour required to seek out such small things everywhere, one might say, by sea 
and land?  One lifespan would scarcely suffice for the inspection and analysis of 
all those poets in both languages, those grammarians, those orators, those 
dialecticians, those sophists, those historians, those mathematicians, those 
philosophers, those theologians, when the mere listing of their titles would 
exhaust a man. . . .  But, I ask you, how small a part is it of all my labours?  An 
almost larger army of commentators lies in wait for you, some of whom by their 
idleness and inaccuracy and a certain number by pure ignorance . . . have added 
not a little to the burden of my labours. (172) 
  
Hunting and digging all over the scholarly world for precious artifacts buried within or 
beneath the textual sites of various ancient authors, Erasmus emerges as a crusading 
scholar— somewhat like an early modern Indiana Jones— fighting against an army of 
incompetent, lazy, and envious enemies to retrieve those artifacts and disseminate 
accurate knowledge about them as part of a morally justified mission.16   In effect, this 
performative embodiment of the scholarly process enables Erasmus to offer aristocratic 
men the violence of their traditional militarism in a symbolic or figurative form 
acceptable to the nonviolent exigencies of court politics as well as humanistic pacifism. 
As I have tried to show, this ideological compromise illustrates for us the way that 
the body functions as a synthesizing site for such rhetorical materializations.  However, 
this study’s main focus is not the prematurely aged and unhealthy body of the senex 
scholar, but rather the bodies of aristocratic male children socially constructed by the 
quite different somatic ideals and expectations of healthy male socio-sexual 
                                                 
16 See the May 23, 2008 Cosmos Magazine interview of Claire Smith, the head of the World 
Archaeological Congress, entitled “Indiana Jones: ‘Nightmare’ Archeologist” for a brief but interesting 
discussion of the serious ethical issues that such a performative masculinization of archaeology raises, 
issues such the commercialization of artifacts and the colonial and imperialist assumptions about artifacts 
vis-à-vis non-Western  native peoples.  But despite those questions, Smith also concedes, “"The great value 
of Indiana Jones for the archaeological community is that he makes a pedantic and exacting science appear exciting.”    
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performativity.17  Agnolo Bronzini’s Portrait of a Young Man with a Book (see. Fig. 4), 
which provides a complement to Holbein’s portrait of Erasmus, boldly represents the 
difference that those ideals and expectations make.18  In contrast to the metaphorical 
transfer of Erasmus’s physical health and strength to his scholarly text, Bronzino 
represents youthful virility and scholarly prowess as simultaneous and complementary 
states of being.  In other words, the healthy body of Bronzino’s young man stands as a 
synthesizing site balanced between traditional masculinity, which is represented by his 
left arm akimbo,19 and scholarly engagement, which is represented by his right hand 
propping up a book on a table with his index finger holding a page as if he is taking a 
break from his scholarly labor just long enough for Bronzino to represent his image.   
But despite these differences, Bronzino’s portrait also suggests a comparable 
pacifying ideological compromise, for the young man’s masculinity is defined by and 
against his learning rather than the typical symbols of military prowess: such as armor, 
swords, daggers, war horses, or even hunting dogs.  For Erasmus, the internalization of 
habituating reason during the early formative stages of development is essential to the 
disciplined balance on display in Bronzino’s portrait.  As Erasmus explains in A 
Declamation on the Subject of Early Liberal Education for Children, reason is that which 
enables us to become human by liberating us from the animal tendencies of our fallen 
nature.  If that rational capacity is not molded immediately through the early bodily 
habituation of the distinctively imitative nature of children, Erasmus warns that we 
                                                 
17 See note 21.   
18 In “Bronzino, Castiglione, and A Self-Portrait: Re-evaluating Bronzino’s Trip to Pesaro,” Heather L. 
Sale Holian argues that The Portrait of a Young Man reflects the courtly ideals articulated in Castiglione’s 
The Book of the Courtier; that Bronzino, like Castiglione, was inspired by a trip to the Della Rovere court 
in Pesaro.     
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quickly absorb habits that, in effect, make us sexually promiscuous animals.  
Furthermore, in Erasmian thinking, imitative bodily habituation precedes and enables 
rational-ethical development.  Significantly, this understanding derives from the classical 
tradition.  In Plato’s Republic, Socrates concludes his description of the proper 
educational method and content for members of the guardian class with a rhetorical 
question that applies generally: “[H]ave you not observed that imitations, if continued 
from youth far into life, settle down into habits and second nature in the body, the speech, 
and the thought?” (640).  In The -icomachean Ethics, we find a similar and perhaps more 
famous expression from none other than Alexander’s teacher, Aristotle: 
Moral virtue comes about as a result of habit . . . .  For the things we have to learn 
before we can do them, we learn by doing them . . . we become just by doing just 
acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, [and] brave by doing brave acts. . . . 
 This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in 
our transactions with other men we become just or unjust. . . .  It makes no small 
difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very 
youth; it makes a great difference, or rather all the difference. (29) 
 
Later classical theorists, particularly Quintilian and Plutarch, elaborate on the character-
shaping function of habituation in their educational writings, and, to return to A 
Declamation, Erasmus urgently and powerfully brings these insights to bear on early 
modern educational thinking in an effort to counter aristocratic anti-intellectualism as 
well as change violent educational practices.  That is, by all accounts, the typical 
schoolroom was not characterized by the gentle and loving instruction of free children 
advocated by classical and humanistic educational theorists.  Children were instead 
subjected to a grueling curriculum enforced by the practice and ever-present threat of 
corporal punishment: “So schools,” Erasmus angrily laments, “have become a torture-
                                                                                                                                                 
19 In “The Renaissance Elbow,” Joaneath Spicer explains, “In the wider context of narrative from which 
portraiture takes many of its cues, the arm akimbo is found widely, but not randomly: typically a male 
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chamber; you hear nothing but the thudding of the stick, the swishing of the rod, howling 
and moaning, and shout of brutal abuse.  It is any wonder, then, that children come to 
hate learning?” (325). What Erasmus attempts to do in A Declamation to eliminate this 
inconsistency between the highest of humanistic ideals and the brutal realities of 
educational practice is argue for the early habituation of children: 
A young child, I agree, is not ready for Cicero’s [On Duties], Aristotle’s Ethics, 
any of Seneca’s and Plutarch’s moral treatises, or St. Paul’s Epistles.  
Nevertheless, a child who misbehaves at the dinner-table is corrected, and 
expected from then on to behave properly.  When he is taken to church, he is told 
to kneel, fold his hands, uncover his head— in short, assume a pose of complete 
reverence; and when mass is being celebrated, he must be silent and raise his 
eyes to the altar.  Children are taught these first beginnings of good behavior and 
proper devotion before they can even speak; these principles remain with them 
into adulthood and thus contribute in no small way to the growth of true 
spirituality. . . .  
To think that these first imitations of goodness, whatever their nature may 
be, are of no avail towards the child’s moral progress is in my view a serious 
moral mistake. . . .  Therefore, just as small acts of wrongdoing habitually 
repeated amount to great sin, so also, small acts of goodness, habitually repeated, 
amount to great virtue.  It is the young who most easily acquire the good, since 
they possess that natural flexibility which enables them to bend in any direction, 
are not as yet enslaved to bad habits, and are readily inclined to imitate whatever 
is suggested to them. . . .  Goodness, then, is best instilled at an early stage, for 
once a certain pattern of behaviour has been imprinted upon a young and 
receptive mind, that pattern will remain. (318; my italics)  
 
This theory of habitual imitation is in large part a response to “those silly women,” as 
Erasmus identifies them, or “men very much like women” who conclude “that the 
benefits derived from study at this [early formative] stage are too slight to justify either 
the expenditures required of the parents or disturbances created in the lives of these 
fragile creatures” (299).  “Good behavior” and “proper devotion” are prerequisites to the 
development of the moral and faithful mind— of language comprehension, of 
understanding, of spirituality, ultimately of the soul— and Erasmus recommends that 
                                                                                                                                                 
military figure registering self-possession and control, either the assertion of success or defiance” (86).   
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fathers systematically habituate their children’s bodies— their knees, hands, heads, 
mouths, and eyes— within the disciplinary networks of early modern domestic and 
religious rituals.  A few years after A Declamation, Erasmus reiterates this association of 
mind and body in On Good Manners for Boys.  Specifically, in the process of itemizing 
the physical gestures and behaviors that best reflect or infer a well-ordered mind, he, 
under the subheading “On behavior in church,” powerfully articulates the determinative 
understanding of bodily deportment in the following injunction: 
While the sacred mysteries are being enacted [in church], with every fibre in your 
body striving towards the state of reverence, let your face be turned towards the 
altar, you mind towards Christ.  Touching the Ground with one knee while the 
other is upright supporting the left elbow is the gesture of the impious soldiers 
who addressed the Lord Jesus in mockery, “Hail, King of the Jews!”  You should 
kneel on both knees with the rest of the body slightly bowed in veneration. 
(280).20 
 
This understanding of the practical embodied nature of belief— of the gestures most 
conducive to faith and those antithetical to it—  is what Althusser describes in his second 
thesis of ideology as “the materiality of ideology” (162).  After asserting in his first thesis 
that “[i]deology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence” (162), Althusser concludes that “an ideology always exists [in 
the material existence of] an apparatus, and its practice, or practices” (166).  That is, 
despite the “imaginary distortion” of ideology, the “ideas” of a subject ultimately exist in 
his or her actions, a state of affairs which Althusser laconically but powerfully expresses 
by paraphrasing Blaise Pascal’s reflection “Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and 
you will believe” (168).  Pierre Bourdieu, who I will return to in my chapter-six  
discussion of embodied memory and historical forgetting in Rabelais’s Gargantua, was 
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also deeply influenced by this emphasis on the gestural-ritualistic basis of belief or 
ideological domination, as he warns us that “concessions of politeness [such as, ‘sit up 
straight’ or ‘don’t hold you knife with your left hand’] . . . always contain” (69) the kinds 
of “political concessions” (69) central to Erasmus’s educational theory.                                  
 Specifically, this association of manners and the mind is Erasmus’s answer to the 
question that governs A Declamation: “[W]hy should children not be fit to be instructed 
in letters if they can be taught good behaviour at [an early] age?” (297). 21  But to arrive 
at it, he engages in a rhetorical strategy that so repetitively links the cognitive 
development of children to bodily and material conditions and processes— like 
swaddling, nursing, good manners, the molding of wax, the cultivation of plants, and 
even animal training— that the distinction between the two ultimately fades away.  For 
instance, at one point, Erasmus warns his readers, 
Unless you mould [sic] and shape the mind of your child, you will be the father of 
a monster, not a human being.  If your child were born with some physical defect, 
with, for instance, a cone-shaped head, a humpback, a club-foot, or six fingers on 
each hand, how upset you would be and how ashamed to be called the father of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 See Ramie Targoff’s Common Prayer: The Language of Public Devotion in Early Modern England for 
an analysis of the continued belief in the transformative capacity of external practice in post-Reformation 
England.   
21 Of course, this optimistic theory of child development existed in a tense relationship to the pessimistic, 
biblical understanding of human fallenness: what Erasmus describes as the “disposition to evil. . .deeply 
ingrained in us” (321).  Indeed, at times, it seems as if Erasmus is contradicting himself, as if he is talking 
about two completely different kinds of human natures, really completely different kinds of human beings.  
But of course, he is significantly attempting to synthesize the two understandings in such a way that serves 
the pedagogical and social interests of a society deeply rooted in both understandings.  This practical and 
philosophical tension—that, to varying degrees, was at the center of educational and political disputes 
throughout the period—is perhaps best described by the term Christian humanism and perhaps best 
illustrated on the early modern stage some seventy years after A Declamation was published by 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet.  Both these texts pivot complexly and anxiously on the question: is it possible for 
human beings to rise above their bodily or animal desires to realize and act in accordance with their godlike 
capacity to reason?  Shakespeare, writing after the Reformation, that is, after the emphasis on grace and 
divine providence of Luther and Calvin was securely rooted in England, answers somewhat modestly: “Let 
be.”  Erasmus, on the other hand, as I have indicated, is the classical optimist, believing strongly in the 
ability of a liberal education— Greek and especially Latin literacy— to enable us to suppress our sinful 
nature by developing the deeply implanted seeds, as he often terms them, of virtue or reason.  This study, 
therefore, roughly follows a trajectory from Erasmian optimism to Shakespearean pessimism, from the 
most optimistic of humanistic and Reformation ideals to the tempering of those ideals.  
 18 
 
freak rather than a human being.  Can you remain insensitive, then, when your 
child’s mind is deformed? (305). 
 
Just a few sentences later, Erasmus vividly characterizes the newborn child as an ultra-
imitative “shapeless lump [of material] . . . capable of assuming any form” (305) and then 
proceeds to implore fathers that “[they] must so mould it that it takes on the best possible 
character” (305; my italics).  The rhetorical materialization of the mind in A Declamation 
is so persistent that whether “it” refers to the mind or the body is no longer clear or even 
important, for Erasmus’s point is to get us to understand both in terms of the other and 
subject both to the same processes.  The body, as we are reminded by the considerable 
weight of early modern body scholarship in the past few decades, 22 was indeed very 
much on the minds and thought a part of the minds of early modern thinkers.  
It is indeed ironic that A Declamation— a text centrally concerned with 
distinguishing human beings from animals by emphasizing reason as a natural 
characteristic— would end up spending so much time analogizing the shaping of the 
infant mind to animal training and the maternal care of infant bodies.  But Erasmus is at 
pains to conceptualize the mind in terms that his intended readers and potential patrons 
can understand and ultimately accept.  Indeed, as Mary Thomas Crane points out, 
“Humanists who acted as tutors to a royal or noble family in the early years of the 
sixteenth century felt the aristocratic resistance to their programs” (101).   In a sense, 
Erasmus, by constantly employing bodily and animal analogies, materializes the mind, 
that is, gives the mind bodily substance, to persuade his aristocratic male readers that 
                                                 
22 See Sean McDowell’s “The View from the Interior: The New Body Scholarship in Renaissance/Early 
Modern Studies” for an overview of that scholarship, which he also describes as the emerging field of 
historical phenomenology.  He also critically evaluates that scholarship vis-à-vis the older historicism of 
the 1930s-1960s.  
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they, rather than mothers and nurses, should control the early shaping of their male 
children’s bodies.  
By employing materializing metaphors and focusing on the body in this way, 
Erasmus and other educational theorists perform the textual equivalent of Bronzino’s 
portrait in treatises otherwise devoted to teaching Latin grammar and classical texts.  In 
other words, it is the mind-body unity of humoral, specifically Galenic, medical 
discourses that both allowed those theorists to take seriously the general benefits of 
health and provided them with the conceptual and rhetorical means by which to 
persuasively embody learning as a nonviolent alternative to aristocratic militarism.  The 
problem is that this rhetorical function has largely been neglected by education and 
literary scholarship.  That scholarship roughly falls into three categories: older and more 
traditionally oriented scholarship that, in a quasi-Cartesian manner, pays short shrift to 
questions of embodiment and focuses instead on curricular content and specifically the 
reception of classical authors; more recent innovative scholarship that uses Marxist and 
other postmodern paradigms to explore the sociopolitical implications of embodied 
subjectivity; and lastly scholarship that complexly straddles the other two categories, as 
they attend to questions of discipline and subjectivity.23  Of course, aspects of all three 
                                                 
23 First-category studies include T.W. Baldwin’s William Shakspere’s Small Latine and Lesse Greeke, Joan 
Simon’s Education and Society in Tudor England, and Kenneth Charlton’s Education in Renaissance 
England.  Second-category studies include Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine’s From Humanism to the 
Humanities, Richard Halpern’s Poetics of Primitive Accumulation, Jonathan Goldberg’s Writing Matter, 
and Lynn Enterline’s forthcoming study entitled Shakespeare's Schoolroom: Rhetoric, Discipline, Emotion.  
Enterline introduces sections of her study in Peter Holland and Stephen Orgel’s From Performance to Print 
in Shakespeare’s England under the title “Rhetoric, Discipline, and the Theatricality of Everyday Life in 
Elizabethan Grammar Schools”; she has also presented sections of her study in various forums, and I was 
fortunate enough to attend her presentation at the 2010 Renaissance Society of America conference in 
Venice, Italy.  While Enterline’s study promises to provide a smart and thorough account of early modern 
educational theory and practice, my concern is that her dependence on Lacanian psychoanalysis prevents 
her from appreciating the inherent tension in or imperfection of an imitative model of learning that sets 
vastly different bodies—the aged schoolmaster and the youthful pupil— in imitative relationship to each 
other.  Third-category studies include Rebecca Bushnell’s A Cultural of Teaching, Mary Thomas Crane’s 
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inform this study, but what significantly distinguishes it is a more sustained, historically 
contextualized focus on the medicalized bodies materialized in educational treatises and 
literary texts.   
What also distinguishes this study is that it brings the critical orientation of early 
modern body scholarship to bear on early modern educational treatises by taking 
seriously (male) children as embodied subjects and the psychosomatic implications of 
early modern childrearing.  While early modern body scholarship has indeed provided, as 
Sean McDowell recently observed, “a greater degree of historical sensitivity” to the 
humoral constitution of the gendered, racialized, and even classed bodies of early modern 
adult subjects, it has strangely had virtually nothing to say about the bodies of children 
and how differently they are constructed by the period’s medical and educational 
treatises.  Roughly situated between Gail Kern Paster’s embarrassed, gendered subject 
and Michel Schoenfeldt’s empowered, self-fashioning one, that scholarship typically 
assumes an adult subject in an adult body empowered or oppressed by the complexities of 
early modern medical discourses.  Even when the fetal or infant body emerges, as it does 
in Paster’s seminal study The Body Embarrassed, it does so primarily to draw attention to 
the particularity of the maternal body. 24   
                                                                                                                                                 
Framing Authority, Jeff Dolven’s Scenes of Instructions, Marie Rutkoski’s The Mouth of Babes, Julian 
Koslow’s Laureate Poetry and Humanist Literary Pedagogy in the English Renaissance, and Andrew 
Wallace’s Virgil’s Schoolboys.          
24 Paster draws on a wealth of classical and early modern medical writings to illustrate and, as I would say, 
materialize the important part that disciplines of shame played in gendering early modern bodies, that is, 
the part that patriarchal discourses played in pathologizing the incontinent, menstruating, pregnant, and 
nursing bodies of women.  Emphasizing the agency involved in people’s ability to regulate their own body, 
Schoenfeldt, in his study Bodies and Selves, charges, “Paster tends to pathologize the leaky body, to see it 
as the site of something socially embarrassing” (15).  In her most recent study Humoring The Body, Paster 
responds, “I do disagree in part with Schoenfeldt’s central thesis about ‘the empowerment that Galenic 
physiology and ethics bestowed on the individual’ (11).  The implications of such phrasing— that all 
persons are equal under the laws of Renaissance Galenism— simply ignores the realities of social and 
gender hierarchy everywhere in the period. . .” (21).  Other studies include Jonathan Sawday’s The Body 
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Interestingly though, the more I attempted to draw attention to the bodies of 
(male) children, the more I realized that a full account of them required also giving an 
account of the female bodies that they emerged from.  And in doing so, this study 
attempts to bring the critical orientation of feminism, early modern body studies, and 
masculinity studies to bear on early modern educational treatises in an original way.  In 
that spirit, I devote much of chapter two— “Boys Don’t Cry: Prince Edward and the 
Performative Emergence of the Male Child from the Female Body”— to the birth, 
infancy, and education of Edward Tudor.  I begin with the considerable mystery 
surrounding Jane Seymour’s long and difficult labor and the likelihood, as the feminist 
historian Jennifer Loach suggests, that she died twelve days after giving birth to Edward 
as a result of the intervention of royal doctors in the birthroom.  I explain the likelihood 
or, at least, the plausibility that Henry ordered that intervention and the subsequent 
displacement of midwives in terms of the period’s masculinist medical treatises, which 
identify women and both their minds and bodies as defective and therefore threatening 
necessities to the survival and development of the vulnerably and ambiguously 
constituted bodies of male children.  According to the caloric economy of Aristotelian 
and Galenic notions of sex-gender difference, women’s bodies are imperfect because 
weaker, colder and more moist than men’s, and the male child’s eventual emergence 
from that imperfection requires his engagement in the kinds of activities that will allow 
him to performatively embody his future social-sexual role as a legitimate man.  Physical 
exercise is crucial to that goal, and the pediatric sections of the medical treatises I 
consider identify, as Aristotle before them, crying as an early form of physical exercise 
                                                                                                                                                 
Emblazoned, Carla Mazzio and David Hillman’s The Body in Parts, and Kathryn Moncrief and Kathryn 
McPherson’s Performing Maternity in Early Modern England.  
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that begins the masculinizing process of expelling effeminating fluids in the form of 
tears, nasal mucus, and saliva. 
Like these medical treatises, the educational ones are indeed haunted by the 
unstable nature of sex-gender difference.  And for as much as they are concerned with 
Latin and Greek curricular content and pedagogical methodology, they also, as I have 
shown with Erasmus’s A Declamation, pay considerable attention to the somatic-
disciplinary practices required to establish and maintain adult male identity.  As those 
medical treatises, they too recommend physical exercise as a defining or distinguishing 
form of performative masculinity.  Specifically, in opposition to the notorious 
masculinizing violence of early modern grammar schools, the major English treatises of 
the sixteenth century— Sir Thomas Elyot’s The Book -amed the Governor (1531), Roger 
Ascham’s The Schoolmaster (1570), and Richard Mulcaster’s Positions Concerning the 
Bringing Up of Children (1581)— take seriously Galen’s assertion that physical exercise 
is essential to mind-body health and promote such activities as a nonviolent alternative by 
which to turn boys into men.  In sum, these treatises are so focused on— really obsessed 
with— the vulnerably constituted bodies of male children and the health benefits of a 
proper diet and exercise, because they are haunted by the authoritative role of women 
during early child development.  That is why, as I argue, each treatise ironically 
constructs and employs aristocratic women, specifically Elizabeth, as negative-sedentary 
somatic ideals against which the female knowledge and authority of mothers, nurses, and 
midwives are implicitly critiqued and displaced and the psychophysiological superiority 
of aristocratic men confirmed.  
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The next three chapters are devoted to the specific way in which this anxious 
masculinizing process is played out in each treatise.  In chapter three, “Sir Thomas Elyot 
and the Domestication of Male Aggression in The Book -amed the Governor (1531), I 
argue that this attention to the body allows Elyot to recommend couples dancing as a 
moderate, nonviolent alternative to traditional military training.  Significantly, by 
replacing the tiltyard and the battlefield for the dance-floor and male-only armed combat 
for hetero-social couples dancing, Elyot recommends the symbolic violence of couples 
dance to sublimate traditional male aggression.  In chapter four, “Gentle Instruction and 
the ‘Lay[ing]’ Queen in Roger Ascham’s The Schoolmaster (1570),” I similarly argue 
that, in the course of constructing Elizabeth I and Lady Jane Grey as negative-somatic 
ideals, Ascham recommends physical exercise as a nonviolent alternative to corporal 
punishment— in a sense a nonviolent way of making the male child cry— that retains, 
even as it redefines, the masculinizing rite de passage function of grammar schools.  And 
in chapter five, “Richard Mulcaster’s (Ig)noble Lie and the Body Politic in Positions 
Concerning the Bringing Up of Children (1581),” I argue that Mulcaster’s Positions is a 
late-sixteenth century version or, we might say, translation of Socrates’s “noble lie” 
justifying social stratification articulated in Plato’s Republic.  Specifically, by defining 
the performative mind-body aptitude of aristocratic boys as rare jewels and precious 
metals in the body politic, Mulcaster proposes a subtly and perhaps insidiously restrictive 
grammar school admissions policy that effectively justifies the exclusion of women and 
non-aristocrats.   
Much of the period’s literary production confronts the behavioral and affective 
implications of the demilitarization of masculinity and the resultant masculinization of 
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learning through crises of masculinity variously registered in terms of the unruly and 
threatening female body.  Chapters six and eight— with chapter seven helping to shift 
emphasis from the education of boys to girls— focus specifically on the complex and 
creative ways in which Rabelais and Shakespeare process both medical and educational 
discourses in two texts: respectively, Gargantua and The Taming of the Shrew.              
In chapter six, “Ass-Wiping Intelligence: Memory, Forgetting, and Social Control 
in François Rabelais’s Gargantua (1534),” I argue that Rabelais registers Gargantua’s 
emergence from the grotesque body of his mother as well as the influence of incompetent 
midwives and lascivious nurses in terms of his precocious knowledge of ass-wiping 
bodily cleanliness, a knowledge which inspires his father to hire a male tutor 
(Poncrates/Powerbrain) to implement a proper humanistic educational program.  That 
program effectively masculinizes Gargantua by subjecting him to a rigidly scheduled 
regime of bodily care focused on proper diet and exercise.  Also, significantly, that 
program was only able to begin after a doctor literally purging Gargantua’s brain of any 
memories of that early formative period of his anxious material embodiment.    
In chapter seven, “Women’s Bodies, Gender-Appropriate Learning, and Political 
Agency in Humanist Thought,” I explore the way in which humanists—specifically 
More, Elyot, and Vives— synthesize biblical and classic theories of women’s 
embodiment in an attempt to resolve the period’s “confusion,” as Paster describes it, 
generated by the presence of learned and even politically significant women in classical 
and early modern history.  Despite their advocacy of women’s learning and their implicit 
acceptance of women’s capacity to rule, those humanists should not be seen as proto-
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feminists, because the somatic terms of their resolution allows them to continue to see 
women as weaker and therefore politically and educationally inferior to men. 
In chapter eight, “‘Nothing but sit, and sit, and eat, and eat’: Rhetorical Agency 
and Nonviolent Performative Masculinity in The Taming of the Shrew (1594),” I argue 
that Petruchio’s tortuous taming technique focuses on the gendered body as essential to 
individual and societal reformation.  Building on the previous chapter, this chapter 
explores the paradoxical relationship between mind-body unity and women’s rhetorical 
agency.  As a challenge to the most celebratory feminist readings of the play, I argue that 
to read Katherine’s speech as evidence of empowered agency requires one to ignore the 
extent to which speech and agency are embodied, constrained, and often ironically 
complicit with the very patriarchal forms of oppression it may be seeking to oppose.  In 
fact, Petruchio’s taming technique itself illustrates an effective nonviolent disciplinary 
process by which to turn potentially subversive speech into complicit speech.  But for as 
much as The Taming is about taming a shrewish woman, it is also significantly about a 
crisis of masculinity.  The play, in other words, raises important questions, as do many of 
Shakespeare’s other texts (Othello, Hamlet, Titus, Coriolanus, The Rape of Lucrece, etc.), 
about the appropriate nonviolent role of men in domestic and political life.  Petruccio’s 
nonviolent taming technique, therefore, demonstrates to the other male characters and 
perhaps Shakespeare’s audience that the translation of traditional male aggression into 
the nonviolent domestic and political spheres is necessarily played out on the woman’s 
body. 
As a further reflection on the theoretical implications of this critical orientation, 
the epilogue, “Can the [Renaissance Woman] Speak?,” draws on Gayatri Spivak’s 
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influential essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” to illustrate just how complex and 
pessimistic is Shakespeare’s understanding of women’s rhetorical agency at this early 
stage in his career, specifically as reflected in The Rape of Lucrece and Titus Andronicus.  
In an attempt to counter the type of disciplinary and theoretical antagonism that often 
results in simplistic and celebratory reading of women’s speech and agency, I define my 
study as a profeminist study of early modern masculinity—one, in other words, that 
relates issues of male children’s embodiment and the expectations of performative 
masculinity to women’s embodied speech— to show that such disciplinary and 
theoretical inclusiveness is crucial  to understanding the complex and interrelated 
constructions of both men and women.       
The expansiveness of Erasmus’s erudition is perhaps only matched by the 
pervasiveness of his influence— and more generally the influence of humanistic 
thought—  over educational thinking throughout early modern Europe.  It is precisely this 
pervasiveness that transformed this project from one initially conceived as a narrowly 
focused study of sixteenth-century English educational theory to one that attempts to 
illuminate those texts within a much broader historical and geographical, that is, 
humanistic, framework.  The following chapters are ordered and developed in such a way 
to illustrate both that interdisciplinary expansiveness, specifically as it relates to 
embodiment, and that geographical transcendence.  From the classical (medical) 
knowledge that traveled across the Alps through France and Germany and into Tudor 
England in time to construct the bodies of Jane Seymour and Prince Edward to early 
modern educational treatises and literary texts variously shaped by that knowledge, this 
study pays considerable attention to classical as well as contemporary non-English 
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writers.   And while I attempt to do some justice to that expansive and transcendent 
quality, by no means do I intend the sum total of these chapters as anything close to a 
comprehensive study of early modern education or culture.  Such a project, I humbly 
confess, would have indeed proven a Herculean task way beyond my scholarly powers.  
Rather, by humanistic standards, my scholarly goals remained quite focused and 
relatively modest: demonstrate the significance of classical theories of gendered 
embodiment to early modern education and argue that those theories provided the 
conceptual means by which to masculinize learning and demilitarize performative 
masculinity in a way consistent with the nonviolent exigencies of court society and the 
nonviolent political ethics of many of the period’s humanists. 
That focus and modesty notwithstanding, it is my belief that this attention to the 
ethically-constructed body also carries precisely the serious revolutionary potential 
necessary to make the case for the political relevance— indeed the urgent necessity— of 
the humanities in our society.  Driven by both that sense of urgency and the belief that 
current cultural theory has lost its relevance because it has lost and forgotten its political 
and moral purpose, Terry Eagleton develops a Marxist interpretation of Aristotelian 
ethics in his recent book After Theory:  “Ethics for Aristotle,” Eagleton explains, “is a 
sort of sub-branch of politics.  Nobody can thrive when they are starving, miserable or 
oppressed, a fact which did not prevent Aristotle himself from endorsing slavery and the 
subordination of women.  If you want to be good, you need a good society” (128).  While 
taking issue with these exclusionary aspects of Aristotelian values, as I take issue with 
the classical and biblical misogyny that informs early modern educational theory, 
Eagleton nevertheless recognizes in Aristotle’s political—that is, real, practical, material, 
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and institutional— ethics a potential corrective to the abstract, trivial, politically evasive, 
and therefore uninspiring strains of cultural theory.   
Importantly, for Eagleton, the common material realities of the body make 
political ethics possible.  As he explains,  
The material body is what we share most significantly with the whole of the rest 
of the species, extended both in time and space.  Of course it is true that our 
needs, desires and sufferings are always culturally specific.  But our material 
bodies are such that they are, indeed must be, in principle capable of feeling 
compassion for any others of their kind.  It is on this capacity for fellow-feeling 
that moral values are founded; and this is based in turn on our material 
dependency on each other.  (156) 
 
The specific function of such a “materialist morality” (181), as he later terms it, is to re-
educate our bodily desires, and what that means in a deeply materialistic and 
individualistic society such as our own is that we must redefine our relationship to 
property and other material possessions, like the ones on display in the poster that opened 
this study.  He continues, 
To perceive accurately, we must feel; and to feel we need to free the body from 
the anaesthesia which too much property imposes on it.  The rich are insulated 
from fellow-feeling by an excess of property, whereas what impoverishes the 
bodies of the poor is too little of it.  For the rich to repair their own sensory 
deprivation would be for them to feel the privations of others.  And the result of 
this would be a radical social change, not just a change of heart. (184) 
 
In terms of the poster, this materialist morality would, for instance, inspire a re-drafting 
that minimizes material possessions and actually represents racially and culturally diverse 
people— the diversity, in other words, of the human body— peacefully and lovingly 
coexisting in a justly ordered society.  This, of course, is all easier said than done, 
especially when we consider that petty consumption and bourgeois fantasies of wealth 
also often anesthetize the poor to their own suffering.  In fact, Eagleton is never really 
explicit about how to inspire people, rich or poor, to accept such a radical reorganization 
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of society.  Perhaps that is because implicit in his political ethics is a faith in education 
and specifically the inspirational and transformative power of literary and philosophical 
expression.  For instance, King Lear represents for him one of the most powerful and 
presumably inspirational illustrations of the idea of a materialist morality, because it is 
only after Lear has been stripped of everything and exposed to the elements that he can 
understand physical suffering and identify his suffering with that of the poor: 
 Poor naked wretches, wheresoe’er you are, 
 That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm, 
 How shall your houseless heads and unfed sides, 
 Your loop’d and window’d raggedness, defend you 
 From seasons such as these?  O, I have ta’en 
 Too little care of this!  Take physic, pomp;  
 Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel, 
 That thou mayst shake the superflux to them, 
 And show the heavens more just.  (3.4. 28-36) 
 
The early modern medicalized body represents for Eagleton, as it represents for the 
literary figures and educational theorists I examine throughout this study, a compelling 
material and figurative site upon which to imagine what just social change would look 
like and feel like.  This study was conducted in that spirit. 
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Chapter Two: 
Boys Don’t Cry: Prince Edward and the Performative Emergence of the Male Child 
from the Female Body 
 
On October 12, 1537, all the hopes of the Tudor dynasty rested on the survival of 
a new-born boy.  As we know, the birth of Prince Edward was the realization of Henry 
VIII’s desire to continue the Tudor line through a male heir, a desire that proved stronger 
than his faith and loyalty to the Catholic Church as well as his first two wives, Catherine 
of Aragon and Anne Boleyn.  Catherine and Anne, as we also know, produced two 
female children: Mary and Elizabeth respectively.  But what is little discussed and 
perhaps little known is that they also suffered a combination of seven failed pregnancies.  
For Henry, in the providential milieu of early sixteenth-century England, the birth and 
survival of a male heir would have suggested divine justification for his break with the 
Church as surely as the inability to produce one would have suggested divine disfavor. 25  
Therefore, it is not surprising that, once his third wife, Jane Seymour, became pregnant, 
Henry took the greatest care to ensure the birth and survival of a son.  One of the 
provisions of that care was placing royal physicians on stand-by just in case Jane’s 
midwives experienced any difficulty during the latter stages of the “lying-in” period of 
labor and delivery.  Jane’s labor was particularly difficult and painful, and it is likely that 
at some point royal physicians— most likely Drs. George Owen, John Chambre, and 
William Butts— took over.  However, this transfer of power, as recent historians have 
theorized, arguably cost Jane her life.  Twelve days after giving birth, she died of massive 
bleeding or a “natural laxe” because the physicians likely failed to remove the entire 
                                                 
25 These realties also significantly defined Henry’s own early life.  His older brother, Arthur, died suddenly 
at the age of fifteen, leaving the ten-year old Henry the heir apparent.  And his mother, Queen Elizabeth, 
died in childbirth attempting to produce another male child just in case Henry himself died before 
producing an heir. 
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afterbirth: “An experienced midwife” Jennifer Loach tells us, “would routinely check the 
afterbirth to make sure that it was completely extruded, but Jane was cared for by the 
royal doctors— distinguished academics whose practical experiences was very small.  A 
lesser woman might have received better treatment” (7). 26  In the following chapter, I 
attempt to situate the likelihood or, at least, plausibility of Henry’s interventionist actions 
within the masculinist medical discourses that construct women— specifically mothers, 
midwives, and wet-nurses— as threatening necessities to the survival and development of 
male children.   
Because it was still thought inappropriate for men to touch the genitalia of women 
in need of gynecological or obstetrical care as late as the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, Henry’s decision to have physicians step in to deliver Edward represents a 
complex intervention of royal and patriarchal authority. Indeed, childbirth represented 
one of those rare instances when men relinquished their direct patriarchal authority to the 
expert experience of women.  “Very few men,” David Cressy explains, “gained intimate 
entry into the birthroom or knew what happened behind the screen [that shielded a 
                                                 
26 As my repetition of “likely” indicates, considerable mystery, debate, and speculation shroud the history 
of Edward’s birth and Jane’s death.  However, it is striking how little attention has been paid to the likely 
presence of midwives and the subsequent transfer of power to the royal doctors.  See the following 
biographies for examples of that neglect: John Edward’s Literary Remains of Edward VI (1857); Hester W. 
Chapman’s The Last Tudor King (1959); W. K. Jordan’s Edward VI: The Young King (1968); Jennifer 
Loach’s Edward VI (1999); and Chris Skidmore’s Edward VI: The Lost King of England (2007).  Indeed, 
most commentators and historians have been and continue to be more concerned with what disease killed 
Jane and the role that the physicians played in her death: puerperal fever, Caesarean section, or, most 
recently, Loach’s suggestion of catastrophic hemorrhaging as a result of a partially removed placenta.  To 
my knowledge, nothing in the historical record suggests that Henry completely excluded midwives and 
other women from the birthing room.  Hence, my suggestion that, at some point, the physicians took over 
due to Jane’s long and difficult labor.  As I will discuss, this intervention is consistent with what the 
obstetrical treatises of the period recommended.  One of the few sources that includes this intervention are 
the several ballads on Jane’s death.  In several of them, Jane herself implores the midwives to summon a 
doctor to perform a C-section. See Francis James Child’s  The English and Scottish Popular Ballads  for 
nine versions of the ballad on Jane’s death.  Also, see Richard L. DeMolen’s “The Birth of Edward VI and 
the Death of Queen Jane: The Arguments for and Against Caesarean Section” for a review of the 
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laboring woman’s body]. The transformation [of pregnant women’s bodies] belonged to a 
powerfully gendered domain” (15) with the midwife at its center.   In Midwiving Subjects 
in Shakespeare’s England, Caroline Bicks argues that early modern midwives performed 
the crucial functions of shaping the bodies of infants into early modern subjects as well as 
interpreting the bodies of adult subjects, both women and men.  Midwives were the first 
to touch and handle newborns and were therefore required to perform a series of neonatal 
procedures that were thought to have determining socio-sexual consequences.  Bicks 
explains,  
When the midwife cut the umbilical cord, she allegedly controlled the size of the 
tongue and genitals, anatomical sites whose proportions determined the 
performative success of masculine and feminine roles; and when swaddling the 
malleable newborn body or pressed its head, she molded it into either a deformed 
or perfect figure that supposedly shaped the infant’s fortunes and character” (4). 
 
In the second instance, in routine gynecological exams or court searches, midwives were 
often authorized to determine a woman’s virginity.  And specifically, in annulment cases, 
midwives “were brought into medieval and early modern courts to examine and handle 
husband’s genitals . . . either making a man’s erection and proving the possibility of 
consummation or else making nothing and proving him impotent” (4).   
By way of contrast, the presence of surgeons and physicians in the birthing room 
was often associated with imminent death.   As Jean Donnison explains in Midwives and 
Medical Men, 
All [the surgeon] could do . . . before the invention of the midwifery forceps in 
the seventeenth century, was remove the infant piecemeal by use of hooks and 
perforators, or if there was still hope of delivering a living child, to perform a 
Caesarian section on the body of the mother after death . . . .  [Therefore, the 
surgeon’s] advent in the lying-in room presaged the death of the mother or child, 
if not both.  (2) 
                                                                                                                                                 
speculation around Jane’s death.  However, DeMolen argues for a C-section, a conclusion I find 
implausible.     
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In Jacques Guillemeau’s early seventeenth-century obstetrical treatise entitled Childbirth 
Or, The Happy Delivery of Women (a text I will discuss at length later on), it is indeed 
somewhat startling, in light of Guillemeau’s emphasis on the educated care and 
gentleness of surgeons and physicians vis-à-vis the incompetent rashness of midwives, 
that he includes large illustrations of the obstetrical instruments— namely, a ten to twelve 
inch crotchet and a large knife— used for the matter-of-factly or clinically described 
piecemeal delivery of dead fetuses.  And while it is understandable that the gruesome 
procedure was often necessary to save a woman’s life, it also makes sense that these 
instruments, which law prevented midwives from using, arguably represented a powerful 
metonymic association with the fatal and violent masculinist intervention of physicians 
and surgeons.27   
In any event, it appears that the association of the doctors and surgeons with 
birthroom deaths was not lost on the English public or Henry’s Catholic enemies.  
Almost immediately after Edward’s birth, it was rumored in London that Jane died during 
her long and difficult labor because Henry ordered the doctors to perform a Caesarian 
section, and versions of that rumor spread throughout Catholic countries in an attempt to 
villainize Henry for his break with the Catholic church.  In what is perhaps the most 
                                                 
27 Generally, Guillemeau attempts to counteract that professionally damaging association, and, in one 
instance, he even warns the surgeon that if a woman in labor is weak and in extreme distress, “then hee 
must forbeare for fear least he be blamed, and thereby discredit those means which should have profited, 
and may also doe good unto others” (124).  Loach’s plausible theory of the partial removal of Jane’s 
afterbirth notwithstanding, we cannot definitively say who or what was to blame for Jane’s death.  In an 
October 31 letter to the English ambassadors to France, Thomas Cromwell, Henry’s Lord Privy Seal, 
concludes that Jane died because of “the faulte of them that were about her, which suffred her to take greate 
cold and eate such thinges that her fantazie in syknes called for” (LP, XII, ii, 1004).  While this conclusion, 
rooted in Galenic humoralism, is, as we now know, without scientific merit, it is, however, interesting that 
Cromwell doesn’t identify “them that were about her”: doctors or midwives, men or women, or both.  
Perhaps, in the spirit of Guillemeau’s advice, Cromwell’s use of the gender neutral “them” is an attempt to 
protect the reputation of the all-male medical profession— and specifically the reputation of  the doctors 
who delivered Edward— by blaming midwives. 
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extreme version, a contemporary document now in the Vatican Library asserts that 
“Henry caused Jane’s death . . . ‘by having all her limbs stretched for the purposes of 
making a passage for the child, or (as others stated) having her womb cut before she was 
dead’” (qtd. in Loach 4).  In a 1581 version, Nicolas Sanders, a Catholic priest living in 
England at the time of Edward’s birth, writes that Henry authorized the C-section after 
cruelly reasoning that ‘he could easily provide himself with other wives” (qtd. in Loach 
4).  At this point, several important questions emerge.  Where did these rumors come 
from and what made them plausible?  And, with the association of doctors with 
birthroom deaths in mind, why would Henry authorize such a radical masculinist 
intervention— of course, assuming that he did— that likely claimed his wife and exposed 
him and even his children to horrible anti-Henrician and anti-Tudor rumors? 
 The answers to these questions are to be found in a confluence of several medical-
historical and biographical factors.  Throughout the early modern period, various forms 
of the plague visited London and the surrounding areas on a regular basis, claiming 
thousands of people at a time.28  And in the specific case of the early Tudor period from 
about 1485 to 1551, England was hit at least five times by a particularly virulent form of 
the plague known as the sweating sickness or the English sweat.  “It impressed 
contemporaries,” Paul Slack, a social historian of the early modern period, explains, 
“because it was spectacular.  It killed within twenty-four hours.  It attacked a community 
suddenly and then was gone” (25).  Henry was terrified of dying without producing a 
male heir, and the sudden and devastating visitations of the plague as well as other 
potentially fatal illnesses no doubt intensified his fear of death.  In an attempt to avoid a 
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summer 1517 outbreak, Henry fled London with his court for Richmond, then Richmond 
for Greenwich, and then Greenwich for Windsor.  While at Windsor, he dismissed most 
of the members of his household to prevent contact with potentially infected people, and 
he only conducted the most necessary business of state.  As we will see, similar measures 
were taken to preserve Edward’s health.  Indeed, as the diplomat Stephen Gardiner 
describes, “the mere words ‘sweating sickness’ were ‘so terrible to His Highness’s ears 
that he dare in no wise approach unto the place where it is noised to have been’ ” (qtd. in 
Weir 203).  Also, thinking that sickness was one of God’s ways of punishing sinfulness, 
Henry spent a good deal of this time in relative seclusion praying for God’s mercy.   
 However, Henry didn’t just run and pray.  He also tried to develop a cure. In fact, 
over the course of his life, he developed more than thirty remedies for the sweating 
sickness and various forms of the plague; he also developed remedies for an assortment 
of other ailments from itching to testicular tumors.  Significantly, this complex 
interconnection of fear, faith, and scientific effort reflects the Christian humanism of the 
period and specifically Henry’s qualified enthusiasm about classical learning and the 
potential of that learning to advance the scientific knowledge that would enable humanity 
to control— or at least strongly influence— its somatic and environmental realities. 
Central to that effort was the regulation and improvement of medical and surgical 
practices in England.  In the first decade and a half of the sixteenth century, almost 
anyone in England could practice medicine or perform surgery, and, as we have seen with 
the rumors around Edward’s birth, people perceived surgeons and doctors with extreme 
suspicion and seriously doubted their ability.  Henry and his doctors were committed to 
                                                                                                                                                 
28 See the introduction to Keith Thomas’s Religion and the Decline of Magic entitled “The Environment” 
for a sense of how precarious was life in pre-industrial society.  Also, see Andrew Wear’s Knowledge and 
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changing that perception, and the recurrent outbreaks of epidemic disease provoked his 
sense of urgency concerning public health enough for him to allow his first principal 
doctor, Thomas Linacre, to implement the types of educational and professional measures 
necessary to reform English medicine.  The first measure was the Medical Act of 1512, 
which prevented anyone from practicing medicine within the City of London or within a 
seven-mile radius unless he passed “a compulsory examination administered by the 
Bishop of London, who was to be advised by four physicians and surgeons” (Furdell 23).  
When that measure failed, Linacre committed himself to establishing a College of 
Physicians modeled after comparable institutions in Italian cities, and, in the wake of the 
summer outbreak of 1517, he was able to persuade Henry to found the Royal College of 
Physicians the following fall in September 1518.  The College assumed the geographic 
jurisdiction of the 1512 act as well as the licensing authority of the Bishop of London; 
and in 1523 that authority “was broadened to include all of England” (Furdell 23).  While 
the absence of any enforcement mechanism made it impossible to control who actually 
practiced medicine, the existence of a licensing educational institution “for the first time 
extended recognized professional status for medical practitioners” (Furdell 23).  In the 
specific case of surgeons, things were just as chaotic, and Henry, with the urging of his 
sergeant-surgeon Thomas Vicary, united the two exiting companies of Surgeons and 
Barbers in 1540 (see Fig.5).  The statutes governing the union granted the Company full 
parliamentary authority, clearly distinguished the procedures peculiar to each group, and 
also stipulated that the Company was to be allotted the bodies of four executed felons 
each year in the interest of advancing surgical education. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Practice in English Medicine, 1550-1680. 
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Indeed, these institutional measures as well as Henry’s own collection of remedies 
demonstrate just how enthusiastic he was about improving English medicine.  However, 
that enthusiasm was also significantly defined by a sexist dark side.  In her recent book-
length study of medieval and early modern medicine aptly entitled Making Women’s 
Medicine Masculine, Monica Green, primarily focusing on Italian sources from the 
twelfth to the early sixteenth century, argues that male medical practitioners “moved well 
beyond their earlier ‘hands-off’ advisory role to a more active engagement both 
intellectually and clinically with the diseases of women” (265).  This “masculine birth of 
gynecology,” as Green terms it, represents a significant chapter in the history of medicine 
and specifically of the Renaissance, as it effectively excluded women from the care and 
understanding of their own bodies:   
Thus we are left in the rather heretical position of concluding that by the end of 
the Middle Ages, the women who received the best medical care according to the 
standards of the time were upper-class women of northern Italy.  By breaching, at 
least partially, the taboo against male inspection of the female genitalia, north 
Italian male practitioners were actually able to bring to women something 
approaching the same quality of care they gave their male patients.  (317)  
 
In light of Henry’s desire to advance English medicine, it only makes sense that he would 
want to provide Jane with the best medical care.  And, as I have already pointed out with 
the founding of the Royal College of Physicians, that meant modeling institutional 
reforms and medical practices after northern Italian medical universities.  The University 
of Padua was thought to have the best medical school in Europe and ambitious English 
medical students and other non-Italian students went their for the advanced training not 
available in their own countries.29  Linacre was just such a student, receiving his medical 
                                                 
29 See Jerome J. Bylebyl’s “The School of Padua: Humanistic Medicine in the Sixteenth Century” in 
Charles Webster’s Health, Medicine, and Mortality in the Sixteenth Century for a brief but detailed 
description of that advanced training.    
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degree at Padua in 1496.  Several of Henry’s other doctors appointed or temporarily 
employed over the course of his reign possessed Paduan or other Continental medical 
degrees, and at least one of them— John Chambre— who attended and perhaps 
intervened during Jane’s labor and delivery was educated at the University of Padua as 
well.  So, whether doctors intervened or not, these historical-biographical details help to 
explain why it would have made sense for Henry to order them to do so and why people 
at home and abroad assumed that he did.   
The horrible rumors surrounding Jane’s death illustrate that the professional 
legitimacy of doctors and surgeons and specifically the masculinization of women’s 
medicine still had a long road to travel in England.  In that direction though, by mid-
century, the religious establishment required midwives to become licensed in accordance 
with the Medical Act of 1512, a process which entailed paying a fee, providing character 
witnesses, and taking “a solemn oath swearing to obey the rules of conduct which the 
Church hath laid down for their practice” (Donnison 6).  But because that process did not 
include an examination of obstetrical knowledge and practices, surgeons and physicians 
attempted to regulate what the midwives knew and did through the translation and 
publication of Continental, specifically German and French, obstetrical and 
gynecological treatises.  
 Significantly, it was through these treatises that English and other northern 
European doctors and surgeons advanced the masculinization of women’s medicine 
started in Quattrocento Italy and possibly initiated in England by Henry and his doctors 
on the body of Jane Seymour.  For instance, in 1540, Richard Jonas published an English 
translation of Eucharius Rösslin’s 1513 German midwifery textbook The Rose Garden 
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for Pregnant Women and Midwives as The Birth of Mankind: Otherwise -amed, The 
Woman’s Book.30  The Rose Garden was one of the first obstetrical treatises published in 
a vernacular language, and its major unacknowledged source text, as Monica Green has 
recently identified, is Michele Savonarola’s Practica major, a text central to the 
masculinization of women’s medicine in Quattrocento Italy: “Through Rösslin’s 
unacknowledged deployment of Savonarola’s obstetrics, therefore, the northern Italian 
model of the midwife as a subordinate assistant to the male physician or surgeon was 
transmitted to . . . all of western Europe” (270).  In that spirit, in his dedicatory epistle to 
Queen Katherine Howard, Henry’s fifth wife, Jonas explains that his translation is 
intended to strengthen and clarify the understanding of the few “right expert, diligent, 
wise, circumspect, and tender” (206) midwives and to oppose the damage done by the 
majority who are “full undiscreet, unreasonable, churlish, and far to seek [that is, at a 
loss]” (206) in gynecological and obstetrical matters.  In the revised and expanded 1546 
edition, Thomas Raynalde, a physician and the new editor, echoes Jonas’s opposition to 
unqualified midwives in his “A Prologue to the Women Readers”  and describes 
precisely how the treatise has influenced birthroom practices: 
And truly (as I have been credibly informed by diverse persons worthy to be 
believed), there be, sith the first setting forth of this book, right many honourable 
ladies and other worshipful gentlewomen which have not disdained, the oftener 
by the occasion of this book, to frequent and haunt women in their labours, carry 
with them this book in their hands, and causing such part of it as doth chiefly 
concern the same purpose to be read before the midwife and the rest of the 
women then being present. (21) 
 
Raynalde’s “Women Readers” are like medical missionaries, taking Rösslin’s treatise 
where men could not and converting other birthroom women— ladies, gentlewomen, and 
                                                 
30 See the introduction of Elaine Hobby’s recent (2009) critical edition of The Birth of Mankind for a 
detailed history of the text and its English editors.  
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midwives— from the practically developed (and therefore “erroneous”) knowledge of 
midwives to the academic (and therefore “expert and correct”) knowledge of medical 
men.  In this powerfully but simplistically constructed binary of good doctor/bad 
midwife, any opposition to the doctors’ physical or textual intervention is dismissed as 
ignorant, irrational, envious, churlish, etc.  So, while the birthroom remained the 
midwife’s domain, the pressure and influence of the religious and secular-medical 
establishment threatened and ultimately qualified her authority over that space.          
Although Guillemeau’s Childbirth Or, The Happy Delivery of Women was 
published in English about seventy-five years after Jane’s death, it, nevertheless, gives us 
a complex account of the classical justification for the displacement of medical women 
that would have made sense to the early sixteenth century.  In other words, despite its 
date and Guillemeau’s birthing innovations, there is ultimately nothing new about the 
justification for male superiority.  For instance, he ironically starts his section on 
midwifery by citing the many classical figures— Hippocrates, Ovid, Origen, Galen, 
etc.— who provide compelling evidence of women’s medical knowledge and obstetrical 
skills as documented in classical mythology and history.  However, Guillemeau, in his 
retelling of Hyginus’s story of Agnodicea (or Hagnodice), is careful to point out that that 
knowledge and skill developed as much out of necessity as intellectual curiosity.  In the 
story, Agnodicea disguises herself as a young man (specifically by cutting off her hair 
and wearing men’s clothing) to subvert the Athenian law preventing women from 
studying and practicing medicine.  After her training, she proceeds to build a clientele of 
sick and suffering women by secretly revealing her actual sex to prospective patients too 
embarrassed to seek care for “their naturall parts” (80) from male doctors.  The male 
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doctors grow suspicious and attempt to prosecute Agnodicea in a court of law for 
deceiving and abusing sick women.  It is at this point that Agnodicea dramatically 
removes her clothing in open court to reveal her actual sex to the Areopagites (the chief 
magistrates and judges of the city) in a way that perhaps rivals or even surpasses anyone 
of Shakespeare’s cross-dressing comic heroines.  This powerful nonverbal somatic-
gestural defense is also a confession of the far greater crime of a woman having studied 
and now practicing medicine in Athens.  But the “chiefest women” of Athens, the very 
sick and suffering modest women that she restored to health, come to her rescue, arguing 
that if the Athenian men convict Agnodicea then they will prove themselves the enemies 
of women.  In short, Agnodicea has proven a female doctor capable and, more 
importantly, necessary.  And with the testimony of her patients, the magistrates and 
judges change Athenian law to allow women to study and practice medicine. 
Of course, on one level, this is a wonderful story of sociopolitical and judicial 
subversion and transformation.  But on another level, it is a more conservative story 
about the measured concession of the masculinist establishment on the grounds of 
medical and social necessity.31  In other words, Agnodicea’s initial intellectual curiosity 
isn’t gender or sex specific.  It is only after she completes her medical training, that is, 
after she acquires the misogynistic knowledge and potential power of male doctors, that 
she appears to recognize the women’s health crisis in Athens, a crisis resulting from the 
                                                 
31 While I respect Bicks’s and Cressy’s attempts to read midwives in terms of their relative agency and 
authority in early modern cultural and political production, I fundamentally disagree with these types of 
celebratory readings.  Perhaps a reflection of the life experiences that have significantly shaped my own 
more cautious—even pessimistic— critical-interpretive inclinations, I find Wendy Arons’s understanding 
of early modern midwifery a far more plausible critical-interpretive starting point: “Although there is no 
denying that midwives were edged out of the field of women’s health care by medical men, it is a bit 
romantic to assign to the early modern midwife a position of power, even if she did have primary control 
over women’s health issues.  For as Helen Callaway points out, ‘childbirth takes place within a male-
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conflict between the need to expose one’s body for medical treatment and women’s 
unwillingness to expose their bodies to male doctors.  As Gail Kern Paster argues in The 
Body Embarrassed, medical discourses and emerging discourses of shame intersected in 
the early modern period to construct women’s bodies as embarrassing because “suspect 
and unstable” (174) or as one early modern writer describes them, “unclean, filthy, and 
foul” (qtd. in Paster 174).  For Guillemeau and other medical authorities, the cold and 
moist humoral tendency of the female body was, strangely enough, harmful to fetal 
development and even explained miscarriage: “Another cause of [miscarriage],” 
Guillemeau suggests, “may bee the over-much fullness & moistness wherewith women 
abound, and chiefly in their womb” (71).  Guillemeau also claims that “the cause of 
[measles and smallpox] are the reliques of the impure part of the blood, wherewith the 
child was nourished in the Mothers wombe” (99).  Significantly, in the Agnodicea story, 
Guillemeau makes no mention of men’s bodies or men’s health, for presumably the 
women’s health crisis is such that Agnodicea doesn’t even have a chance to see or 
imagine seeing male patients.  In other words, in this story, the pathologized bodies of 
women, as opposed to the absent, normalized, and presumably healthy or, at least, not-
too-diseased bodies of men, are such problem bodies— such sites of disease, lust, 
embarrassment, deception, etc.— that Agnodicea’s initial intellectual curiosity is 
immediately channeled, limited, or, as Guillemeau himself describes it, “constrained” 
(80) by the material “realities” of other women’s bodies and the misogynistic medical 
discourses that pathologically materialize them to educated men and women.  In a sense, 
to borrow Katherine Maus’s conclusion that “What makes [early modern] women 
                                                                                                                                                 
dominated cultural system which considers female sexuality to be inherently dangerous and controls it 
through strong ritual restrictions’” (11).               
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fertile— what makes them women— also renders them stupid” (184), or, as she more 
tactfully states, “unfit for intellectual pursuits” (183), Agnodicea’s cold and moist body 
connects her to other women but also conveniently limits her intellectual capabilities and 
therefore her professional possibilities. 
Significantly, this story represents a microcosmic anecdotal instance of the 
qualified and constrained acceptance of medical women that runs throughout 
Guillemeau’s treatise and that sets the stage for the their eventual displacement.  In fact, 
the first sentence of the section devoted to midwifery raises doubts about whether the 
midwife is necessary at all: “Daily experience doth shew us,” Guillemeau begins, “that 
many women are delivered without the help of the Mid-wife” (79).  He later explains that 
birth is a miracle of nature that “cannot be comprehended . . . but only wondred at, and 
admired” (86) and “that the faults of Nature are very rare, and that she worketh always, 
and in such order, and measure, that of a thousand births, there is scarce one found that is 
amisse” (86).  In other words, Guillemeau reduces the midwife to a virtual witness of a 
natural process that would in all likelihood take place without her, and therefore he 
concludes that “neither the Midwife nor any of her assistants, ought to doe anything 
rashly, but suffer nature to worke” (86).  To emphasize the point, Guillemeau explicitly 
criticizes midwives and nurses that violate this passive, largely observant orientation.  
“Some Midwives,” Guillemeau describes, “either through ignorance or impatience, or 
else being hastened to go to some other womans labour, doe teare the membranes with 
their nailes, let forth the water, to the great hurt and danger, both of the poore woman and 
her child” (94).  In another instance, he recounts the story of the fatal consequences of a 
nurse “who took upon her[self] to be a Midwife” (135) in the delivery of a 
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gentlewoman’s baby by violently pulling the afterbirth, which presented itself before the 
baby: “I have set downe this Story more at large by reason of the great sorrow I took for 
this Gentlewomans death, whom I had delivered twice before with mine own hands, 
coming not soone enough to help her the third time” (136).  In yet another instance, he 
describes a midwife’s failure to recognize the birth of twins: 
for I myself was present not long since, at the delivery of an honest woman, who 
brought two children: and when she was delivered of the first, the Midwife (not 
expecting that there was a second) was already to draw out the after burthen, but 
that I perceived another offer itself, at the passage, which it came naturally, so 
was she delivered thereof very fortunately. (170) 
 
Specifically, the point that he’s making in these examples, as he states in the introduction, 
is “if the midwife be at the farthest end of her skill, then if they will save the child, and 
consequently the mother from death: they must call a Chirurgion to deliver her, & bring 
the child into the world” (Sig. ¶2r).  
 It is important to understand that these medical women represented a professional 
threat, because their expertise, as Agnodicea’s, was persuasively rooted in their bodily 
and experiential knowledge.  In an effort to displace medical women, Guillemeau and 
others work to persuade women of the professional competence and discretion of 
surgeons and physicians while at the same time characterizing medical women as too 
rash, ignorant, and violent, or, in short, incompetent.  Indeed, although Guillemeau seems 
to suggest that a midwife would have been better qualified than a nurse to deliver the 
baby, the birthing complication that claimed the gentlewoman’s life exceeds, as any and 
every complication, the professional limitations that he places on women.  But, in 
Guillemeau’s all-encompassing erudite masculinist tone and positioning, women are even 
displaced from those natural and uncomplicated instances.  In that regard, it is perhaps 
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telling that he doesn’t explain the complicating circumstances that led to the exclusion of 
a midwife in his delivery of the gentlewomen’s previous two children.  All that matters is 
that he, with his superior knowledge and skill developed over forty years, safely 
delivered two of her children with his “own hands” and that a rash, ignorant, and violent 
nurse-midwife caused her death before his arrival.  In other words, it is clear that he 
knows women’s bodies better than women.  
 The myth of women’s psychophysiological inferiority also qualified and 
displaced nurses and wet-nurses, who were responsible for nourishing and shaping the 
bodies of infants in the nursery.  In his description of swaddling, Raynalde’s employs an 
arboreal trope, perhaps the most common analogy for children’s bodies in the period, to 
illustrate the long-term effects of correct and incorrect swaddling methods on the bodies 
of infants: 
 For in this is it, as it is in young and tender imps [that is, saplings], plants, and 
twigs, the which, even as you bow them in their youth, so will they evermore 
remain unto age.  And even so the infant, if it be bound and swaddled, the 
members lying straight and upright.  If it be crookedly handled, it will grow 
likewise.  And to the ill negligence of many nurses may be imputed the 
crookedness and deformity of many a man and woman, which otherwise might 
seem as well-favoured as any others.  (155)   
 
This “ill negligence,” which threaten both physical and mental consequences, haunts the 
period’s educational treatises, as we will begin to explore in this chapter and continue in 
the next.  Also, the lactating body of the nursing mother or, in many instances for the 
gentry and aristocracy, the wet-nurse was defined by the same humoral complexities— 
the same misogynistic medical knowledge— that necessitated the intervention of male 
doctors in the birthroom.  In the humoral economy of bodily fluids, breast milk was 
thought a whitened form of uterine blood and was therefore as potentially dangerous to 
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newborns as the unstable, unclean and too-moist uterus was to fetuses.  To protect 
infants, Guillemeau and Raynalde recommended the careful scrutiny of every aspect of 
the mother’s or wet-nurse’s milk, for indeed, as Cressy tells us, “all sorts of moral 
qualities as well as physical nourishment were believed to pass from the breast to the 
lips” (90).  Anything but white moderately viscous milk was thought deleterious to the 
physical health and character or dispositional development of infants.  So, despite 
insisting as a moral obligation that mothers nurse their own children, medical authorities 
also considered colostrum— the thick and yellowish first flowings of milk— poisonous 
to infants and recommended a period of precautionary wet-nursing.  Both Guillemeau 
and Raynalde list several factors that should go into selecting a wet-nurse, and Raynalde, 
in particular, clearly spells out the humoral basis of this selection process in his first and 
fourth recommendations:  
First, that [the wet-nurse] be of a good colour and complexion. . . .  [And forth] 
that she be good and honest of conversation, neither over-hasty or ireful, nor sad 
or solemn, neither too fearful or timorous, for these affections and qualities be 
pernicious and hurtful to the milk, corrupting it, and pass forth through the milk 
into the child, making the child of like condition and manners.  (157)  
   
In an effort to control these essential but dangerously unreliable bodies, medical thinkers 
recommended the subjection of  these women to strict dietary and behavioral guidelines, 
even after their breasts had stopped producing colostrum.  For instance, Guillemeau 
orders nursing women to avoid “bad aire, and all kinde of stinking smells” (8) as well as 
salty and spicy meats and any food with strong flavors, such as onions, leeks, garlic, 
mustard, and “all kind of Baked Meates, and old cheese” (8).  Instead, he recommends 
moderate portions of easily digestible meats, like veal, mutton, chicken, kid, partridge, 
and “such like meates which are of good juice” (9).  He also recommends that nursing 
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women abstain from sex, because “carnal copulation (as Galen saith) troubleth the blood, 
and so by consequence the milke” (4).  However, he also asserts that nursing women 
“must use moderate physical exercise, and chiefly before meales: For moderate physical 
exercise doth strengthen the naturall heat, and consumeth all superfluities” (10).  Because 
of the inherent permeability and resultant instability of the humoral body, nursing 
mothers and wet-nurses were positioned either as nourishing or poisonous to the infants 
under their care, and these dietary and behavioral regulations were thought necessary to 
protect the vulnerably constituted bodies of children.   
Like women, infants and young children were thought to have moist, imperfect 
bodies, and many of the remedies and cures for their illnesses were intended to establish 
and maintain bodily temperatures conducive to a healthy humoral balance.  As I have 
already suggested with Henry’s appointment of royal doctors to oversee Edward’s 
delivery, Henry was so concerned to protect Edward’s delicately constituted body that he 
also issued a royal proclamation on the same day forbidding anyone residing in the 
plague-ridden London area from attending the christening three days later on October 15.  
In that spirit, in another document detailing the management of Edward’s nurseries, 
Henry ordered that the households be kept meticulously clean and that access to as well 
as the health of Edward’s body be strictly regulated.  The quarters were to be scrubbed 
and swept twice daily; no one with access to Edward’s privy chamber or his person was 
permitted to travel to London during the summer or other times of plague; no one below 
the rank of knight was allowed in Edward’s presence; no one was allowed to touch 
Edward without Henry’s permission, and, if granted, that touch was limited to a 
supervised kiss on the hand; the poor and sick, begging for alms, were to be kept far from 
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the gate to prevent the spread of infection; Edward’s food had to be tested in large 
quantities before he was allowed to eat it; and Edward’s new or newly washed clothes 
had to be “purely brushed, made clean, aired at the fire, and perfumed thoroughly” 
(Edward xxvii) before he could wear them. 
 These regulations of protective somatic proximity— which reveal a significant 
association between social rank, specifically poverty, and infectious disease— also 
involved a gendered hierarchy of care which illustrates the essential but essentially 
qualified role of women that we have witnessed in the period’s medical thinking.  As the 
epistolary record suggests, Cromwell served as liaison between Henry and those men and 
women Henry appointed to manage Edward’s household.  Specifically, Henry selected 
“his trusty servant” Sir William Sidney to serve as chamberlain “as well to have the 
keeping, oversight, care, and cure of . . . the whole realm’s most precious jewel the 
Prince’s grace, and foresee that all dangers and adversaries of malicious persons and 
casual harms . . . shall be vigilantly foreseen and avoided” (Edward xxvii).  To help 
Sidney with these duties, Henry also appointed John Cornwallis as steward, Richard Cox 
as almoner, George Owen as physician as well as a vice-chamberlain, a comptroller, and 
a conferrer.  While, of course, several women— including a governess (Lady Margaret 
Bryan), a wet-nurse, four rockers, and later a dry nurse (Sybil Penne) — were a part of 
Edward’s inner-most circle, they occupied a relatively low level in that hierarchy of care, 
a level, ironically, that existed in an inverse relationship to their proximity.  For instance, 
Henry insisted on the presence of one or several of the appointed men—specifically the 
chamberlain, the vice-chamberlain, and/or the comptroller— during key situations that 
rendered Edward particularly vulnerable: namely, meeting strangers and the preparation 
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of his food as well as his clothes.  And, as I will soon discuss, when women were no 
longer deemed necessary, that is, when Edward was old enough to do without them, 
Henry discharged them and remodeled Hampton Court in anticipation of Edward’s 
formal education.                         
Despite these types of managerial and dietary efforts, children, as Raynalde’s tells 
us, continued to suffer from “infinite diseases” (161), and both Raynalde and Guillemeau 
also include significant sections devoted to identifying and curing common pediatric 
illnesses, such as diarrhea, constipation, nasal congestion, hiccups, insomnia, nausea, 
colds, bladder stone, epilepsy, scrotal swelling, etc.  Although these remedies—except, of 
course, scrotal swelling— generally pay little attention to sex-gender distinctions, 
Guillemeau makes one key recommendation with significant implications in that 
direction.  After charging mothers and wet-nurses to feed infants a little at a time even if 
they cry “because the stomach at first is but weak” (20), Guillemeau continues, “a little 
crying can do him no great harm, but rather may serve for some good use: For it makes 
him run at Nose, shed tears, and spit: it purges his brain, yea, and stirs up his natural 
heat, and also dilates the passages of the breast” (20; my italics).  This recommendation, 
with its consistent use of masculine pronouns, suggests the emergence of a male child 
from “his” dependence on the maternal body.  While, as I have said, all children are 
necessarily and quite literally connected to women in their common somatic 
imperfection, the male child’s eventual emergence from that imperfection necessarily 
defines his future social-sexual identity as a legitimate man.  In that vein, another French 
physician, Laurent Joubert, before arguing that the moment before a woman’s period 
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produces girls because the womb is moist and cold and the moment immediately after 
produces boys because the womb is dry and warm, asserts, 
Now, without a doubt, the male is more worthy, excellent, and perfect than the 
female: witness the authority and preeminence God has given him, constituting 
him as lord and master over his wife.  Thus, the female is, as it were, a defect, 
quite unable to improve.  For nature aims always to make her work perfect and 
entire; but if the matter is not apt for the endeavor, she approaches as closely as 
she can the perfect.  Thus, if the matter is not apt and fitting for the forming of a 
son, she makes a daughter out of it, which is (as Aristotle says) a mutilated and 
imperfect male.  (107)  
 
The ironic female personification of nature notwithstanding, Joubert’s natural 
justification for male perfection and domination, of course, carries significant 
implications for the sex-gender development of early modern boys and girls, men and 
women.  But despite Joubert’s confident, binaristic understanding of both sex 
differentiation and sex-gender assignment, it is important to keep in mind that the 
womb— that unclean, unstable, and potentially poisonous organ that we have 
discussed— is where sex differentiation takes place.  In the humoral-physiological 
thinking of the period, the conception of a perfect child— a male child—hinged on the 
warm dryness of that naturally cold and moist and therefore imperfect place.32  Many 
classical and early modern medical theorists, as a result, thought that women had to be 
erotically stimulated and had to achieve orgasm—had to, in other words, be transformed 
                                                 
32 See Karen Newman’s Fetal Positions: Individualism, Science, Visuality for a historical account of the 
way that “certain modes of visualizing science have profoundly determined ‘fetal politics’ and the 
contemporary abortion debates” (2).  Newman argues that the political right’s success results from its 
ability to shape the abortion debate around images and rhetoric of individual autonomy and human rights.  
In the specific case of fetal images, the right produces what Newman terms “the ideology of fetal 
personhood” by representing the solitary fetus in such a way that “effaces women’s reproductive bodies” 
(8).  “In feminist accounts,” she continues, “the image of a solitary fetus and the erasure of the woman’s 
body demonstrate a certain set of social relations in which women and their bodies are subject to men. . .” 
(8).  Importantly, Newman traces these autonomous images back to classical and early modern sources, 
including Rösslin’s Rose Garden.  While generally persuasive, Newman’s characterization of the absent 
woman’s reproductive body and the passive womb within which the autonomous male fetus resides isn’t 
consistent with those early modern sources that represent the womb as a potentially poisonous and partially 
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temporarily into orgasmic caloric men— for conception to happen.  As Stephen 
Greenblatt explains in a creative reading of Shakespearean comedy in terms of the 
anatomical homology and the humoral instability that defined the early modern “one-sex” 
body, “through heat the struggle between the male and the female seed is determined, and 
again through heat the genital structure of the male emerges from its hidden place, and 
again through heat ejaculation and orgasm are produced” (85).33   
While related, the kind of heat that I’m concerned with is not the erotic or genital 
sort at the center of Greenblatt’s reading, but the not-so-sexy although equally 
masculinizing calisthenic heat generated by Guillemeau’s crying male child.  As Bruce 
Smith points out, “In Galenic physiology, masculinity consists not, as modern 
psychoanalytical theory would have it, in the possession of a penis, but in the possession 
of the hot, moist34 complexion of which the penis is but one sign” (37).  Most likely 
referencing the end of book seven of Aristotle’s Politics, Guillemeau presents crying as 
essentially a form of physical exercise that triggers the male child’s “natural heat,” which 
in turn expels effeminating fluids in the form of tears, nasal mucus, and saliva.35  Not 
unlike our own society’s sexist and homophobic association of girls’ and women’s 
athletics with lesbianism and boys’ and men’s athletics with hyper-masculine 
                                                                                                                                                 
determinative site.  In that regard, those images, considered out of textual context, perhaps represent a 
fantasy of  male-fetal autonomy.                   
33 There are several critiques of Greenblatt’s as well as Thomas Laqueur’s argument for the male-
teleological drive of the one-sex body, most notable of which are Patricia Parker’s “Gender Ideology, 
Gender Change: The Case of Marie Germain” and Gail Kern Paster’s “The Unbearable Coldness of Female 
Being: Women’s Imperfection and the Humoral Economy.”  Although, as Stephen Orgel points out in 
Impersonations that “outside the professional scientific community [anatomical] homology remained the 
predominant theory (24), Parker complicates the notion of natural male perfection by illustrating the many 
instances in the historical record of male coldness, effeminacy, and impotence.  Paster critiques both Parker 
and Laqueur for misrecognizing the classical and early modern theory of vital heat, which represented a 
more foundational method of defining maleness and femaleness than genital difference.                 
34 Unless Smith is referencing a specific theorist, he probably means “dry” here.  In Galenic thought, men 
were generally thought hotter and dryer than women. 
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heterosexuality, physical exercise played a crucial role in sex-gender assignment and 
identity in the early modern period.  The difference, of course, is that physical exercise in 
the early modern period was not merely thought behavioral confirmation of a biologically 
rooted pre-discursive and pre-socialized psycho-sexual essence, but the type of 
prescriptive or prohibited behavior that in and of itself promised or threatened to 
transform boys, girls, and women into men. 
Significantly, Greenblatt’s creative exploration implicitly acknowledges the 
importance of physical exercise as a part of a potentially transformational process in his 
recounting of one of Ambroise Paré’s examples of an ostensibly prodigious sex change:  
Paré recounts several such cases, including that of a fifteen-year-old peasant girl 
named Marie who one day was ‘rather robustly’ chasing her swine, which were 
going into the wheat field.  As Marie in midpursuit leaped over a ditch, ‘at the 
very moment the genitalia and male rod came to be developed.’  After consulting 
the physicians and the bishops, Marie changed her name to Germain and went to 
serve in the King’s retinue. . . .  The prodigy was not at home, however.  In the 
town, Montaigne noted in his journal, ‘there is still a song commonly in the girls’ 
mouths, in which they warn one another not to stretch their legs too wide for fear 
of becoming males, like Marie Germain.’  (81) 
 
While Germain Garnier’s story may seem prodigious, it, as Greenblatt points out, 
“merely repeats or represents the normal development of males through the healthy 
operation of bodily heat” (81).  At the end of this section of Paré’s Monsters and Marvels 
entitled “Memorable Stories about Women Who Have Degenerated into Men,” he, 
echoing Joubert’s expression of the period’s belief that women were cold and moist 
imperfect men, explains why female-to-male sex change is not that prodigious an 
occurrence after all:  
Wherefore if with time, the humidity of childhood which prevented the warmth 
from doing its full duty being exhaled for the most part, the warmth is rendered 
                                                                                                                                                 
35 Aristotle asserts, “Those are wrong who in their laws attempt to check the loud crying and screaming of 
children, for these contribute towards their growth, and, in a manner, exercise their bodies” (263).  
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more robust, vehement, and active, then it is not an unbelievable thing if the latter 
chiefly aided by some violent movement, should be able to push out what was 
hidden within.  (32) 
 
In this estimation of things, one’s sex seems a fluid and uncertain matter of degree rather 
than kind that subsequently raises a slew of vexing question for the patriarchal 
establishment.  Was Garnier a male child stifled by “the humidity of childhood,” a male 
child, in Joubert’s terms, not allowed to cry or physical exercise that moisture out?  Was 
he/she an “actual” girl whose robust running and leaping effected a late, transformative 
compensation for imperfect or mutilated in utero sex development?  Is it significant that 
he/she was not fully mature (that is, fifteen years old—incidentally Edward’s age at 
death) at the time of his/her transformation?  Does his/her transformation merely 
illustrate nature, as Joubert describes her, tending to the perfection of physiological 
maleness?  Although Paré explains that male-to-female sex change is impossible because 
nature only tends to male perfection, is it really possible for girls and young women to 
develop into men?  And, although Paré honors Garnier’s change by consistently calling 
him/her Germain and using masculine pronouns, what does it mean that Montaigne 
informs us of the folk song which dubs Garnier “Marie German,” as it warns girls not to 
leap as Garnier did?  There are no simple answers to these questions.  In fact, these are 
precisely the types of questions, as Greenblatt argues, from which the anxious but playful 
sexual-linguistic energy of Shakespeare’s comedies derive.  In another sense, they 
illustrate that the one-sex model that generated them created for the early modern period 
the type of trouble or potential subversive performative parody that Garnier represents 
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and that Judith Butler advocates.36  But where Butler argues that gender identity “is the 
[performative] stylized repetition of acts through time and not a seemingly seamless 
identity” (179) and then advocates performative parody as a mean by which to expose 
and possibly subvert the constructedness of heterosexist norms of sex and gender, 
Guillemeau advocates physical exercise as a form of performative masculinity crucial to 
establishing and maintaining the tenuous boundaries distinguishing men from women.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 The following studies use Butler’s theory of perfomativity to interpret early modern masculinity: Bruce 
Smith’s Shakespeare and Masculinity, Will Fisher’s Materializing Gender in Early Modern Literature and 
Culture, and Jennifer Low’s Manhood and the Duel: Masculinity in Early Modern Drama and Culture.   
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Chapter Three: 
Sir Thomas Elyot and the Domestication of Male Aggression in The Book amed the 
Governor (1531) 
 
The association of formal learning and manhood was not at all an obvious one in 
the period, for formal education, as Ruth Kelso tells us, was thought by many early 
sixteenth-century aristocrats to reduce “the valor of a man, making him effeminate and 
fearful, more fond of the ease of the study than the hardships of camp” (112).  As a result, 
many aristocrats held fast to a medieval ethos of military training and service that 
dismissed scholarly education as useless and even dangerous.  As we know, the 
bureaucratic complexities that came along with the consolidation of power in 
monarchical courts and the advances in military technology that rendered the martial 
skills of the individual knight-warrior unnecessary forced aristocrats to accept scholarly 
training as more useful and indeed more important than military training to sociopolitical 
advancement.  Yet this fear of effeminacy and the resultant military weakness proved 
especially resilient in a society still significantly shaped by long histories of civil unrest, 
foreign wars, and present threats of invasion.  For example, in the specific context of 
Elizabethan England, the main thrust of Stephen Gosson’s The School of Abuse (1579) is 
that poetry, plays, and other potentially effeminating endeavors have rendered England, a 
society once characterized by tough martial discipline, vulnerable to invasion: “If the 
enemy besiege us,” Gosson warns, “cut off our victuals, prevent foreign aide, girt in the 
city, and bring the ram to the walls, it is not Cicero’s tongue that can pierce their armor to 
wound the body, nor Archimedes’s [mathematical formulas] that hath any force to drive 
them back” (18).  Sir Philip Sidney, in The Defense of Poesy (1581), takes this fearful 
anti-intellectualism quite seriously, as he attempts to debunk it with examples from 
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antiquity— most notably Aristotle’s instruction of Alexander the Great and in turn 
Alexander’s high regard for Homer— that illustrate the extent to which “Poetry is the 
Companion of [military] Camps” (26), that, in other words, poetry in particular and 
scholarly education in general  contribute to and are indeed central to the development of 
a virtuous soldier-courtier.37   
Henry exemplified this combination of learning and military prowess.  As his 
patronage of medicine and his own medical endeavors reflect, he was well educated in 
the new learning of classical humanism and enthusiastic about spreading its influence.  
But he also received instruction in the traditional aristocratic sports and exercises.  By all 
accounts, Henry was obsessed with chivalric tournaments as a crucial form of military 
training, although, as I have already mentioned and will return to, chivalric military skills 
had become obsolete by the sixteenth century.  “When he was sixteen,” Alison Weir tells 
us, “he was reported to have exercised in the [jousting] lists every day” (117); and as a 
young man, he continued to train on a regular basis.  Significantly, by the time of his 
reign, he was the first English king in recent memory to be more than just a “mere 
                                                 
37Sidney’s own life powerfully illustrates this argument, for he was a courtier, poet, and soldier who died 
honorably at the age of thirty-two defending Protestantism in the Netherlands against Spanish invasion.  
And although the manner of his death— a musket shot shattered his thigh— suggests the obsolescence of 
chivalric military skills on the early modern battlefield, chivalric tournaments provided and thereby 
preserved an alternative physical and imaginative space wherein men like Sidney could continue the 
performance of those traditional manly skills as a method by which to attain the favor of the queen.  
Specifically, in the context of the doctrine of the king’s two bodies, the “cult of love,” Elizabeth’s 
celebrated virginity, and the overall theatricality of her reign, tournaments were one of the key methods— 
aside from progresses, civic pageants, and religious ceremonies— by which Elizabeth’s power was 
displayed and secured.  And although, as Alan Young points out in Tudor and Jacobean Tournaments, 
tournaments began as far back as Edward III’s reign and were significantly developed during the reign of 
Elizabeth’s grandfather, Henry VII, Elizabethan tournaments raise important questions about sex-gender 
assumptions and monarchical rule in the period.  Specifically, as a female monarch, Elizabeth had to 
cultivate a paradoxical, rhetorical and visual representation of her monarchical authority that, at once, 
recognized and legitimized the “inadequacy” of her female body.  In that cultivation, performative 
masculinity was not a “real” option or expectation for her in the ceremonial context of tournaments or the 
context of actual war.  Rather, as her Tilbury speech demonstrates, it was only a part of a complex strategy 
designed to get men to perform their own masculinity on her behalf in both contexts, and Sidney and other 
aspiring courtier-soldiers strove to do just that. 
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spectator” (117) at tournaments, and his skills were so impressive that he earned the 
admiration of foreign observers and therefore significantly bolstered England’s 
international prestige.  He was also obsessed with hunting, another sport thought a good 
preparation warfare.  In a 1520 letter to Cardinal Wolsey, Richard Pace reported that 
Henry hunted “daily, except on holidays, [from] 4 or 5 o’clock [in the morning] . . . till 9 
or 10 at night” (qtd. in Weir 106).  His hunting trips were so grueling that he was reported 
to exhaust eight to ten horses on each trip, and his obsession was such that he found it 
difficult to postpone a hunting trip during Jane Seymour postpartum illness.38 
The hopeful expectation was that Edward, as Henry’s only male heir, would, as 
Sir Richard Morrison’s words on Holbein’s portrait of the infant prince implore, “emulate 
thy father and be the heir of his virtue” (qtd. in Skidmore 25) (see Fig. 6).  But perhaps 
because of the negative view of the body that shaped Edward’s early Protestant 
biographers who represent him “primarily as a sickly but pious child . . . awaiting his 
removal to a better and higher place” (Loach 180), what has often been neglected or 
minimized in discussions of Edward’s education and upbringing is that that virtue 
significantly consisted of the performative masculinity that we have been discussing.  
Edward, as Loach concludes, “was a typical aristocratic youth of the sixteenth century” 
(181), who was trained in and reportedly loved tournament sports such as archery, the 
rings, and jousting. 
 It would, therefore, be erroneous to argue, as Mary Thomas Crane does in study 
Framing Authority, that martial skills and scholarly education represented the disparate 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
38 Chris Skidmore explains that “Henry postponed a hunting trip he had planned to mark the start of the 
season, but only temporarily.  If  Jane’s condition did not improve, he remarked, he ‘could not find it in his 
heart to tarry’ ” (18). 
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cultural values of two diametrically opposed social groups, aristocrats and humanists 
respectively.39  For instance, shortly after relinquishing his position as Edward’s principal 
tutor, Dr. Richard Coxe illustrates the untenability of this opposition in a December 10, 
1544 letter reporting on Edward’s behavior and educational progress to Henry’s private 
secretary, Sir William Paget:  
Sir, as concerning my lord and dear scholar, it is kindly done of you to desire so 
gently to hear from him and of his proceedings in his valiant conquests.  We can 
never render God much thanks sufficiently that He hath prospered the King’s 
Majesty in his travails at [Boulogne], and surely . . . my lord is not much behind 
in his feats.  He hath expugned [sic] and utterly conquered a great number of the 
captains of ignorance.  The eight parts of speech hath made them his subjects and 
servants, and can decline any manner Latin noun and conjugate a verb perfectly 
unless it be [irregular].  These parts thus beaten down and conquered he beginneth 
to build them up again and frame them after his purpose with due of construction, 
like as the King’s Majesty framed up [Boulogne] when he had beaten it down.   
(Gairdner 438; my italics) 
 
As Hester Chapman suggests, Coxe, realizing Edward’s preoccupation with Henry’s 
siege of Boulogne, “induced [him] to concentrate on his studies by presenting them, in 
what might be called the Ascham-Elyot method, as military objectives” (60).  While it is 
not exactly clear (to me) what Chapman means by “the Ascham-Elyot method,” it is 
likely that he is attributing to Ascham and Elyot the classical method of nonviolent- 
playful instruction.  For instance, in the dialogue about corporal punishment preceding 
The Schoolmaster, Ascham quotes Nicholas Wotton, a distinguished statesmen for much 
of the Tudor period with doctoral degrees in civil and canon law as well as divinity, as 
                                                 
39 See Crane’s fifth chapter “Pastime or Profit: Aristocratic and Humanist Ideology, 1520-1550.” In 
particular, she argues, “In opposition to aristocratic codes of honor, violence, and frivolous display, 
humanist teachers and writers sought to instill respect for learning, hard work, and serious devotion to 
duty” (94).  She later suggests that “the royal school organized by Catherine Parr for the education of 
Edward, Elizabeth, and various noble children seems to have chosen a humanist (and Protestant) rather than 
aristocratic curriculum” (103).  As I have illustrated, this suggestion isn’t borne out by the historical record.  
Although Crane acknowledges that at least two figures—Thomas Cromwell and Lord Burghley—
developed educational programs that combined humanistic and aristocratic values, that combination 
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stating the nonviolent Platonic method that Ascham and almost every humanists 
championed: “In mine opinion, the schoolhouse should be indeed, as it is called by name, 
the house of play and pleasure, and not of fear and bondage.  And as I do remember, so 
saith Socrates in one place of Plato” (6).  What is ironic about Coxe’s specific version of 
this nonviolent method is that the figurative-educational game of war intended to make 
education playful and pleasurable enough to motivate Edward is itself imaginatively 
violent.  And, as Coxe soon found out, imaginative violence has its costs, as it creates the 
kind of antagonistic milieu that ultimately necessitates real, corrective violence.  After the 
game of war developed in Edward an unproductive sense of his masculine identity as a 
sovereign conqueror and possessor, a sense Coxe personified as “Captain Will,” Coxe 
explains, “I took my morris pike [that is, my hand or rod] stand at Will.  I went and gave  
him such a wound that he wist not what to do, but picked him privily out of the place that 
I never heard of him since.  Me thought it the luckiest day that ever I saw in battle” (qtd. 
in Bushnell 57).  So, despite the principle of nonviolent instruction, which humanists, as I 
discuss in greater detail in the next two chapters, extended to political rule, Coxe’s 
imaginative militarization of learning represents an ideological compromise made 
necessary by the masculinist and militaristic culture of the aristocracy, a compromise that 
turned the schoolroom into a man-making battlefield and the tutor into a justly violent 
warrior conquering the worst tendencies of that culture.40                     
But what explains the near-seamless, metaphorical ease of Coxe’s militarization 
of learning is that the body and physical exercise, as defined by Galen, were crucial to 
gender-identity construction for both aristocrats and humanists.  In that regard, it makes 
                                                                                                                                                 
represents for her “a curious mix” (102).  In light of the importance of Galenic materialism in the period 
and particularly the importance of exercise to establish and maintain health, that mix makes perfect sense.           
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sense, as Dennis Brailsford points out, that “the military training of the chivalric tradition 
provided the practical starting point for a revival of physical education” (10).  Indeed, 
Galen’s theories of health and exercise, while broadly and complexly applicable to men 
and women, are fundamentally gendered male. 41  In De Sanitate Tuenda, which is 
perhaps the most influential of Galen’s treatises on health and exercise to educational 
theorists, Galen clarifies his subject in the section on exercise and massage: 
The subject of our consideration, therefore, is a boy, thoroughly healthy by nature, 
beginning the third seven [that is, fourteen] years of his age, whose body it is our 
purpose to develop and maintain as perfectly as possible.  And . . .[perfectly] 
means this. 
As it has been shown that there is numerous diversity of bodies, so also 
there are numerous forms of the lives which we lead.  It is not therefore possible 
to administer perfect care of the body in every form of life, but the best that is 
possible for each, for absolute perfection is not possible in all lives. . . .  But 
whoever is completely free, both by fortune and by choice, for him it is possible 
to suggest how he may enjoy the most health, suffer the least sickness, and grow 
old most comfortably.  (51-52) 
 
Galen’s program for “the perfect care of the body” excludes girls and women as well as 
peasants, slaves, the constitutionally unhealthy or disabled, and ambitious and zealous 
businessmen “so involved in affairs of business that they [are like willing slaves to hard 
masters and] can have little leisure for the care of their bodies” (51).  In another instance, 
                                                                                                                                                 
40 See chapter two (“The Sovereign Master and the Scholar Prince”) of Bushnell’s A Culture of Teaching.    
41 In fact, it is important to note that Galen’s first appointment after his extensive medical training in 
Smyrna, Corinth, and Alexandria was physician to the gladiators in his hometown of Pergamum in 157 AD.  
See Rebecca Flemming’s chapter six “Galen’s Women” from Medicine and the Making of Roman Women 
for a detailed examination of the negative construction of women’s bodies that informs his medical 
theories.   Also, see Debra Hawhee’s Bodily Arts: The Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece for an 
illustration of  the interconnected nature of mind and body in ancient pedagogical thinking: “In Greece, the 
archaic and Classical periods . . . marked a time when training was broad, when arts were intricately 
interwoven, and when mind and body moved and thought together. . . .  In ancient Athens, athletic and 
rhetorical practices overlapped and nurtured each other in many ways . . . .  Pedagogically, they shared 
modes of knowledge production, an attention to timing, and an emphasis on habituation, imitation, and 
response” (4-6).  Although at the conclusion of her study, Hawhee claims that the Renaissance, as visually 
represented by Raphael’s “School of Athens,” “[forgot] the early blending of bodily and intellectual 
practices” (190) characteristic of ancient Greece in favor of what she terms the “Myth of the Mind” (190), 
early modern educational theorists of the sixteenth century, as we have begun to consider and will consider 
throughout this study, were deeply influenced by this early blending. 
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he explains, “from the second seven years [that is, from seven to fourteen], if you wish to 
bring [your son] to the peak of excellence, desiring to make him a soldier of some sort, or 
a wrestler, or otherwise powerful, you will pay less attention to those endowments which 
conduce to scholarship and wisdom” (38).   In the early modern world, this expression of 
anti-intellectualism effectively leaves us with precisely the subject group of greatest 
interest to patron-seeking humanists: able-bodied aristocratic and well-to do boys.  And 
while, as I have said, early modern educational theorists primarily looked to physical 
exercise as a way of maintaining mind-body health for men and women of all social 
levels, these characterizations of the soldier’s or wrestler’s body identify elite male 
bodies as the peak of healthy excellence and power.  
It is in the “excellent” and “powerful” spirit of healthy-martial manhood that early 
modern educational theorists devoted considerable sections of their treatises to physical 
exercise.42  In Sir Thomas Elyot’s English translation of Plutarch’s The Education or 
Bringing Up of Children (1533), he translates Plutarch as saying,  
Exercise is not a little to be esteemed and for that purpose children must also be 
committed to masters, which may exercise them sufficiently, to the intent that 
thereby good shape of limbs and members for strength of body may be acquired.  
For the good habit and disposition in the bodies of children, is for age a sure 
foundation. 
 And in summer and fair weather men provide against winter: so  
the best provision of age is good manners and temperance gotten in youth.  Also 
labor is to be kept in, as it were in a closet or cell, and so moderately used, that 
children being tender and flexible, be not [too tired to study].  For as Plato saith, 
labor and sleep be enemies to learning.  But what need I tarry here upon, seeing 
that I purpose to declare that which is more necessary to speak of.  It shall be 
more expedient to exercise children in  feats of arms, as in riding and chasing, 
casting of javelin and darts, shooting in the longbow, and such other martial acts, 
where the vanquisher appoint for their reward to have the goods of them that be 
vanquished.  All be it war little esteems the person brought up in the shadow.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
42 In “‘Sinews of Ulysses’: Exercise and Education in Milton,” Michael Lieb charts the way that the major 
educational theorists of the sixteenth century “extolled the virtues of exercise” (25). 
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pure and lean soldier, always haunting the affairs of war, oft times overthrows the 
great wrestler in battle and enforces the front already embattled to recule.  (28-29) 
 
In Plutarch’s formulation, healthiness represents a bodily state with clear gender, 
sociopolitical, and military implications, for the fitness or health of the tender and 
flexible bodies of male children promises longevity, disciplinary control, and martial 
prowess.  And although Plutarch recommends moderate indoor exercise so as not to 
expend the energy needed for Greek and Latin instruction, he also significantly points to 
a time when martial aristocratic training— riding and chasing, casting of javelin and 
darts, and shooting in the longbow— will transform their weak pre- and early pubescent 
bodies into the strong and durable bodies of gentlemen soldiers.43   
Elyot’s own educational treatise, The Book -amed the Governor (1531), is an 
insistent and even defensive endorsement of classical and early modern monarchical 
political theory.  In Elyot’s estimation, both God’s natural order and His example prove 
the rightness of a public weal with a king or prince as its ruler.44 But since it is impossible 
for a king or prince to manage a large dominion by himself, he must depend on many 
                                                 
43 Like Galen, Plutarch also recognizes the practical socioeconomic limitations of his educational program, 
despite his universalizing intentions to propose one that might “be common and also profitable to every 
man.”  But after recognizing the tension between his intentions and Greco-Roman realities, he justifies and 
mystifies that tension as well as classical inequalities by blaming the poor for their exclusion from a quality 
education: “What is that to the purpose, says some man to me?  For where thou did promise to give 
advertisement, concerning the bringing up of honest men’s children, notwithstanding thou pass over poor 
men and the common people, that thou goes about to instruct only rich men and nobles.  Whereunto it is 
not difficult to reply.  Certainly my intent is, that my exhortation should be common and also profitable to 
every man.  But if any be of such poverty, that he is not able to use this counsel, he shall blame fortune and 
not me, that do the best I can to advertise him” (28-29).   
44 After listing examples of that order, he rhetorically asks, “Hath not [God] set degrees and estates in all 
His glorious works?” (3); later, after praising the ancient Greek “rule of men of best disposition” (6) and 
criticizing the ancient Athenian “rule of the commonalty” (6), he concludes with another rhetorical 
question: “Wherefore undoubtedly the best and most sure governance is by one king or prince. . . .  For 
who can deny but that all thing in heaven and earth is governed by one God, by one perpetual order, by one 
providence?” (7); and lastly, in the specific case of the diversity of human ability, he concludes, “And 
therefore it appeareth that God giveth not to every man like gifts of grace, or of nature, but to some more, 
some less, as it liketh His Divine Majesty” (4). 
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well-educated magistrates or inferior governors, “which be named of Aristotle his eyes, 
ears, hands, and legs; which if they be of the best sort (as [Aristotle] furthermore saith), it 
seemeth impossible a country not to be well governed by good laws” (13).  Of course, for 
Elyot, gentlemen are of the best sort.  But the emerging bureaucratic complexities of the 
period along with the development of military technology radically changed the terms of 
public service and political advancement in such a way that made the educated cleric 
more important to the business of state than the aristocratic warrior of the previous 
century.45  Therefore, the challenge for Elyot is how to get those militaristically-oriented 
aristocrats to see education as essential to perfecting themselves and especially their 
children.      
The twelfth chapter of the first book of the treatise, “Why gentlemen in this 
present time be not equal in doctrine to ancient noblemen,” exemplifies his attempt to do 
so, for in that book he identifies and critiques four anti-educational aspects of the 
aristocracy— “pride, avarice, the negligence of parents, and the lack or fewness of 
sufficient masters or teachers” (40)—threatening its survival as a dominant group.  
Significantly, that critique implicitly identifies the physical and economic, that is, the 
materialistic, biases of the aristocracy working against its acceptance of something as 
abstract and therefore lacking in physical or material value as a humanistic education. 
Indeed, for Elyot and other humanists, wealth brought both potential benefits and 
dangers, and, in that spirit, Elyot acknowledges the importance of wealth but critiques 
                                                 
45 As a result, as Lawrence Stone explains, “the highest public offices went to those who had been trained 
to think clearly, could analyse a situation, draft a minute, know the technicalities of the law, and speak a 
foreign language” (673).  In other words, those offices were beginning to go to educated men of low birth, 
and “[t]his threat to the established order,” as Stone also characterizes it, “alarmed conservatives 
everywhere, and stimulated a demand that the old aristocracy should again fill their rightful place in the 
councils of the nation” (673). 
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materialistic corruption as a way of getting aristocrats to invest more of their money in 
the education of their children. 46  After citing impressive examples of learned noblemen 
from classical and early English history (such as, Henry I and Alexander the Great), he 
critiques that corruption head on: 
Verily they be far from good reason, in mine opinion, which covet to have their  
children goodly in stature, strong, [agile], well singing, wherein trees, beasts, 
fishes, and birds be not only with them equal, but also far do exceed them.  And 
cunning, whereby only man excelleth all other creatures in earth, they reject, and 
account unworthy to be in their children.  What unkind appetite were it to desire 
to be father rather of a piece of flesh, that can only move and feel, than a child 
that should have the perfect form of a man?  (43) 
 
The problem with the materialism at the center of aristocratic culture is that it establishes 
a value system that promotes the natural physical and performative qualities of trees and 
animals rather than the only quality that truly defines and distinguishes human beings as 
superior, even God-like creatures: rational intelligence, or as Elyot terms it, cunning.  As 
the above passage illustrates, Elyot, in his specific critique of aristocratic pride, employs 
a grotesque, cannibalistic image of fathers preparing sons for slaughter and consumption 
as a way of pathologizing aristocratic materialism.  In other words, by analogizing 
aristocratic materialism to an “unkind appetite” that reduces children to stupid “piece[s] 
of flesh,” Elyot, much like Coxe’s imaginative militarization of Edward’s Latin 
instruction, figuratively and rhetorically appropriates the materialistic terms of 
aristocratic culture and turns them against the aristocracy, or, perhaps more correctly, 
uses those terms to illustrate the extent to which materialism potentially leads to a self-
destructive self-consumption.   
                                                 
46 Even Juan Luis Vives, despite his strong critique of the profit motive in his major educational treatise De 
Tradendis Disciplinis (1531), concludes that “it should be said: ‘we must first philosophise, and afterwards 
get rich’” (277). 
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Comparable materializing analogies characterize Elyot’s critique of the remaining 
anti-educational aspects of aristocratic culture.  For instance, on the subject of avarice, 
Elyot critiques the unwillingness of fathers to invest significant time and money in their 
children’s education:  
A gentleman, ere he take a cook into his service, he will first diligently examine 
him, how many sorts of meats, pottages, and sauces, he can perfectly make, and 
how well he can season them, that they may be both pleasant and nourishing; yea  
and if it be a falconer, he will scrupulously inquire what skill he hath in feeding, 
called diet, and keeping of his hawks from all sickness, also how he can reclaim 
her and prepare her to flight.  And to such a cook and falconer, whom he findeth  
expert, he spareth not to give much wages with other bounteous rewards.  But of a 
schoolmaster, to whom he will commit his child, to be fed with learning and 
instructed in virtue, whose life shall be the principal monument of his name and 
honour, he never maketh further inquiry but where he may have a schoolmaster; 
and with how little charge; and if one be perchance found, well learned, but he 
will not take pains to teach without he may have a great salary, he speaketh not 
more, or else saith, “What, shall so much wages be given to a schoolmaster which 
would keep two servants?”  To whom may be said these words, that by his son 
being well learned he shall receive more commodity and also worship than by the 
service of a hundred cooks and falconers.  (43-44; my italics)        
                        
By comparing schoolmasters to cooks and falconers, that is, by insisting that education is 
itself a kind of food or activity even more important than the traditional culinary and 
recreational pleasures of aristocratic life, Elyot attempts to expand aristocratic 
materialism enough to include education (and therefore expert pedagogical skill) as a 
virtuous and honorable commodity worthy of a comparable investment of time and 
money.47  
 In that vein, Elyot goes on to critique those negligent parents who end formal 
instruction after their sons have only just learned to speak Latin elegantly by arguing, in 
similar materializing terms, that the lasting benefits of education require the extension of 
                                                 
47 His attempt, in other words, at a more inclusive materialism— arguably illustrates the historical 
emergence of a particular type of what Pierre Bourdieu’s terms cultural capital.  See Bourdieu’s “The 
Forms of Capital” for a detailed analysis of the different forms of capital. 
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instruction to the age of twenty one.  That is, education should not end at fourteen or 
fifteen because that is precisely the period when boys, Elyot tells us,  
do approach or draw towards the estate of man, which is called mature or ripe . . . 
wherein not only the said learning continued by much experience shall be 
perfectly digested, and confirmed in perpetual remembrance, but also more 
serious learning contained in other liberal sciences, and also philosophy, would be 
learned. (44) 
 
As historians and literary critics have pointed out, these types of vegetive-horticultural 
and digestive analogies represent two ways in which early modern educational theorists 
attempted to describe both physical and cognitive development.  In the specific case of 
the vegetive-horticultural analogies, Elyot, way before he argues for an extended 
educational program, tells us that his teaching method is based on “the policy of a wise 
and cunning gardener” (15) and that that method will enable him to “ensue in the forming 
of the gentle wits of noblemen’s children, who, from the wombs of their mother, shall be 
made [fit] or apt to the governance of a public weal” (15).  Indeed, Elyot concludes his 
section on avarice by analogizing the mind of a child to the fertile soil within which to 
plant the tree of learning, which, if tended well, will eventually bear leaves and ultimately 
the best fruit: 
Finally, like as a delicate tree that cometh of a kernel, which, as soon as it 
burgeoneth out leaves, if it be plucked up or it be sufficiently rooted, and laid in a 
corner, it becometh rotten and no fruit cometh of it, if it be removed and set in 
another air or earth . . . it either semblably dieth or beareth no fruit, or else the 
fruit that cometh of it loseth his verdure and taste, and finally his estimation. 
So the pure and excellent learning whereof I have spoken . . . if, before it take a 
deep root in the mind of the child, it be laid aside, either by too much solace or 
continual attendance in service, or else is translated to another study which is of a 
more gross or unpleasant quality before it be confirmed or stablished by often 
reading or diligent exercise, in conclusion it vanisheth and cometh to nothing. 
(50)       
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While literary critics have paid considerable attention to what these materializing 
analogies suggest about the relationship between teachers and students and the physical 
and cognitive development of children, no one, to my knowledge, has explored the way 
in which these analogies also function to materialize or reify learning as a manly 
activity.48  As we have seen with Plutarch’s and Galen’s theories of health and exercise, it 
is important to keep in mind that the ultimate goal for Elyot and other educational 
theorists was to cultivate learning in the delicate soil of children’s minds and bodies until 
they reached “the estate of man” or “ripe[ness],” for it is only at that point that early 
formative education will be perfectly internalized or digested and therefore permanently 
remembered; and it is only at that point that more complex instruction in philosophy and 
law can take place.  In other words, the fertile but delicate soil of the pre- and early 
pubescent male body represents the best ground for the cultivation of a humanistic 
education, because the adult male body represents the best ground from which to bear the 
fruit of lasting, complex, and above all empowering knowledge.49 
 Not only do these materializing and ultimately masculinizing analogies enable 
Elyot to tell aristocrats that they must change and how they must change, they also enable 
him to tell them that there are ways in which they can remain the same.  That is, after 
establishing the healthy male aristocratic body as the most appropriate ground or soil for 
                                                 
48 In particular, see chapter three (“Seed or Goad: Educating the Humanist Subject” [53-76]) of Crane’s 
Framing Authority and chapter three (“Cultivating the Mind”) of Bushnell’s A Culture of Teaching.  
 
49 In the last instance, Elyot argues that so few learned men teach because of, as we have seen, the contempt 
with which aristocrats perceive learning and the little money they offer teachers.  In his specific critique of 
this treatment of teachers, he analogies humanistic education to a serious of trades: “Also common 
experience teacheth that no man will out his son to a butcher to learn, or he bind him prentice to a tailor; or 
if he will have him a cunning goldsmith, will bind first prentice to a tinker: in these things poor men be 
circumspect, and the nobles and gentlemen, who would have their sons by excellent learning come unto 
honour, for sparing the cost or for lack of diligent search for a good schoolmaster wilfully destroy their 
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humanistic learning, Elyot justifiably turns his attention to the “sundry forms of exercise 
necessary for every gentleman”: 
 Although I have hitherto advanced the commendation of learning, specially in 
gentlemen, yet it is to be considered that continual study without some manner of 
exercise shortly exhausteth the spirits vital and hindereth natural decoction and 
digestion, whereby man’s body is the sooner corrupted and brought into divers 
sicknesses, and finally the life is thereby made shorter; where contrariwise by 
exercise, which is a vehement motion (as Galen prince of physicians defineth), the 
health of man is preserved, and his strength increased, forasmuch the members of 
moving and mutual touching do wax more hard, and natural heat in all the body is 
thereby augmented.  Moreover it maketh the spirits of a man more strong and 
valiant, so that by the hardness of the members all labour be more tolerable; by 
natural heat the appetite is more quick; the change of the substance received is the 
more ready; the nourishing of all the parts of the body is the more sufficient and 
sure.  By valiant motion of the spirits all things superfluous be expelled, and the 
conduits of the body cleansed. (59; my italics) 
 
This shift in attention from vegetive-horticultural analogies to the literal digestive health 
concerns associated with the sedentary nature of continual study also shifts attention 
away from the empowered teacher-gardener cultivating the minds of his students to that 
teacher-gardener seeing to it that those students are themselves physically and spiritually 
empowered by Galen’s man-making exercises.  In fact, the aristocratic male body is so 
important to Elyot’s treatise that he devotes eleven of book-one’s twenty-seven chapters 
(which is roughly forty percent) to the exercises required to development its vehement 
motion, strength, hardness of body, valiant motion, and courage.  Again, like Coxe’s 
imaginative militarization of learning, this focus on masculinizing exercises in the midst 
of an educational treatise represents Elyot’s attempt to persuade aristocrats of the need to 
change by striking a balance between that need and the desire to stay the same. 
 While Galen’s theory of health and exercise may be fundamentally hierarchical 
and identifies the elite male body as the ideal, it also addresses the implicitly imperfect 
                                                                                                                                                 
children, causing them to be taught that learning which would require six or seven years to be forgotten” 
 69 
 
health of women and non-aristocrats in such a way that potentially gives the impression 
that all bodies, though different, are of equal importance.  Therefore, in order to highlight 
the equation of health and aristocratic manhood, Elyot initially abridges Galen’s diverse 
and ostensibly inclusive list of healthy exercises and focuses specifically on those martial 
ones— such as, wrestling, running, swimming, horseback riding— consistent with the 
military ethos at the center of the aristocratic culture he is attempting to change.   Except 
for walking, tennis, and two types of weight training, the most that Elyot can or is willing 
to do for those interested in the breath and complexity of that list is recommend Thomas 
Linacre’s 1517 Latin translation of  Galen’s De sanitate tuenda.  Elyot offers no 
explanation for this abridgement or the recommendation of a text that only the already 
learned would have been able to read. However, what perhaps explains his abridgement 
is that interpretive nuance and complexity, as is usually the case with attempts at 
sociopolitical and ideological change, threatens to confuse aristocratic men and therefore 
undermine his specific goal of getting them to accept that humanistic learning and 
aristocratic culture complement each other on some fundamental and exclusive level.  
Indeed, as Elyot tells us, “I will  . . . only speak of those exercises, apt to the furniture of 
a gentleman’s personage, adapting his body to hardness, strength, and agility, and to help 
therewith himself in peril, which may happen in wars or other necessity” (60).  However, 
the problem with those exercises, a I have also already explained, is that they were no 
longer likely to help the early modern soldier, because they were developed for the 
battlefield peril of a bygone era.  Whether citing the classical importance of wrestling as 
useful for hand-to-hand combat or of running, swimming, and horseback riding as 
preparation for the pursuit or evasion of one’s enemies, Elyot says nothing about how to 
                                                                                                                                                 
(58-59). 
 70 
 
modify— or whether it is even possible to modify— these exercises for early modern 
wars fought with firearms.  Indeed, early modern soldiers like Sir Philip Sidney, who 
died after a musket shot shattered his thigh in the 1586 Battle of Zutphen, learned the 
hard way of the difficulty of wrestling, pursuing, or evading enemies in the midst of 
artillery blasts and musket shots.50  In that regard, Elyot’s silence on the obsolescence of 
traditional military skills seems to represent another way in which he attempts to 
persuade aristocratic men that requisite cultural change doesn’t have to mean the death of 
cultural traditions, for that silence implicitly endorses the kind of impractical military 
conservatism at the center of the desire of aristocratic men to feel that their traditional 
military skills and indeed their traditional identities still mattered. 
 As we have already seen with Henry’s obsession with tournaments and hunting, 
that desire as well as anxieties about traditional legitimacy were also significantly 
reflected in the amount of time and money that aristocratic men invested in the sports that 
allowed them to continue the performance of those otherwise impractical military 
exercises.51  While or perhaps because of that impracticality, these lavishly financed 
sports created an alternative referential justification as well as outlet for traditional 
aggressive forms of masculinity in the nonviolent context of the early modern court.  In 
other words, “The tiltyard,” as Alan Young suggests, “could still be a place where, 
                                                 
50 See note 34.   
51 As Alan Young points out in Tudor and Jacobean Tournaments, tournaments began as far back as 
Edward III’s reign and were significantly developed during the reign of Elizabeth’s grandfather, Henry VII, 
Elizabethan tournaments raise important questions about sex-gender assumptions and monarchical rule in 
the period.  Specifically, as a female monarch, Elizabeth had to cultivate a paradoxical, rhetorical and 
visual representation of her monarchical authority that, at once, recognized and legitimized the 
“inadequacy” of her female body.  In that cultivation, performative masculinity was not a “real” option or 
expectation for her in the ceremonial context of tournaments or the context of actual war.  Rather, as her 
Tilbury speech demonstrates, it was only a part of a complex strategy designed to get men to perform their 
own masculinity on her behalf in both contexts, and Sidney and other aspiring courtier-soldiers strove to do 
just that. 
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disguised in the surface appearance of chivalric gentility, pride would be vindicated and 
aggressive energies released” (35).  Indeed, like the emergence of the highly ritualized 
manners that Norbert Elias identifies as part of a “civilizing process” in early modern 
court society, this investment in sports or recreational combat represents a significant 
symbolic and political means by which military prowess and specifically the male athletic 
physique were contained or domesticated.52   
Arguably, it is this domestication of traditional male aggression that allows Elyot 
to include dancing as a legitimate alternative to traditional masculinizing exercises.  
While he never explicitly identifies dancing as an alternative, the fact that he devotes a 
lengthy defense of it at the end of his list of exercises, I think, subtly suggests yet another 
instance of him attempting to redefine the aristocracy in a way consistent with the 
nonviolent behavioral exigencies of humanism and early modern court politics.  Indeed, 
in the process of illustrating “how wise men and valiant captains [throughout classical 
mythology and history] embraced dancing for a sovereign and profitable exercise” (73; 
my italics), Elyot offers several examples from classical mythology and history, most of 
which come from Lucian’s dialogue The Dance, that ultimately paint a picture of dancing 
as a gestural “rhetoric of the body”53 with “real” political power.54  In one instance, he 
                                                 
52 In Ritual and Early Modern Europe, Edward Muir provides a summary of Elias’s study of the “civilizing 
process”: ‘In examining the history of manners [Elias] pointed to the sixteenth century as a critical moment 
in transforming human behavior through the spread of heavily ritualized social graces.  Adopting ‘civilized’ 
or ‘courtly’ manners inculcated a high level of self-control over the behavior of the upper classes. . . .  The 
self-control implied by the new manners required the conscious, rational regulation of emotional expression 
and physical processes in what might be seen as an effort to subordinate the lower body to the upper body” 
(125).  Elias deeply influences several studies of early modern manners and embodiment: Paster’s, 
Schoenfeldt’s, Correll’s, etc.  These studies, however, ultimately focus attention on the adult, gendered 
body, despite the fact that Erasmus’s educational treatises are central to Elias’s conclusions.      
53 I am referencing Lynn Enterline’s book-length study The Rhetoric of the Body, which explores the 
relationship between the violated female body and the female voice in Ovidian narratives and the 
interpretive implications of that relationship to early modern literary production.   
54 Therefore, like the ideological compromise of Coxe’s militarization of learning and his own 
appropriation of the terms of aristocratic materialism, Elyot attempts to synthesize both cultures around the 
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recounts how Jupiter’s mother, Rhea, used dancing to save his life from Saturn’s filicidal 
melancholy; in another instance, he recounts the resourceful way in which the ancient 
Syracusians circumvented a law against verbal communication by using dancing as a sign 
language to organize and carry out the overthrow of the tyrant Hiero; in another, he 
recounts how a “famous [though unnamed] dancer” (75) performed for Demetrius the 
Cynic in an attempt to persuade him of the communicative and philosophical value of 
dancing: “O man,” he reports Demetrius responding at the end of the dance, “I do not 
only see, but hear you, what thou doest, and it seemeth also to me that with thy hands 
thou speakest” (75); and in yet another, he recounts the story of how the same dancer, 
after singing and dancing for Nero and a visiting “barbarian” king, became a valuable 
diplomatic gift.  That is, in response to Nero’s offer “to give him anything that might be 
to his commodity” (75), the visiting king asked for the dancer and explains,  
Sir . . . I have divers confines and neighbours that be of sundry languages and 
manners, wherefore if I have often times need of many interpreters.  Wherefore if 
I had this man with me and should have anything to do with my neighbours, he 
would so with his fashion and gestures express everything to me, and teach 
everything to me, and teach them to do the same, that from henceforth I should 
not have need of any interpreter. (76) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
political legitimacy of dance.  In the first instance, he takes on unnamed “excellently learned . . . divines” 
(69) who base their rejection of dancing on the saying of Saint Augustine, “that blessed clerk” (71), “that 
better were it to delve or to plough on the Sunday than to dance” (69).  Rather, he argues that if those men 
consider the specific context of what is really only an ostensible blanket critique, they will see that it 
actually represents a rhetorical oversimplification needed to oppose the persistence of pagan idolatry in the 
early, insecure days of Christianity at the end of  the perfection of the Roman Empire.  Therefore, with a 
confusing bit of choplogic, he concludes, “Augustine doth not prohibit dancing so generally as it is taken, 
but only such dances which were superstitious and contained in them a spice of idolatry, or else did with 
unclean motions of countenances irritate the minds of the dancers to venereal lust” (70).  In the second 
instance, he cites four specific examples of the virtuousness of dancing from classical history that would 
have spoken to military-minded aristocrats.  The first is that of Lycurgus, the Spartan or Lacedaemonian 
lawgiver, who ordered that “children should be taught as diligently to dance in armour as to fight.  And that 
in times of wars, they should move them in battle against their enemies in form and manner of dancing” 
(74); the second, that of “the old inhabitants of Ethiopia” (74), who Elyot describes as engaging in war 
dances instead of actual combat as a method of putting “their enemies in fear” (74). 
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As an expressive vehicle of political action, philosophical thought, and diplomatic 
negotiation, as, in other words, a legitimate political and philosophical “rhetoric of the 
body,” dancing, like humanistic education, supposedly develops the kinds of complex, 
intellectual skills commensurate with the nonviolent political realities of the early modern 
court.  And although it is important to note that Elyot also links dancing to the military 
rituals of the ancient Greeks, Romans, and even “the old inhabitants of Ethiopia” (74) as 
a way of dispelling perceptions of it as an effeminate activity, his emphasis on its 
strategic-nonviolent aspects works to establish for the well-developed male body a 
middle ground between the stigma of effeminacy and the obsolescence of traditional 
armed combat, a middle ground that effectively materializes or embodies learning as a 
manly activity acceptable to the early modern court. 
 As a way of further establishing the classical-historical legitimacy of dancing as a 
serious expressive vehicle, as a serious rhetoric of the body, Elyot, assuming the role of a 
theorist of expressive dance, treats it like he would any important language and proceeds 
to break it down into its component parts.  That is, after identifying tragic (Eumelia), 
comic (Cordax), war (Enopliae), and couples (Hormus) dancing as the four main 
categories of ancient dance, he goes on to identify the basse, the bargenettes, the pavions, 
the turgions, and the rounds as early modern examples of the hormus and proceeds to 
focus on how the individual steps and movements of those dances, specifically the basse 
dance, provide a gestural and observational method— that is, a less tedious method than 
text-based instruction— of teaching children “the first moral virtue, called prudence” 
(78).  As I have been arguing about Elyot’s advocacy of humanistic education, his 
selection of couples dancing has everything to do with his desire to translate the 
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perfection of the classical past into the terms and activities that the early modern 
aristocracy would understand and accept, for, as he tells us, “of all the other [ancient 
dances, the hormus is] most like to that which is at this time used” (76).  But beyond that, 
his selection of couples dancing also significantly brings girls and women into a treatise 
that up to and after that point is about the upbringing of boys and young men in the all-
male context of the early modern grammar school.  In effect, what this attention to men 
and women dancing within a nonviolent domestic context does is continue the 
domesticating or civilizing movement of male aggression from the battlefield to the early 
modern court.  For instance, in the twentieth chapter entitled “Of the first beginning of 
dancing and the old estimation thereof,” Elyot explains the hormus as a dance “wherein 
danced young men and maidens, the man expressing in his motion and countenance 
fortitude and magnanimity apt for the wars, the maiden moderation and shamefastness 
which represented a pleasant connection of fortitude and temperance” (76).  In the next 
chapter entitled “Wherefore in the good order of dancing a man and a woman danceth 
together” (77), Elyot goes on to reiterate this gendered binary opposition:  
A man in his natural perfection is fierce, hardy, strong in opinion, covetous of 
glory, desirous of knowledge, appetiting by generation to bring forth his 
semblable.  The good nature of a women is to be mild, timorous, tractable, 
benign, of sure remembrance, and shamefast.  (77-78) 
 
Couples dancing itself performatively enacts Elyot’s ideological compromise.  Men can 
remain men: strong, magnanimous, ambitious, fierce, etc.  But, at the same time, the act 
of dancing with a women or watching other men dance with women teaches them to 
synthesize their natural manly perfection with those qualities specific to women— 
mildness, passivity, fearfulness, weakness, etc— to create the virtues of “very nobility” 
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(78).  After initially identifying  matrimony and concord as two of those virtues, Elyot 
proceeds to show how that dialectical process creates many others: 
 And in this wise fierceness joined with mildness maketh severity; audacity with 
timorosity maketh magnanimity; willful opinion and tractability . . . maketh 
constancy a virtue; covetousness of glory adorned with benignity causeth honour; 
desire of knowledge with a sure remembrance procureth sapience; shamefastness 
joined to appetite of generation maketh continence, which is a mean between 
chastity and inordinate lust. (78) 
 
As an ideological compromise, this process presents an ostensible paradox, for dancing 
enables the continuation of the performative virtue of traditional male aggression even as 
it dialectically choreographs boys and young men beyond it.  Significantly, what allows 
aristocratic men to have it both ways— to be aggressive and restrained at the same 
time— is that Elyot replaces the battlefield for the dance-floor and male-only armed 
combat for hetero-social couples dancing.  Indeed, Elyot offers men couples dancing as a 
kind of war of the sexes, and, with the physical and dispositional advantages afforded 
them by traditional military exercises, male victory is as certain as John Donne’s 
chauvinistic declaration in “The Sun Rising”: “She is all states, and all princes I,/Nothing 
else is” (21-22).  The alternative pleasure of this performative symbolic violence 
effectively mystifies a dialectical or hybridizing process that actually synthesizes both 
male and female qualities into a supremely virtuous male governor or courtier.  In that 
regard, those female qualities are not all bad; in fact, as a balance to those male ones, 
they’re all necessary.  As I will explore at length in my chapter-seven discussion of 
Elyot’s Defence of Good Women and my chapter eight discussion of Shakespeare’s The 
Taming of the Shrew, that’s what arguably explains the ambivalent way in which Elyot, 
Shakespeare, and other educational theorists perceived learned women; women are mild, 
passive, and weak, but they are also benign, docile, and sure of remembrance.  In other 
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words, they possess the qualities necessary for learning as well as nonviolent court 
service.  The cost, however, of appropriating those qualities for the domestication of men 
is that women become the objects or targets of the symbolic and potentially real violence 
of male aggression now tenuously sublimated in the performative enactment of couples 
dancing. 
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Chapter Four: 
Gentle Instruction and the “Lay[ing]” Queen in Roger Ascham’s The Schoolmaster 
(1570) 
 
In “Latin Language Study as a Renaissance Puberty Rite,” Walter Ong argues 
“that when Latin . . . became by the time of the Renaissance a “dead” language— a 
language which, however widely used, was divorced from family life— initiation into the 
language became more than ever a [male] rite de passage” (122).  In other words, Latin 
became an essential part of an extra-familial toughening up process— a process that 
necessarily included corporal punishment— that turned boys into men and thereby 
distinguished them from the girls and women left back home.  For Ong, Roger Ascham’s 
example of Lady Jane Grey in The Schoolmaster (1570) ironically illustrates this 
difference in sex-gender expectations and socialization:       
Ascham does not pause to note that, rather than straightforwardly contrasting 
schooling based on kindness with schooling based on physical punishment, his 
example really contrasts the romantic world of a maturing young girl with the 
rough-and-tumble world of his society prescribed for young boys.  Despite 
Ascham’s attempt to make something else out of his example, what is remarkable 
about Lady Jane is not that she is not flogged— Master Elmer [her tutor] certainly 
could not have flogged her— but that she is studying the classics instead of 
hunting.  (121) 
 
The question remains, why in a treatise about the education of gentry and aristocratic 
boys does Ascham present Lady Jane as well as Queen Elizabeth as exemplars of Latin 
learning to begin with?  Why, in other words, does Ascham run the risk of reminding his 
(predominantly male) readership of the military ethos of the medieval period that 
dismissed education as effeminating, instead of more simply and more safely 
emphasizing the classical link between learning and performative military masculinity 
that Sidney would attempt about ten years later?  Questions of authorial intention 
notwithstanding, Ascham’s selection of Lady Jane and Elizabeth, I think, represents far 
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more than an oddly chosen example that inadvertently or unintentionally reveals the 
contrasting sex-gender socialization of early modern English society.  Rather, it 
significantly— and perhaps intentionally— reveals the extent to which masculinity and 
femininity— manhood and womanhood— are mutually constitutive socio-biological and 
sociopolitical categories.  What I think Ong misses here is that, in terms of performative 
masculinity, it might have been even more remarkable or potentially subversive to sex-
gender distinctions for Ascham to have witnessed Lady Jane engaged in or interested in 
hunting or at least an educational program balanced between study and hunting.  Instead, 
for Jane, gender-appropriate study, as a sedentary activity generally deleterious to the 
male-humoral body, is perfectly appropriate for an aristocratic woman’s constitutively 
weak, cold, and therefore inferior body. 55   
Perhaps because Ascham’s focus, as the other educational theorists of the period, 
is the male-only world of the grammar school, what has often been overlooked or 
cursorily commented on is the extent to which exemplary aristocratic women function in 
his treatise as negative-somatic ideals against which performative masculinity and male 
physical and intellectual superiority are defined.  In that regard, for a man whose place in 
English political and educational history depends centrally on his association with two 
                                                 
55 In a way that ostensibly contradicts what I have been saying about performative masculinity and sex-
gender distinctions, Ascham reports that when he met with Jane her “parents, the duke and the duchess, 
with all the household, gentlemen and gentlewomen, were hunting in the park” (35).  It would, however, be 
an oversimplification to conclude that men and women performed identical or equal roles on a hunt. 
Classical-mythological figures like Diana, Cynthia, and Belphoebe notwithstanding, “actual” early modern 
aristocratic women, including Elizabeth, didn’t engage in hunting in more than a supportive, although at 
times authorizing, capacity.  See chapter one of Gregory M. Colón Semenza’s Sport, Politics, and 
Literature in the English Renaissance for an informative, though somewhat celebratory, discussion of 
women’s participation in aristocratic sports.             
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women,56 it is indeed somewhat ironic that his major educational treatise so thoroughly 
attempts to establish a myth of male somatic and intellectual superiority only slightly but 
significantly qualified by female authority and influence.  This attempt begins 
immediately— really before the treatise itself begins— in the first few sentences of 
Ascham’s “A Preface to the Reader”: 
When the great plague was at London, the year 1563, the Queen’s Majesty Queen 
Elizabeth lay at her castle of Windsor, where, upon the tenth day of December, it 
fortuned that in Sir William Cecil’s chamber, Her Highness’ principal secretary, 
there dined together these personages: Master Secretary himself, Sir William 
Petre, Sir John Mason, Doctor Wotton, Sir Richard Sackville, Treasurer of the 
Exchequer, Sir Walter Mildmay, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Master Haddon, 
Master of Requests, Master John Astley, Master of the Jewel House, Master 
Bernard Hampton, Master Nicasius, and I. . . .  I was glad then, and do rejoice yet 
to remember, that my chance was so happy to be there that day in the company of 
so many wise and good men together as hardly then could have been picked out 
again out of all England beside. (5; my italics) 
 
For as much as Elizabeth represented the political-gravitational center which drew these 
men to Windsor castle, Ascham’s account ultimately pulls them off-center, fortunately, as 
he characterizes it, landing them in Cecil’s chamber for dinner.57  This masculinist drift 
importantly establishes Cecil’s hieratic axiality (or formal center), and it is indeed his 
axial position that authorizes the attempt of these exemplary “wise and good” men to 
solve the problem of corporal punishment driving school boys away from the education 
essential to turning them into the kinds of distinguished men Ascham finds that night 
assembled at Cecil’s dinner table. 58   In effect, the contrast between Elizabeth “laying,”59 
                                                 
56 Of course, his contemporary and historical reputation owes much to the fact that he tutored Queen 
Elizabeth, and his wife, Margaret Ascham, was instrumental in getting The Schoolmaster— his major 
educational treatise— published after his death. 
57 That these men met in Cecil’s chamber for a meal is arguably not just a passing insignificant detail, for 
eating, as Michael Schoenfeldt argues and as I will discuss further in the next chapter, was key to early 
modern self-fashioning.  
58 I borrow this quite technical spatial term from David Smith’s “Portrait and Counter-Portrait in Holbein's 
The Family of Sir Thomas More.”  Smith asserts that we should not understand the Portrait as motivated by 
Holbein’s desire to capture, like a photograph, the More family actually engaged in a learned and pious 
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as if defenseless or even an inanimate object, at Windsor and Cecil eating with and 
surrounded by ten of her most important councilors and agents highlights the extent to 
which Ascham represents Elizabeth as a sedentary, marginal, silent, and ultimately 
absent-present queen. 
One of those men, Richard Sackville, is so  impressed with Ascham’s defense of 
the non-violent Platonic-Socratic method of education and so desperate to make sure that 
his infant grandson, Robert, receives a better education than his own or his son’s that 
after dinner he approaches Ascham in the Queen’s privy chamber, where Ascham has 
retired to read Greek with the Queen: “Sir Richard Sackville,” Ascham describes, “came 
up soon after [dinner], and, finding me in Her Majesty’s privy chamber, he took me by 
the hand, and [carried] me to a window. . .” (7).  The extended one-on-one conversation 
goes so well and is so informative that Sackville concludes it by imploring Ascham to 
“put in some order of writing the chief points of this talk concerning the right order of 
teaching and honesty of living for the good bringing up of children and young men” (8).  
As we know, The Schoolmaster, despite Ascham’s initial reluctance to accept the project, 
is the product of that fortunate night of conversation and Sackville’s specific request.  But 
for our purposes, what is most important and most striking is that that all-male dinner 
party takes place in one of Elizabeth’s castles and Ascham’s separate conversation with 
                                                                                                                                                 
activity, but as “a highly constructed image” (485).  Specifically, he argues that the contradiction between 
the formality of More’s pose—which he describes as “nearly concoct[ing] a hieratic axiality” (487) for 
More—and the informality of the surrounding figures creates an ironic, subversive, ambivalent, and 
centrifugal re-presentation of More’s public identity.  That is, the Portrait’s informality is a visual method 
by which More, through Holbein, displays his Lucianic inspired self-deprecating sense of humor, his 
humanistic taste for ceremonial play, and his distaste for medieval rituals. 
59 See Karen Cunningham’s “‘She Learns as She Lies’: Work and the Exemplary Female in English Early 
Modern Education”   
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Sackville takes place right in her privy chamber.  While the precise proxemic60 
orientation, to borrow E.T. Hall’s term, of these men to the queen is unclear, a distinct 
homosocial intimacy— men eating, talking, and even touching as they talk about the 
gentle or violent touch of the schoolmaster— characterizes the scenes that we have 
discussed.  In Ascham’s celebratory narrative of homosocial male superiority, there is no 
place for a woman, not even a monarch.  We are therefore left to wonder where Elizabeth 
is physically in relationship to these men as well as where she is philosophically on the 
education of English boys. 
While it is possible that Elizabeth’s exclusion from that intimacy has something to 
do with protecting her from the plague or perhaps with the quotidian ceremonial protocol 
that governed her movements around or proximity to others, Ascham’s treatise, 
specifically his translation of Socrates’s “seven plain notes [or characteristics] to choose 
a good wit in a child for learning” (27; my italics), reveals that something else is also 
going on.  Although Ascham promises that he will “plainly declare in English what 
[those characteristics] mean and how aptly they be linked and how orderly they follow 
one another” (27), his translation of them— 1) bodily facilities; 2) memory quick to 
receive and sure to keep; 3) love of learning; 4) lust to labor; 5) ability to learn from 
others  6) boldness to ask any questions; and 7) love to be praised of well-doing—  
significantly eliminates one of the most distinctive and perhaps most revolutionary 
                                                 
60 In The Hidden Dimension, Hall defines “proxemics” as “the interrelated observations and theories of 
man’s use of space as a specialized elaboration of culture” (1).  Consistent with much of his other research, 
this study largely explores the culturally contingent nature and cross-cultural importance of social-somatic 
distance.   
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aspects of Socrates’s proposal: women are included in this evaluative-educational 
process.61   
In Socrates’s estimation, the family, like private property, must be abolished 
because it is a source of the dissension and individualism antithetical to the unity or 
“community in pleasures and pains” (703) necessary for a just social order, a social order, 
in other words, where “when one citizen fares well or ill, men will pronounce in unison . . 
. It [sic] is mine that does well, or, It [sic] is mine that does ill” (703).  Initially, Socrates 
merely states that, in this society, women and children are to be held in common. But, 
after several of the dialogue’s participants— Polemachus, Adimantus, and Glaucon— 
accuse him of laziness for not taking the time to define or explain this radical re-ordering 
of social bonds, Socrates takes them and us through a distinctively Socratic process that 
powerfully begins with a redefinition of human nature and specifically the understanding 
of the relationship between professional-administrative capabilities and the gendered 
body.  Drawing on the pack behavior of watchdogs, Socrates concludes that if the bearing 
and breeding of whelps does not prevent female dogs from sharing in guarding and 
hunting duties, then “we are to use the women for the same things as the men [and 
therefore] we must teach them [music and gymnastics]” (691), which Socrates 
established as the most useful subjects for guardian-warriors.  He also gets the dialogue 
participants to accept that it would be ridiculous to argue that the nature of hairiness or 
baldness should disqualify men—and perhaps women— from tasks and responsibilities 
                                                 
61 In fact, the section of The Republic that describes the first characteristic (V.455b)  ironically begins with 
Socrates accepting the task of an explanatory plainness exactly opposite to Ascham’s: “Shall we,” Socrates 
proposes to the skeptical dialogue participants, “beg the raisers of such objections [to the belief that sex-
gender doesn’t matter] to follow us, if we may perhaps prove able to make it plain to him that there is no 
pursuit connected with the administration of the a state that is peculiar to a woman?” (694; my italics).  As 
Lawrence V. Ryan identifies, Socrates describes points two through six in VII.535B-D.  However, Ryan is 
unable to find a Platonic source for the seventh point, love of praise.        
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that have nothing to do with whether one has hair.  It would be ridiculous, in other words, 
to say that a man’s hairiness or baldness qualifies or disqualifies him to be, for instance, a 
cobbler.   
While, for Socrates, women, like children, remain the individual or collective 
possessions of men to be used one way or another, what is so potentially revolutionary 
about his proposal—in fact, so ridiculous to his time, as he admits— is that it rejects the 
belief that physical differences generally and gender differences specifically are 
determinative of professional-administrative capabilities.  Socrates significantly clarifies, 
We meant, for example, that a man and a woman who have a physician’s mind 
have the same nature. . . .  But if it appears that [women] differ in just this respect 
that the female bears and the male begets, we shall say that no proof has yet been 
produced that the woman differs from the man for our purposes.  (693) 
 
In the just city, it is accepted, as a matter of nature, that both men and women can possess 
a physician’s mind and therefore it is possible for both to be physicians.  Of course, this 
specific example is of particular relevance to our discussion, for its subordination of sex-
gender differentiation is a far cry from the somatically-based limitations and ultimate 
displacement of professional women that we have thus far examined in early modern 
obstetrical and gynecological treatises.   
In that regard, Ascham’s “plain” translation of Socrates’s characteristics— much 
like Guillemeau’s translation of the Agnodicea story— is hardly that.  Rather, in a way 
that complements his prologue’s displacement of Elizabeth, it engages in a process of 
translating women out of the professional-administrative hierarchy of early modern 
society.  Indeed, Ascham’s treatise is all about the determinative nature of the sexed-
gendered body and specifically the superiority of the male body and mind.  For instance, 
after describing “the parts of the body that must another day serve learning” (27) as “not 
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troubled, mangled, and halved, but sound, whole, full and able to do their office” (27-28), 
he goes on to specify the ideal qualities of those parts:  
a tongue not stammering or overhardly drawing forth words, but plain and ready 
to deliver the meaning of the mind; a voice not soft, weak, piping, womanish, but 
audible, strong, and manlike; a countenance not [sickly-looking] and crabbed but 
fair and comely; a personage not wretched and deformed but tall and goodly; for 
surely a comely countenance with a goodly stature giveth credit to learning and 
authority to the person. . . .  And how can a comely body be better employed than 
to serve the fairest exercise of God’s greatest gift, and that is learning.  But 
commonly the fairest bodies are bestowed on the foulest purposes.   
       (28; my italics) 
 
In the early modern period, as Patricia Parker points out, the tongue as the central 
instrument of learned or copious speech was always a potential synecdoche of the female 
body and effeminacy. 62  Therefore, Ascham is careful to emphasize that the ideal (male) 
tongue produces a distinctly masculine voice, “a voice” as he describes it, “not soft, 
weak, piping, womanish, but audible, strong, and manlike.”  But, as we have also seen, 
virile-military action above speech remains a central defining aspect of masculinity in the 
period, and Ascham’s challenge is to persuade those somatically and materially oriented 
fathers— fathers who associate learning with somatic deformity and implicitly 
effeminacy63— that learning, which Ascham attempts to re-present as God’s greatest gift, 
is, in fact, “the fairest exercise” for a sound and comely male body.  With that in mind, it 
makes sense that Ascham eliminates Socrates’s questioning and ultimate subordination of  
                                                 
62See Patricia Parker’s “On the Tongue: Cross-Gendering, Effeminacy, and the Art of Words.”  In this 
essay, Parker again critiques Greenblatt’s argument for the male teleology of the one-sex model and 
concludes, “For if one text Greenblatt does not mention anxiously envisages the reverse of the normative 
teleology as the ‘preposterous’ degeneration of men into effeminacy, it is precisely this possibility that 
traverses the arts of word, in which men of the period found themselves engaged, in texts ranging from the 
debates over style to the more exclusively English phenomenon of transvestite theater.  The spectre of 
effeminacy is one that haunts, with remarkable commonality of instances, the whole province of the 
lingual: the model of the quintessential male— the laconic Spartans who eschew words in favor of more 
virile deeds— occupies the later antitheatrical literature just as it does the discussion of style in [Erasmus’s] 
Lingua of 1525” (459).       
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sex-gender differentiation, for he is attempting to establish for learning greater legitimacy 
by linking it to the ideal male body, by, in other words, embracing the materialistic and 
masculinist biases of the-still-dominant aristocratic culture of the early modern period: 
“for surely a comely countenance,” he asserts, “with a goodly stature giveth credit to 
learning and authority to the person” (28).64 
 Ascham’s attempt to link the authorizing male body to learning—his attempt, in 
other words, to materialize and thereby masculinize learning for those fathers— comes in 
the form of a series of materializing analogies.  Learning “is a marvelous jewel in the 
world” (28) and should be set in a sound and comely body “as a fair stone requireth to be 
set in the finest gold with the best workmanship” (28); “the pure clean wit of a sweet 
young babe,” he also insists, “is, like the newest wax, most able to receive the best and 
fairest printing and, like a new bright silver dish never occupied, to receive and keep 
clean any good thing that is put into it” (34);  and also, “nobility governed by learning 
and wisdom is indeed most like a fair ship, having tide and wind at will, under the rule of 
a skillful master” (41).   It is with these analogies— learning, cognitive ability, and social 
rank factored as jewels, wax, dishes, ships, tides, winds, captains— that Ascham attempts 
to persuade his readers that learning is not a sedentary-effeminating activity which only 
engages in obscure theoretical abstractions but “the fairest exercise” with dynamic, 
tangible, and therefore valuable effects on the minds and bodies of well-born male 
children.   
                                                                                                                                                 
63 Ascham explains, “For if a father have four sons, three fair and well formed both mind and body, the 
fourth wretched, lame and deformed, his choice shall be to put the worst to learning as one good enough to 
become a scholar” (28). 
64 Ascham chooses not to include examples of the “foulest purposes” thought most appropriate for the 
comely body.  Perhaps the inclusion of traditional virile military action would have damaged or at least 
weakened his case for education as a comparable exercise.     
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The materialization of learning also significantly implies the materialization of the 
mind.  Put differently, it only stands to reason that materialized processes either already 
work on materialized objects or, at the very least, physically or imaginatively materialize 
those otherwise immaterial objects.  Therefore, this characterization of learning as “the 
fairest exercise” arguably invokes both the physical and cognitive senses of the word 
“exercise” conveyed in several Oxford English Dictionary entries.  The seventh entry, 
however, is the sense of the word most consistent with Ascham’s process.  While several 
of the other nine entries—especially 5a, 6a, and 8— suggest that exercise is a broadly 
applicable, interchangeable term that can be applied to the mind or body, the seventh 
entry presents learning as a somatically rooted character-developmental process which 
entails the exercise and development of the body as necessary to the health and 
development of the mind.65 Ascham’s Toxophilus (1545), a general defense of exercise 
and pastimes and a specific defense of archery, presents two particularly vivid examples 
of this interconnection: 
Princes being children ought to be brought up in shooting; both because it is an  
exercise most wholesome, and also a pastime most honest: wherein labor prepares 
the body to hardness, the mind to courageousness, suffering neither the one to be 
marred with tenderness, nor yet the other to be hurt with idleness: as we read how 
Sardanapalus and such other were, because they were not brought up with 
outward honest painful pastimes to be men: but cockered up with inward naughty 
idle wantonness to be women. (53) 
 
And, 
   
A pastime, says Aristotle, must be like a medicine.  Medicines stand by 
contraries, therefore the nature of studying considered, the fittest pastime should 
soon appear.  In study every part of the body is idle, which causes gross and cold 
humors, to gather together and vex scholars very much, the mind is altogether 
                                                 
65 For instance, entry 5.a defines exercise as “The action or process of training or drilling scholars, troops, 
etc.”; 6.a “Practice for the sake of training or improvement, either bodily, mental, or spiritual”; 7 “Exertion 
of muscles, limbs, and bodily powers, regarded with reference to its effect on the subject”; 8 “A task 
prescribed or performed for the sake of attaining proficiency, for training either body or mind. . . .” 
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bent and set on work.  A pastime then must be had where every part of the body 
must labored to separate and lessen such humors withal: the mind must be unbent, 
to gather and fetch again his quickness withal. (60) 
 
In the first instance, while an educational program that includes archery as an “outward 
honest [and] painful pastime” produces the masculine ideal of hard bodies and 
courageous minds, an antithetical program that allows the negative feminine qualities of 
“inward naughty idle wantonness” threatens to prevent men from realizing that masculine 
ideal.  In the second instance, Ascham likens exercise to a medicine that counteracts the 
effeminating idleness of study that bends the mind and causes gross and cold humors to 
accumulate in the body.  Exercise, in effect, refreshes or unbends the mind by lessening 
those humors.  It is precisely these examples of mind-body interconnection and the 
opposition between outward-oriented masculinity and inward-oriented femininity that 
allows Ascham to advocate for the elimination of corporal punishment from grammar 
schools without sacrificing the rite-of-passage function of those schools in the sixteenth 
century.  In other words, Ascham’s privileging of the ideal embodied masculine mind 
enables him to replace corporal punishment with a learning process re-defined to include 
physically rigorous methods or honest and painful pastimes that function to exclude girls 
and women and turn boys into men.  
After arguing against corporal punishment and for the kind of gentle instruction 
that would instill a love of learning, Ascham identifies the freedom or “license” (38), as 
he terms it, that “rich and great men” (40) grant their children from seventeen to twenty-
seven as another problem or “discommodity” that “hindereth learning and virtue and [the] 
good bringing-up of youth” (38).  This belief that “license” is antithetical to learning as 
well as a love of learning importantly challenges the way in which the Renaissance and 
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Renaissance education specifically are still popularly read in terms of our own prevailing 
myths of autonomous individuality. 66  For Ascham, learning is fundamentally about 
discipline, order, and obedience, and the freedom that typically accompanied the young 
adulthood—which to Ascham is “the most dangerous time of all a man’s life and most 
slippery to stay well in” (40) — of well-born and well-to-do children makes those 
children lustful and disobedient and in effect wastes “the great cost and charge” (40) of 
their education.   
Ascham proceeds to play on social-rank antagonism in an attempt to persuade the 
aristocracy that its very survival, as Lawrence Stone argues, depends on the abandonment 
of “this evil” practice of an undisciplined life: “This evil is not common with poor men” 
(40), he warns, and as a result “commonly the meaner men’s children come to be the 
wisest counselors and the greatest doers in the weighty affairs of this realm” (40).  
Ascham also attempts to persuade these parents to take greater control of their late-
pubescent and young-adult children by citing both classical and biblical examples.  First, 
he cites Xenophon’s account of “the old noble Persians  
. . . whose children to the age of twenty-one year were brought up in learning and 
exercises of labor, and that in such place where they should neither see that was 
                                                 
66 In From Humanism to the Humanities, Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine challenge the view—still held 
by many humanities teachers and departments— that what justified and continues to justify the teaching of 
the humanities is that it shapes its students into moral and virtuous individuals prepared for and inclined to 
public service or participation. After an impressively detailed examination of textbooks, students’ notes and 
compositions, and tutors’ diaries and letters, the authors reconstruct educational scenes characterized not by 
profound character shaping but the rigorous drilling of superficial matters that instead fostered the 
development of obedient and docile character traits. In that regard, the authors assert that the humanist 
curriculum didn’t replace medieval scholasticism because of its inexorable elevation of the free and 
engaged individual but because it produced types of subjects—obedient and docile—that “fitted the needs 
of the new Europe that was taking shape, with its closed governing elites, hereditary offices and strenuous 
efforts to close off debate on vital political and social questions” (xiv). This demystification of the humanist 
ideal/theory and the exploration of the historical relationship between educational practice and 
sociopolitical needs will, the authors seem to hope, enable us to confront that our acceptance of the ideal 
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uncomely nor hear was unhonest” (38).  Cyrus the Great exemplifies the benefits of this 
rigorous, extended educational program, for even “after he conquered Babylon and 
subdued . . . Asia Minor” (39), he would not accept Cyaxares’s—his uncle’s— offer of 
his daughter to wife, before consulting with his parents.  Next, he cites “strong” 
Sampson, who “saw a maid that liked him, but he spake not to her, but went home to his 
father and his mother and desired both mother and father to make the marriage for him” 
(39).  And finally, in the last and perhaps most significant example, Ascham summarizes 
the section of Isocrates’s Areopagiticus that describes “the care that the noble city of 
Athens had to bring up their youth in honest company and virtuous discipline” (46): 
The city was not more careful to see their children well taught than to see their 
young men well governed, which they brought to pass not so much by common 
law as by private discipline.  For they had more regard that their youth by good 
order should not offend than by law they might be punished, and if offense were 
committed there was neither way to hide it, neither hope to pardon for it.  Good 
natures were not so much openly praised as they were secretly marked and 
watchfully regarded, lest they should lose the goodness they had.  Therefore in 
schools of singing and dancing, and other honest exercises, governors were 
appointed, more diligent to oversee their good manners than their masters were to 
teach them any learning.  It was some shame to a young man to be seen in the 
open market, and if for business he passed through it, he did it with a marvelous 
modesty and bashful fashion.  To eat and drink in a tavern was not only a shame 
but also punishable in a young man.  To contrary or to stand in terms with an old 
man was more heinous than in some place to rebuke and scold with his own 
father. (47)  
 
The Athenian system successfully produced shameful, bashful, modest, and ultimately 
obedient young men not by focusing on the discursive-ideological content of learning and 
the kinds of juridical methods— presumably methods like corporal punishment— that 
young men can run away from or be pardoned from.  Rather, it focused on what we might 
describes as a proto-Foucauldian disciplinary process that internalizes obedient 
                                                                                                                                                 
has allowed us to evade education’s complicity with the establishment as well as to understand that the 
Humanities are so embattled today because they no longer serve the needs of the establishment.  
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dispositions in young men through the diligent surveillance of training in honest exercises 
and good manners.67  Exercise, therefore, does not only represent an alternative method 
by which to turn boys into men, it also represents a more effective alternative method by 
which to control them.   
For Ascham, these examples represent less the peculiarities of the ancient and 
biblical past than precisely the kinds of cultural practices that early modern England is in 
desperate need of.  In fact, things are so bad in Ascham’s England that “not only young 
gentlemen, but even very girls,” he laments, “dare without all fear, though not without 
open shame, [that is, public disgrace,] where they list, and how they list, marry 
themselves in spite of father, mother, God, good order, and all” (39).  It is indeed 
significant that disobedient-lustful daughters— the children, in other words, with the 
most defective minds and bodies— emerge as illustrative instances to make the point of 
the critical need for a bodily-centered educational program.  And while I will more 
extensively examine the matters of women’s sexuality and education in chapter three of 
this study, in Ascham’s treatise women and their bodies, as I have pointed out with 
Elizabeth and Lady Jane Grey, function as negative ideals which disappear as quickly as 
they materialize for men to define themselves against.  For instance, immediately after 
identifying disobedient-lustful daughters, Ascham returns to sons: 
 The cause of this evil is that youth is least looked unto when they stand most need 
                                                 
67As we see in  2 Henry IV, Henry V, and Hamlet, this disciplinary method is more effective than efficient; 
both Prince Hal’s time with Falstaff in the Eastcheap tavern and Hamlet’s delay represent sons struggling 
to obey fathers, and forms of exercise are key to their eventual obedience.  Also, in “Foucault and Utopia: 
Politics and New Historicism” (from Reading Tudor-Stuart Texts Through Cultural Historicism), Albert H. 
Tricomi demonstrates that “the regulatory disciplines of power, which Foucault locates in the eighteenth 
century, actually have a much longer history, since they were already being formulated in detail in More’s 
Utopia” (42).  Ascham’s reference to Isocrates’s Areopagiticus establishes an even longer history.  Lastly, 
for a study that thoroughly fleshes out the significance of Foucauldian theories of power, domination, 
identity, and freedom to sport and exercise, see Pirkko Markula and Richard Pringle’s Foucault, Sport and 
Exercise: Power, Knowledge and Transforming the Self. 
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of good keep and regard.  It availeth not to see them well taught in young years 
and after, when they come to lust and youthful days, to give them license to live 
as they lust themselves.  For if we suffer the eye of a young gentleman once to be 
entangled with vain sights, and the ear to be corrupted with fond and filthy talk, 
the mind shall quickly fall sick and soon vomit and cast up all the wholesome 
doctrine that he received in childhood, though he were never so well brought up 
before.  And being once englutted with vanity, he will straightway loathe all 
learning and all good counsel to the same (39-40) 
 
The subtle shift from the gender neutral pronouns “they” and “them” to “young 
gentlemen” and the masculine pronoun “he” significantly illustrates the extent to which 
Ascham is ultimately not concerned with disobedient-lustful daughters but rather with 
what is necessary to protect the embodied minds of young gentlemen from a corrupt 
world with erotic temptations— some of which presumably come in the form of someone 
else’s disobedient-lustful daughters— that attack those minds through the eyes and the 
ears.  Therefore, the consequences of materializing the mind in order to masculinize it— 
the consequence, in other words, of imaging “the wholesome doctrine” of  learning as 
food and the ideal mind as an ingesting and digesting masculine body— is that bad food 
or improper diet can sicken the mind, causing it to vomit. 
These are the reasons why Ascham and other educational theorists of the period 
are so insistent on— really obsessive about— the importance of exercise as a part of a 
humanistic program.  The Athenian example importantly provides a strong classical 
justification that allows Ascham to counteract the perception that exercise is too trifling a 
matter to devote considerable time to.  “[F]or the selfsame noble city of Athens,” Ascham 
explains, 
justly commended of me before, did wisely and upon great consideration appoint 
the Muses, Apollo, and Pallas to be patrons of learning to their youth.  For the 
Muses, besides learning, were also ladies of dance, mirth, and minstrelsy; Apollo  
was god of shooting and author of cunning playing upon instruments; Pallas also 
was lady mistress in wars.  Whereby was nothing else meant but that learning 
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should be always mingled with honest mirth and comely exercises, and that war 
also should be governed by learning and moderated by wisdom.  (52-53)             
 
Although Ascham does not restate the disciplinary role of “honest mirth” and “comely 
exercise,” these activities in the Athenian belief system as well as humanistic theory and 
practice are primarily about the development of obedient male children.  Of course, what 
is most striking about Ascham’s description of that system is the complex way in which 
male and female deities represent socio-educational ideals and practices intended 
exclusively for “real” young men.  However, in the very next paragraph devoted to the 
early modern context, Ascham again makes clear, perhaps unintentionally, that the 
function of and possibilities for idealized-mythological women should not be confused 
with the function of and possibilities for “real” women: 
Therefore, to ride comely, to run fair at the tilt and ring, to play at all weapons, to 
shoot fair in bow and surely in gun, to vault lustily, to run, to leap, to wrestle, to 
swim, to dance comely, to sing and play of instruments cunningly, to hawk, to 
hunt, to play at tennis, and all pastimes generally which be joined with labor, used 
in open place and on the daylight, containing either some fit exercise for war or 
some pleasant pastime for peace, be not only comely and decent but also very 
necessary for a courtly gentleman to use.  (53)  
 
The last text that Ascham cites in defense of exercise is a more contemporary one: 
Baldesar Castiglione’s The Book of the Courtier (Italian 1528; English 1561).  
Significantly, as Joan Kelly-Gadol argues in “Did Women Have a Renaissance?”, 
Castiglione represents noble women— specifically Elisabetta Gonzaga, the Duchess of 
Urbino— as physically present but politically marginal to early modern Italian court 
society: “The men,” she concludes, “do all the talking; and the ensuing dialogue on 
manners and love, as we might expect, is not only developed by men but directed toward 
their interests” (343).  In Kelly-Gadol’s estimation, what explains this marginalization of 
noblewomen in the Renaissance is a shift from feudalism, which supported the cultural 
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activity of those women, to the bourgeois states and despotic monarchical regimes that 
didn’t recognize the more empowering feudal institutions.  In terms of education, Kelly-
Gadol explains that the education of noblemen and women were “symmetrical,” except 
that women’s education focused on “charm” and therefore excluded the kinds of physical 
activities like riding and handling weapons intended to prepare men for military service.  
Also, in what is perhaps the most powerful and counterintuitive of Kelly-Gadol’s claims, 
humanism, for as much as “[i]t brought Latin literacy and classical learning to daughters 
as well as sons of the nobility” (344), transferred the early nonmilitary training of boys 
and girls from the educated lady to the humanistic tutor or boarding school: “Adopting 
the universalistic outlook of their humanist teachers,” Kelly-Gadol concludes, “the noble-
women of Renaissance Italy seem to have lost all consciousness of their particular 
interests as women, while male authors such as Castiglione . . . wrote their works for 
men” (344).  While I am not comfortable with Kelly-Gadol’s speculation about women’s 
consciousness, I do agree, as I have been arguing about The Schoolmaster, that 
aristocratic women occupy a paradoxical present but marginal position.  It is therefore 
significant that The Book of the Courtier is Ascham’s last example in support of exercise, 
mainly martial exercise, because both texts— both authors— see exercise as a way of 
establishing and maintaining the dominance of men over women in societies with women 
in positions of authority.  
 However, after Ascham points out that “actual” examples are ultimately more 
effective than textual ones, than “good precepts in books in all kinds of tongues” (55), he 
“list[s]” or desires not to identify an actual living example.  First, as we might expect, he 
identifies Edward: “If Edward had lived a little longer,” he laments, “his only example 
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had bred such a race of worthy learned gentlemen as this realm never yet did afford” (55) 
(see Fig. 7); he then identifies the Duke of Suffolk and Lord Henry Maltravers, who 
“were such two examples to the court for learning as our time may rather wish than look 
for again” (55); lastly, he turns to educators and identifies Sir John Cheke and Doctor 
John Redman, who “by their only example of excellency in learning, of godliness in 
living, of diligency in studying, of counsel in exhorting, of good order in all thing, did 
breed up so many learned men in that one College of St. John’s” (56).  These exemplary 
though dead young men and the types of men who were committed to educating them 
allow Ascham to praise those young men as well as their developmental potential without 
raising potentially treasonous questions about Elizabeth’s authority.  That is why the only 
living example that Ascham can safely identify is Elizabeth herself.  However, as we 
have examined in both medical and educational discourses, Elizabeth or any woman is a 
flawed, incomplete, or negative example.  Therefore, rather than providing the kind of 
complete and positive model of learned masculinity that Edward, Suffolk, and Maltravers 
provide even to a certain extent in death, her imperfection or incompleteness as defined 
by her sex-gender status functions to shame young men into fully becoming men (see 
Figs. 9 and 10): 
 It is your shame (I speak to you all, you young gentlemen of England) that one 
maid should go beyond all in excellency of learning and knowledge of divers 
tongues.  Point forth six of the best-given gentlemen of court, and all they 
together show not so much good will, spend not so much time, bestow not so 
many hours, daily, orderly, and constantly, for the increase of learning and 
knowledge as doth the Queen’s Majesty herself. . . .  And that which is most 
praiseworthy of all, within the walls of her privy chamber she hath obtained the 
excellency of learning, to understand, speak, and write, both wittily with head and 
fair with hand, as scarce one or two rare wits in both the universities have in many 
years reached unto.  (56) 
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With the materialization of learning as a manly exercise or activity, Elizabeth’s learning 
becomes especially remarkable because it is achieved despite her bodily imperfection and 
the sedentary constraints appropriate to it, despite, in other words, it taking place “within 
the walls of her privy chamber” (see Fig. 8).  Of course, her shaming function— her 
function as a qualified negative ideal for young noblemen— implicitly critiques her 
authority.  It is as if Ascham is saying that noblemen cannot only match Elizabeth’s 
learning but can— indeed, should be able to—  surpass it, or even perhaps that there are 
already some noblemen who have.  This is precisely the kind of misogynistic thinking 
about the embodied minds of women that may have led Henry to make the fateful 
decision to displace Jane Seymour’s midwives during Edward’s birth.  Indeed, Ascham’s 
treatise engages in a similar process of displacing women in favor of an alternative world 
defined by male mind-body superiority and homosocial intimacy, a world of the living as 
well as the dead with male doctors, male teachers, and male children beyond the care and 
expertise of medical women and the authority of a learned queen.    
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Chapter Five: 
Richard Mulcaster’s (Ig)noble Lie and the Body Politic in Positions Concerning the 
Bringing Up of Children (1581) 
 
 Richard Mulcaster was not just an educational theorist (as Elyot) or a royal tutor 
(as Ascham); he was actually headmaster of the largest grammar school in London and 
the second largest in the country, the Merchant Taylors’ School (MTS), for just about two 
decades by the time he published his major educational treatise Positions Concerning the 
Training Up of Children (1581).  Both the name and the size of the school reflect the 
emerging power of merchants in the period as well as the important role that the 
philanthropic investment of their capital played in making sure that education (as a means 
of sociopolitical advancement) was not reserved for boys of already wealthy and/or well-
placed families.  Specifically, according to the school statute, “of the 250 pupils a 
hundred, being ‘poor men’s sons’, were to have their education free; fifty more, also 
designated as poor, were to pay 2s. 2d. a quarter while the quarterage was 5s. for the 
remaining hundred, ‘rich or mean men’s children’ ” (Simon 306).  More specifically, the 
printed register of the school for the period of Mulcaster’s tenure as headmaster names 
859 boys and, of that number, 692 include the occupations of fathers, which ranged from 
shoemaker, innkeeper, fishmonger, scrivener, goldsmith, plasterer, carpenter, plumber, 
baker, etc.  Significantly, “[o]nly a tiny 3 percent,” as the editor of the most recent 
modern edition of Positions terms it, “were professional men, such as doctors, lawyers, or 
clergymen” (Mulcaster 1xvi).  By making education accessible to such a diverse cross-
section of the English population, the MTS, as other grammar schools founded by 
individual merchants and merchant guilds, contributed to the social mobility that 
aristocrats found so threatening to their sociopolitical power.   
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While some scholars of early modern education conclude that Mulcaster’s treatise 
effectively “bridges the social strata of tradesman and gentleman” (Mulcaster 1xvi) or 
even that it represents a “quasidemocratic advocacy of equal educational training for all 
people” (Semenza 46), others more skeptically and I think more reasonably see his 
treatise as ultimately a conservative response to the social mobility in large part enabled 
by merchant capital and represented in the inclusive admissions policy of the MTS.  For 
instance, Lawrence Stone points out that Mulcaster “was disturbed by the potential 
political consequences of large numbers of unemployed grammar school boys being 
thrown on to a glutted labour market” (682) and “favored the restriction of education by 
the purse, and defended the hogging of university scholarships by the rich and well-born” 
(682).  With that in mind, Stone warns us that diversity of school enrollment “is no more 
evidence of genuine social interplay and social cohesion than the attendance today of 
negroes and whites at integrated American schools, or of sons of peers and sons of 
paupers at the more exclusive Oxford and Cambridge colleges” (682-683).  Indeed, as 
complex as the psychology of aversive racism68 and the persistence of insidious forms of 
interpersonal and institutional discrimination in our own society, Mulcaster’s Positions 
represents a complex and ideologically conflicted response to early modern social 
mobility. 
 But what explains this conflicted ideological complexity?  The simple theoretical 
answer is power.  In Stephen Greenblatt’s infamous essay “Invisible Bullets,” after 
identifying the tendency of early modern colonial and monarchical texts to generate and 
                                                 
68 See chapter three (“The Aversive Form of Racism”) of John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner ‘s 
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism for a foundational discussion of aversive racism.  Also, 
follow this video link   http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/120766  for Dovidio’s panel 
presentation on the psychology of aversive racism, which he characterizes as a distinctively 
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ultimately contain the voices of potential subversion, he suggestively explains that  
“power . .  . is not monolithic and hence may encounter and record in one of its functions 
materials that can threaten another of its functions; in part that power thrives on 
vigilance, and human beings are vigilant if they sense a threat” (37).  In what is perhaps 
one of the fairest critiques of Greenblatt’s skeptical view of subversive agency, Alan 
Sinfield suggests that what is missing from or perhaps not explicit enough in Greenblatt’s 
ostensibly universalizing theory of power is the determining importance of historical 
contingency.  That is, a text, in and of itself, is neither subversive nor contained; rather, 
whether it is one or the other “depends on the specific balance of historical forces” (48), 
depends, in other words, on the particular configurations of power and influence at a 
given historical moment.  As the social diversity of MTS and, more generally, the social 
mobility of early modern England illustrate, the historical forces of the period were 
decidedly unbalanced, and, unlike Elyot and Ascham, Mulcaster more fully encounters 
and records this complex reality in a way that potentially serves several established and 
emerging sites of sociopolitical and economic power: the Queen, the aristocracy, 
merchants, and humanists.  In that sense, as my brief summary of Mulcaster scholarship 
already suggests, Positions can be cited to endorse anyone or a simultaneous combination 
of these groups, provisionally forging in the process the illusion of hierarchical or 
quasidemocratic social harmony.   
Significantly, illusions of social harmony reflect (even as they attempt to mystify) 
the fearful realities of disharmonious social complexities, and, if we accept Stone’s 
biographical characterization, Mulcaster’s fear of those complexities is such that he ends 
                                                                                                                                                 
contemporary form of racism, to the Clinton Administration’s “Presidential Advisory Board on 
Race” in 1997.   Dovidio’s co-panelists are Drs. James Jones and Derald Sue.        
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up promoting a restrictive and therefore simplifying admissions policy that ultimately 
advantages aristocratic men.  As I explore in the chapter-five discussion of Rabelais’s 
Gargantua, these types of discriminatory policies constitute the component parts of 
institutional power working behind those illusions, and, in that sense, they importantly 
reveal power, in Greenblatt’s terms, as fundamentally “an allocation method— a way of 
distributing to some and denying to others critical resources . . . that prolong life” (37).69  
In fact, as Greenblatt goes on to explain in a summary of Guido Calabresi and Philip 
Bobbitt’s study Tragic Choices, societies are often forced to justify the way in which 
critical resources are allocated, when changing circumstances— like social mobility, 
female education, or female rule— raise questions about their traditional values.  
Mulcaster confronts two interrelated problems.  In the first instance, as I have discussed, 
he confronts the shifting terms of sociopolitical advancement and power; and in the 
second, he confronts the effect of the Reformation on the employment prospects for 
educated men.  That is, after the official elimination of Catholicism from England and, as 
Mulcaster metaphorically characterizes it, the “habour [that its institutions provided] all 
[educated] men to ride in” (151), there were simply not enough room in the late-Tudor 
secular or ecclesiastical bureaucracies for the vast majority of young men being churned 
out by the grammar schools and universities.  As I have stated, in Positions, Mulcaster’s 
solution is to limit educational access to aristocratic men.  However, the very 
complexities that arguably frightened him also prevented him from just coming out and 
saying so.  In other words, those complexities— the complexities that he confronted as a 
                                                 
69 In what is perhaps an overstatement designed to increase the assumed importance of education, 
Mulcaster explains why all parents already regard education as such a critical resource: “Everie one 
desireth to have his childe learned: the reason is, for that how hardly soever either fortune frowne, or 
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schoolmaster— also forced him to work through a comparably complex justification.  
Without it, his treatise would have been as uncomplicated or simplifying a promotion of 
aristocratic dominance as Elyot’s and Ascham’s.   
Ironically, the classical text most useful to Mulcaster’s attempt to work through 
the complex realities of early modern social mobility is an imaginative and “idealistic” 
one that we have already discussed in relationship to Ascham’s The Schoolmaster: 
Plato’s Republic.  In Plato’s “wished common weale,” as Mulcaster terms it, “nature 
deserveth by abilitie and worth, not where fortune freindeth by byrth and boldness, 
though where both do joyne singularitie in nature, and sucesse in fortune, there be some 
rare jewell” (143).  As we have already seen in the other treatises and as I will later 
explore in Positions, it is significant that Mulcaster’s characterization of Plato’s 
educational selection method materializes, masculinizes, and thereby privileges, as it 
were, the family jewels of the aristocracy.  But for now it is sufficient to note that Plato’s 
just society is at once meritocratic and elitist.70  That is, by accepting the social worth of 
everyone’s potential ability but valuing the ability of the aristocracy as especially 
precious, Plato imagines a stratified social order with a limited built-in tendency for 
social competition.  While, for Plato, such a quasi-meritocratic system perhaps makes the 
fundamental social-philosophical point that nothing or no one can be taken for granted or 
given power in the planning and governance of the just society, for Mulcaster, that type 
of system represents something close to, as we have discussed, the tensions of the 
sociopolitical reality that threatened aristocratic dominance.  Mulcaster and other 
                                                                                                                                                 
casualtie chastice, yet learning hath some strength to shore up the person, bycause it is incorporate in the 
person, till the soule dislodge . . .” (146). 
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humanists attempted to get aristocrats to see that in order to compete in this newly 
competitive milieu they had to redirect and translate their energies away from each other 
on the battlefield and the tiltyards to the schoolrooms, political courts, and therefore 
against non-aristocratic participants in a more open nonviolent or symbolically violent 
field of competition. 
The differences between Plato’s ideal and Mulcaster’s reality notwithstanding, 
what makes the Republic particularly useful to Mulcaster is that it not only imagines the 
competitive conditions comparable to early modern English realities; it also provides a 
suggestion for how to prevent built-in competition from devolving into the kind of social 
disorder that might threaten elite-oriented social hierarchies.  That suggestion begins with 
Socrates’s infamous assertion that “to men [lying is] useful as a remedy or form of 
medicine” (634) and that it is therefore acceptable for rulers—but no one else— to lie for 
the benefit of the state.  After sketching the method by which to select and appoint rulers 
and guardians based on their loyalty to the state, Socrates, with much embarrassed 
hesitation, admits that “one of those opportune falsehoods” (658) or “one noble lie” (658) 
may be the only way to get these men to accept their positions in a stratified society.  
This acceptance is the essence of justice, for, as Socrates goes on to explain, “to do one’s 
own business and not be a busybody is justice” (675).  To that end, the noble lie would 
mystify the workings of sociopolitical engineering whereby citizens are selected, trained, 
and educated by telling them that that process was just a dream.  And that while they 
were dreaming, they were in fact being molded and fostered in the earth, and the earth, 
being their mother and nurse, delivered them at the end of that gestational period.  They 
                                                                                                                                                 
70 See Michael Young’s The Rise of the Meritocracy for a trenchant satirical analysis of how educational 
institutions function in modern society (specifically early to mid twentieth-century British society) to create 
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should then be encouraged to love and defend the earth and consider other citizens their 
brothers.  However, in this as any hierarchical society, that brotherhood cannot mean 
social equality or unrestrained social mobility.  Therefore, those citizen-brothers should 
also be told that, while in the earth, God fashioned them from different metals that 
determine their abilities and therefore their positions in the social order: “God in 
fashioning those  . . . fitted to hold rule,” Socrates explains, “mingled gold in their 
generation for which reason they are the most precious—but in the helpers silver, and 
iron and brass in the farmers and other craftsmen” (659).  While the lie anticipates 
instances of upward and downward mobility, instances like the mobility that Mulcaster 
and other humanists confronted in the sixteenth century, for the most part, people 
constituted of a particular metal will reproduce their own kind and therefore perpetuate a 
relatively static social order.  
Apparently still uncomfortable with the embarrassing illogical and fantastical 
absurdity of the lie, Socrates asks Glaucon, the main participant in this section of the 
dialogue, if he sees “any way of getting [citizens] to believe [it]” (659); and Glaucon 
responds, “No, not these themselves . . . but I do their sons and successors and the rest of 
mankind who come after” (660).  Implicit in Glaucon’s thinking is a politics of historical 
forgetting: that the farther away in time a stratified society gets from the originary myth 
of its stratification the greater the chances that it will accept as natural or divinely 
sanctioned that arrangement.  That is why we live in a world where various subtle and 
even blatant forms of institutional discrimination are accepted or tolerated, often without 
comment.  As Stephen Jay Gould points out in The Mismeasure of Man, an exhaustive 
critique of the racist pseudo-science behind nineteenth and twentieth century biological 
                                                                                                                                                 
and perpetuate the illusion that a wealthy minority deserves its place of power.  
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determinism, different versions of the noble lie have “been promulgated and believed 
ever since [the Republic]” (52), for indeed, as Gould goes on to explain, “[t]he 
justification for ranking groups by inborn worth has varied with the tides of Western 
history” (52).  It is my contention that Mulcaster’s Positions is a late-sixteenth century 
version or, we might say, translation of this justification, and I conclude that it includes 
physical exercise and women, specifically the subject of women’s education, as a way of 
legitimating aristocratic men with the rare jewels and precious metals of their minds and 
bodies as the dominant group in early modern society.   
Comparable to the important role that differential-material embodiment plays in 
the noble lie, Mulcaster’s translation centers on the body politic analogy as the 
fundamental justification for social stratification: 
For the bodie of a common weale in proportion is like unto a naturall bodie.  In a 
naturall bodie, if any one parte be to greate, or to small, besides the eye sore it is 
mother to some evill by the verie misfourming, whereupon great distemperature 
must needes follow in time, and disquiet the whole bodie.  And in a bodie politike 
if the like proportion be not kept in all partes, the like disturbance will crepe 
thorough out all partes.  (139) 
 
“Civilitie,” which Mulcaster defines as “quietnesse, conord, agrement, fellowship and 
friendship” (142), is the sociopolitical quality equivalent to Socrates’s justice, and 
Mulcaster suggests the body politic analogy, as Socrates imagines applying the noble lie, 
in an attempt to get certain parents to accept, as a patriotic duty, whatever role a society 
deems fit for their children: “everie parent must beare in memorie,” he insists at one 
point, “that he is more bound to his country, then to his child, as his child must renounce 
him in countermatch with his countrie” (146).  Specifically, he identifies the 
proportionality of the soul, which is represented by learning and scholars, as the most 
important condition for the overall health, civility, or justice of the commonwealth.  And 
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in his creative and complex metaphorical application of Galen’s theory of 
psychophysiological unity, learning constitutes the soul of the body politic as well as the 
individual souls of the scholars who “professe” it.  And if there are too many scholars, 
that is, too many individual souls with too much learning, both soul and body become 
perilously sick.  “Superfluitie and residence,” Mulcaster explains, “brings sickenes to the 
body, and must not,” he continues to explain with a rhetorical question, “to much then 
infect the soule sore, being in a simpathie with the body?” (141).  Not only do scholars 
make up the most important part of the commonwealth; they also represent the greatest 
threat to its stability.  That is, in Mulcaster’s estimation, learning instills in scholars lofty 
and imperial conceits as well as a disdain “to deal with labour” (141), and no society can 
afford to have such an infectious, arrogant, and lazy group “overflush in number” (141).  
 In the civil just society, the opposite and desirable qualities of  “contentment in 
aspiring” (141) and “patience in paines” (141) define a “civill wit” (141) appropriately 
trained and employed “to enjoye the benefit of his countrie” (141).  In that regard, 
Mulcaster repeatedly advocates limited educational access on the grounds that the needs 
of the state— needs fundamentally illustrated and justified by the body politic analogy—
trump the desire of ambitious parents to give their children a complete education.  
However, the tricky question for Mulcaster is: which group of children should be 
excluded from formal education?  Or, put more precisely, which group should be 
included in a process that, by its very nature, makes people arrogant, lazy, and ultimately 
dangerous to the state? 
While he asserts, with a number of examples and analogies, that “wittes 
misplaced [are] most unquiet and seditious” (142), he only gives us a few passing 
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reference to the seven Socratic characteristics to look for when choosing the best children 
for learning.  Instead, as I have already briefly pointed out, he primarily focuses on wit 
(or what we would term intelligence or mental aptitude) and explains that it constitutes a 
dispositional characteristic contingent upon a society’s political system.  And the 
disposition most important to Mulcaster is the one most appropriate to a monarchical 
society: civility, or as he variously describes it, obedience, gentleness, courtesy, modesty, 
and obsequiousness.   
Aside from the monarch, social rank doesn’t seem to matter much, or, when it 
does, it matters in a way seemingly consistent with the inclusive admissions policy at 
MTS.  For instance, in an attempt to allay concerns that his proposal to limit educational 
access will exclude either the rich or the poor, he insists that “the whole common weale 
standeth upon” (143) the desirable qualities peculiar to each group.  “If all riche be 
excluded,” he explains, “abilitie will snuffe,” and “if all poore be restrained, then will 
towardnesse repine” (143).  In other words, along with proportionality, the strength or, in 
keeping with the body politic analogy, the health of a grammar school and indeed the 
commonwealth depends on the economic support of the rich and “the willingness and 
aptness to learn” (OED) of the poor.  However, the extremes of wealth and poverty, in 
and of themselves, are not conducive to learning, because too much wealth fosters a 
wanton or “a loose and dissolute braine” (144) and too little “a base and servile conceit” 
(144).  That is, in the complex figurative language so characteristic of this densely written 
treatise,71 Mulcaster explains that too much wealth is like too much friendship in that one 
                                                 
71 In the introduction to his edition of The Positions, under the subtitle “Style,” William Barker explains, 
“For readers trained to the virtues of a straightforward and unambiguous plain style, Mulcaster’s highly 
rhythmical and highly figured discourse requires an effort to work through.  Yet this effort is exactly what 
he wished from his readers, as several comments in his books indicate. . . .  Thus, for Mulcaster a hard style 
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“never [has to] strayneth his wittes,” that is, develop his mind, to be freind to [or provide 
for] himselfe” (144), and too little wealth leads to a kind of slavery, because one will 
blindly worship whatever leads him and keeps him out of poverty.  The solution is a 
mean between the two circumstances, a mean for which parents of the middling sort 
represent the best model.  “The middle sort of parentes,” Mulcaster explains, “which 
neither welter in to much wealth, nor wrastle with to much want, seemeth fittest of all . . . 
which must be the levell for the fattest to fall downe to, and the leanest to leape up to, to 
bring forth that student, which must serve his countrey best” (144).  Therefore, 
Mulcaster’s ideal grammar school, not unlike his real one, would include everyone: the 
rich, the poor, and the middling sort.  But the tricky question of who to exclude (and on 
what grounds) still remains? 
Mulcaster’s version of the noble lie is more (than that of Socrates) a lie of 
omission, a lie, in other words, focused, as we have already seen, on not exposing certain 
children to learning and thereby preventing them from developing a socially threatening 
“miscontentment of minde” (148).  But while the patriotic body-politic analogy provides 
a metaphorical-ideological justification for this narrowing of educational access, the only 
practical-administrative measure that Mulcaster suggests for the materialization (in the 
Althusserian sense) of that narrowing is what he terms “necessitie” or “necessarie 
restraint,” which amounts to personal-economic recommendations and legislative 
practices that effectively eliminate the poor and even the middling sort from educational 
institutions.  In the first instance, Mulcaster tells parents that learning requires money and 
                                                                                                                                                 
is an outward sign of worthwhile and challenging matter; difficult thoughts should be set forth in such a 
way to make readers think about them carefully, even forcing them to reread passages.  Indeed, ‘a little 
hardnesse yea in the most onscure, and philosoficall conclusions, maie never seme tedious to a conquering 
mind’ (sig 2Kiv)” (xlix).     
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leisure.  And if their family circumstances are too economically insecure to allow their 
children to focus on education, that is, if their financial need is such that they cannot 
“spare” their children from working to supplement the family income, then they must 
“devise some other way, wherein [their] abilities will serve” (147).  In the second 
instance, his thinking is that people— presumably the same economically disadvantaged 
people— will accept the denial of educational access, if early on in their lives that denial 
bears the authority of law: 
Contentment of mind in the partie restrained, when he shall perceive publike 
provision to be the checke to his fantsie: and timely preventing, eare conceit take 
roote, and thinke it selfe wronged.  Bycause it is much better to nip misorder in 
the verie ground, that it may not take hold, then when it is growen up, then to 
hacke it downe.  He that never conceived great thinges maye be held there with 
ease, but being once entred in the waye to mount, and then throwen backward, he 
will be in some greife and seeke howe to returne gaule, whence he received 
griefe, if he chaunce to prove peevish, as repulse in great hope is a perilous grater.  
 (149). 
Whether the body politic analogy, economic necessity, or legally denied educational 
access, Mulcaster presents us with a psychology of blissful patriotic ignorance that, in 
effect, creates a reductive and perhaps cynical sense that people, particularly poor and 
poorly placed people, can be easily and nonviolently controlled by the powers that be.  
However, as we know from our own history of various forms of socioeconomic and 
racial discrimination, Mulcaster’s social psychology suggests more about the reductive 
desires of the sociopolitical elite of the time than anything about the complex ways in 
which non-elites experienced discriminatory beliefs, practices, and laws.  In any event, 
despite his optimism about this preemptive symbolic violence of “nip[ping] misorder in 
the verie ground,” Mulcaster, whose advocacy of corporal punishment is unique amongst 
humanistic educational theorist of the time, also presents “real” hacking violence as a 
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legitimate though extreme method by which to control or eliminate partially educated 
people with illegal  and/or impractical desires for more extensive formal education.  
According to the logic of Mulcaster’s proposal, the implicit fear of real violence would 
presumably be as effective as symbolic violence in killing or at least repressing these 
desires in the individual or the group.  Or perhaps, his thinking reveals that that fear 
always already lurks behind or even alongside the symbolic, making what is ultimately a 
coercive system seem like one comprised of contented hierarchically arranged consensual 
subjects. 
 Mulcaster’s “necessarie restraint” importantly returns us to the problematic nature 
of power in that it discourages and legally denies the very socioeconomic diversity that 
Mulcaster identifies just a few pages earlier as essential to the health or effectiveness of 
an educational community.  Mulcaster appears conscious of this inconsistency, and, in an 
expression rhetorically equivalent to Socrates’s embarrassment about the noble lie, he 
becomes ambivalent about the role of the poor as learned members of the commonwealth.  
Immediately after explaining his discriminatory policy, in fact at the end of the last 
sentence devoted to discussing it, he reflects, “Yet in both these cases of necessarie 
restraint, I could wish provision were had to some singular wittes, found worthy of 
advauncement . . . yet againe if they passe on, and bewtifie some other trade: that also is 
verie good, seeing they serve their countrey, wheresoever they be [allotted]” (149).  
“[C]ould wish” is an expression of imaginative and material power and influence 
ultimately withheld.  And what perhaps accounts for this change of heart is that 
Mulcaster reaches a point where the ideal of inclusion must now confront the emerging 
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realities of early modern power, and specifically education as of ladder of upward 
mobility. 
But, as I have already pointed out, Mulcaster identifies the poor as possessing 
more educational “towardnesse” or aptitude than the rich.  In fact, he goes on to identify 
that aptitude as a gift of God, “that excellencie,” as he also terms it,  “which God 
commonly gives to the poorer sort” (149).  Therefore, “necessarie restraint” functions to 
limit or ideally eliminate the poor from educational institutions so as to clear the way for 
the advancement of other more traditionally empowered groups, specifically, as I will 
soon discuss, the aristocracy.  Once again, Mulcaster addresses the inconsistency between 
this stance and his earlier more inclusive one, by defensively asserting that his policy 
would not have compromised educational excellence in the past and that the poor should 
not be pitied for their exclusion from educational institutions in the future.  In the first 
instance, with the type of logical contortionism that makes this treatise particularly 
complex and even confusing, he attempt to defend his particular brand of social 
engineering on the grounds that social engineering in general ultimately doesn’t make a 
difference.  That is, he ironically attempts to mystify and thereby minimize the likely and 
desired effects of discriminatory admissions by arguing that, no matter the system of 
inclusion or exclusion, “God would have raised up other [ learned men], whose benefites 
in serving governmentes may not be restrained to any degree of men, as they be men, but 
to the appointment of a civill societie, which have direction over men” (149).  In the 
second instance, he questions why anyone would pity the poor, because “it is no pitie, not 
to wish a beggar to become a prince” (150).  For that minority of “singular wittes” who 
manages to beat the system, as it were, Mulcaster recommends economic support as long 
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as those few poor scholars accept “some other trade” besides court-oriented public 
service as a “verie good” patriotic service to their country. 
With the poor ideally eliminated or, at least, limited to a non-threatening minority, 
Mulcaster, as we have already seen with Elyot, proceeds to make the case for the 
educational privilege of the aristocracy by asserting “that learning was wont to be proper 
to the nobilitie, and that through their negligence it is left for a pray to the meaner sort, 
and a bootie to corruption, where the professours need offereth wrongfull violence to the 
libertie of the thing” (150-151).  That meaner sort includes the slavish poor and the 
wanton rich, both of whom, as we have discussed, Mulcaster identifies as groups 
imperfectly suited to the education that he now reveals is most appropriate for the 
aristocracy.  In fact, Mulcaster, like Plato and more recently Sir Thomas More,72 
identifies the greedy rich as generally deleterious to the commonwealth and therefore 
excludes wealth, in and of itself, as a legitimate method by which to become a gentleman: 
“For of all the meanes to make a gentleman, it is the most vile, to be made for money.  
Bycause all other meanes beare some signe of virtue, this onely meane is to bad a meane, 
either to matche with great birth, or to mate greate worth” (194; my italics).  Indeed, in 
the spirit of the humanist anti-materialism that we have already seen in Elyot and as we 
will return to in chapter seven, Mulcaster describes in vividly grotesque terms and with a 
bit of dark humor the unethical method by which ambitious merchants— presumably 
some of whom financed schools like MTS— murder “many a poore maggot” (194) by 
                                                 
72 See George Logan’s essay “Humanist More” for a sensitive analysis of More’s debt to Plato, particularly 
the negative characterization of wealthy aristocrats as drone: “In More’s society the idle rich generally stay 
rich; and it is this class—the landed nobility of England—to whom he has Hythloday apply the metaphor of 
the drone (in this way clearly signaling the debt of his passage to Plato’s): ‘There are a great many 
noblemen who live idly like drones off the labour of others, their tenants whom they bleed white by 
constantly raising their rents’ (3).      
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selling poor people maggot-infested cheese “to spare expenses, that Jacke maye be a 
gentleman” (195).  And as if that caustic poor-people-eating-poor-maggots imagery 
wasn’t strong enough to discredit those merchants, he continues by explaining why no 
one should be fooled by their use of charity to cover up their unscrupulous practices: 
These people by their generall trades, will make thousands poore: and 
for giving one penie to any one poore of those many thousandes will be counted 
charitable.  They will give a scholer some petie poore exhibition to seeme to be 
religious, and under a sclender veale of counterfeit liberalitie, hide the spoile of 
the ransacked povertie. (195; my italics) 
 
Although this critique is arguably an oblique reference to— or at least is in the spirit of— 
Platonic and perhaps even Utopian communism, it never follows through in the form of 
any commensurate revolutionary socioeconomic policies.  If it did, if it suggested the 
implementation of anything like a radical redistribution of wealth to protect people from 
the impoverishing practices of greedy status-seeking merchants and tradesmen, 
Mulcaster’s anti-poor admissions policy would do little to stem the tide of children (more 
of whom would be economically equal) flooding grammar schools and universities.  In 
other words, the world that Mulcaster inhabits as well as the educational reforms he 
recommends accepts and depends on maintaining rigid social and economic inequalities.  
In fact, he goes on to deny the legitimacy of social mobility, specifically mobility aided 
by money, by appealing to a Socratic-style metaphorical myth of differential-material 
embodiment that functions to reify and essentializes social difference.  “But counterfeit 
metal,” he describes those commoners aspiring to be gentlemen, “for all his best shew 
will never be naturall, as that is, which it doth counterfeit: neither will naturall mettalles 
ever enterchange natures, though the finest be severed and the Alcumist do his best” 
(205).  Therefore, notwithstanding the present-day resonance of his righteous-seeming 
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indignation about the abuse and exploitation of the poor, it appears that he only gets 
religion, as it were, to discredit the groups most threatening to a power structure that 
traditionally privileged the aristocracy: merchants and tradesmen.  Ironically, the 
discrediting of the wealthiest members of the commonality, as Mulcaster terms it, and 
specifically their educational philanthropy cleverly and conveniently works in favor of 
Mulcaster’s anti-poor admissions policy.  That is, without merchant- and tradesmen -
provided educational financial aid, even fewer poor boys would be able to go to school 
under Mulcaster’s system, creating a situation where aristocratic boys wouldn’t have to 
compete for limited school space and resources. 
 Despite this rigged pro-aristocratic educational policy, Mulcaster nevertheless 
engages in a re-definition of the aristocracy intended to further secure its preeminence 
within the nonviolent competitive milieu of sixteenth-century court politics.  As 
Lawrence Stone explains,  
[Humanists of the period attempted to see] to it that the number of idle and 
ignorant aristocrats was reduced to a minimum, and that the chances of 
promotions for the talented ‘new man’ were consequently restricted.  And so there 
was launched a successful attack upon the ignorance of the nobility.  Again and 
again it was hammered home that the justification of the privileges enjoyed by the 
nobility was service to the commonwealth; that the definition of the nobility was 
not exclusively good birth, but ancestry coupled with virtue; and that virtue 
consisted . . . in the mastery of certain technical proficiencies. (674)  
                                      
As we have seen, Mulcaster chides the aristocracy for lazily neglecting and even 
forgetting its own classical history of educational excellence, which, as a consequence, 
enabled the “meaner sort” to occupy and “corrupt” educational institutions and therefore 
seats of power and influence.  Furthermore, implicit in his discrediting of money as a 
legitimate means by which to make a gentleman is the humanistic idea, which he 
forwards or hammers home repeatedly, that social rank is fundamentally a part of an 
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active process whereby only legitimate or virtuous actions can perpetuate the power and 
privileges traditionally granted aristocratic ancestry.  While Mulcaster includes traditional 
military skills as types of virtuous gentleman-making actions, he attempts to re-define the 
aristocracy by emphasizing learning and the skills and wisdom derived from it as 
gentleman-making actions in their own right.  Indeed, as he concludes, “For which be 
gentlemanly qualities, if these be not, to reade, to write, to draw, to sing, to play, to have 
language, to have learning, to have health, and activitie, nay even to professe Divinitie, 
Lawe, Physicke and any trade else commendable for cunning?” (206).  But lest we forget, 
learning also develops lofty and imperial conceits threatening to the health and stability 
of the commonwealth.  And by reserving learning for the aristocracy, a group 
traditionally defined by its military ethos, Mulcaster promotes the development and 
legitimation of an especially dangerous group: educated, lazy, ambitious, power-seeking 
warriors.  In that regard, Mulcaster’s challenge is to figure out how to civilize or 
domesticate the aristocracy, that is, figure out how to get aristocratic men to forego or at 
least repress the violent facet of their collective identity in favor of the civility, 
obedience, gentleness, courtesy, modesty, and obsequiousness appropriate to a 
monarchical form of government. 
As with other educational theorists, physical exercise is central to Mulcaster’s 
solution.  Like Coxe’s militarization of Edward’s instruction and Elyot’s and Ascham’s 
rhetorical materialization of learning, Mulcaster’s Positions ideologically synthesizes 
humanistic and aristocratic cultures by devoting twenty-nine-and-a-half of its forty-five 
chapters (roughly sixty-six percent) to various types of physical exercise.  As I have been 
arguing throughout, this attention represents the attempt of humanists to find common 
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ground upon which to get aristocrats to see learning as part of a legitimate masculinizing 
process.  And for Mulcaster’s part, the specific point of his treatise is to attract 
aristocratic families to grammar schools and universities by recommending exercise as a 
way to transform those institutions into sites that ostensibly embrace their 
materialistically- and militaristically-oriented culture.  However, in what is ultimately a 
delicately-balanced compromise of oppositional cultural values, Mulcaster’s treatment of 
athletic and martial exercises advocates, as Elyot’s couples dancing, a form of 
recreational violence or performative masculinity tempered by humanistic pacifism and 
Galenic theories of moderation.  That is, not only does Mulcaster, consistent with his 
major source text Girolamo Mercuriale’s De Arte Gynmastica, focus on the nonviolent 
“physicall” exercises supportive of general health and specifically the health of students, 
he also advocates for the moderation of the violent “athleticall” and “martiall” ones that 
both Elyot and Ascham identify as necessary for the development of the traditional 
aristocratic warrior.  For instance, in chapter 18 “of fensing,” after acknowledging the 
“gamelike” and “warlike” uses of fencing as well as its health benefits, Mulcaster 
explains that armed fencing is not appropriate for scholars, because “we scholers minde 
peace, as our muses professe that they will not medle, nor have to do with Mars” (85).  
He is also particularly critical of the brutality of ancient Roman gladiatorial fensing, 
characterizing it “as an evident argument of most cruel immanitie, and beyond all 
barbarous, in cold blood to be so bloodie” (85).  Similarly, in chapter 17 “Of wrastling,” 
he cites Clement of Alexandria’s Christ the Educator in an attempt to reestablish the 
classical legitimacy of wrestling on moderate-nonviolent terms: 
Clemens of Alexandrinus which lived in Rome in Galenes time in the third booke 
of his Paedagogue, or of training maister, in the title of exercise, rejecting most 
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kindes of wrastling yet reserveth one, as verie well beseeming a civill trained 
man, whom both seemelinesse for grace, and profitablenesse for good health, do 
seeme to recommende. . . .  Wherfore not to deale with the catching pancraticall 
kinde of wrastling, which used all kindes of hould, to caste and overcome his 
adversarie, nor any other of that sort, which continuance hath rejected, and 
custome refused. . . .  Then an exercise it is, and healthfully it may be used: if 
discretion overlooke it, our countrey will allow it. . . .  Thus much for wrastling, 
wherin as in all other exercises, the training maister must be both cunning to 
judge of the thing: and himselfe present to prevent harme, when the exercise is in 
hand.  (83-85) 
 
Not unlike Ascham’s treatment of ancient Athenian exercises and good manners, 
Mulcaster situates wrestling at the center of a proto-Foucauldian disciplinary process. 
However, rather than concern himself explicitly, as Ascham does, with the management 
of late-pubescent socio-sexual behavior, he employs the classical authority of Clement 
and specifically the medical authority of “Galenes time” in an effort to recast wrestling as 
well as other traditionally violent exercises in terms of the civil and gracious behavior 
conducive to health.  In that regard, it is imperative that wise and vigilant teacher-trainers 
are present during moderate version of these exercises, making sure that both students 
and exercises remain moderate and therefore healthy.  Significantly, this link between 
civility and health returns us to the body politic analogy, in that the collective-political 
health of the commonwealth and the individual-biological health of its subjects are 
fundamentally about the moderate-nonviolent activities that promote internal balance or 
(social) order.  Therefore, by making health a matter of civility, by making it the doctor’s 
orders, Mulcaster seeks to attract aristocrats to educational institutions with nonviolent 
moderate forms of the very exercises that would otherwise prove threatening to 
monarchical stability.  
 However, in the final analysis, fencing is fencing and wrestling is wrestling, and, 
no matter how moderate or civilized a society makes them, they will always carry 
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potentially dangerous traces of their violent military histories.  That is to say, there will 
always be the potential for those repressed histories to explode in the form of violent 
subversive action.  Therefore, as a civilizing-domesticating strategy, a school-based ethos 
of healthy-moderate military exercise, in and of itself, may not be sufficient to repress 
traditional aristocratic male aggression.  And Mulcaster seems to realize as much.  
Indeed, in a way that attempts to capture the social psychological complexities of early 
modern society, Positions presents comparably complex and, in some instances, 
inconsistent ideological and practical solutions that resist the very simplifying effects of 
any one civilizing-domesticating strategy.  In a sense, this resistant complexity itself 
vertiginously pushes the treatise to the brink of its own violent representational 
explosion, its own interpretive undecidability.   
In any event, Mulcaster’s representation of women is key to that complexity.  As 
with Ascham’s The Schoolmaster, we might ask: why does Mulcaster include a defense 
of women’s learning in a treatise committed to the perpetuation of grammar schools and 
universities as all-male institutions?  While William Barker reasonably and I think rightly 
contextualizes that inclusion within the period’s contradictory and confusing defenses of 
women’s learning and specifically suggests that it had something to do with Mulcaster 
“seeking of patronage from Queen Elizabeth” (Mulcaster xxxiii), he says nothing about 
what Mulcaster may be saying about the social psychological as well as behavioral 
effects of female rule.  As I have suggested, Mulcaster’s inclusion of powerful-exemplary 
aristocratic women, like his qualified inclusion of poor and rich commoners, functions to 
re-define aristocratic men in terms of the nonviolent exigencies of court society.  In this 
particular instance, what defines women and facilitates the re-definition of aristocratic 
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men is the gendered version of the (ig)noble lie that we first witnessed in Jane Seymour’s 
birthroom and that we have been witnessing throughout this chapter.  In other words, 
what enables Mulcaster to safely sound— in fact, by his own society’s standards, to be— 
liberal- or progressive-minded on the matter of women’s learning is the traditional belief 
that women’s sociopolitical inferiority results naturally from their psychophysiological 
inferiority: 
For though the girles seeme commonly to have a quicker ripening in witte, then 
boyes have, for all that seeming, yet it is not so.  Their naturall weaknesse which 
cannot holde long, delivers very soone . . . .  Besides, their braines be not so much 
charged, neither with weight  nor with multitude of matters, as boyes heades be, 
and therefore like empty caske they make the greater noise. . . .  As for bodies the 
maidens be more weake, most commonly even by nature, as of a moonish 
influence, and all our whole kinde is weake of the mother side. . . .  [However,] 
[t]hey are to be the principall pillers in the upholding of householdes, and so they 
are likely to prove, if they prove well in training.  The dearest comfort that man 
can have, if they encline to good: the nearest corrosive if they tread awry.  And 
therefore charilie to be cared for, bearing a jewell of such worth, in a vessel of 
such weaknesse.  (177-178)  
      
The combination of the (ig)noble lie and the masculinization of learning creates 
evaluative terms that effectively bar women from being taken seriously as political 
equals.  That is, as long as cognitive processes are likened to physical strength, 
knowledge measured in terms of the weight or quantity of matter, and brains materialized 
as casks or vessels, women, as defined by their relative physical weakness, will always be 
thought less capable than men.  In short, as I have argued throughout, to materialize is to 
masculinize.   
Of course, Elizabeth and a few other exceptional women significantly 
complicated this thinking, but Mulcaster’s adherence to it enables him to continue to 
rationalize that political power naturally belongs to men and that that power only 
“come[s] to the female, when [the male] side faileth” (185).  In terms of hereditary 
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monarchical rule, failure means a terminal failure of health.  And it is precisely the failed 
health and premature deaths of Tudor men, specifically Edward, that threatened and 
ultimately doomed their dynasty by putting women on the throne.  While obviously not 
the case for Edward, physical or healthy civil exercise crucially functions in Positions as 
well as the other two treatises as a way for men to stay healthy and alive long enough to 
keep power out of the hands of women.  In general, this type of masculinist thinking 
retains for men what Mulcaster terms the “superlative” (185) position.  However, that 
retention is not without a compromise.  That is, instead of defining political power and 
masculinity in terms of battlefield prowess, Mulcaster civilizes and domesticates both by 
registering them in terms of a nonviolent or symbolically violent competition between 
men and women.  In that regard, exemplary women like Elizabeth emerge as oppositional 
models of appropriate conduct that effectively redefine masculinity.  For example, in his 
argument against studying in foreign countries, Mulcaster reasons,  
Our ladie mistresse, whom I must needes remember, when excellencies will have 
hearing, a woman, a gentlewomen, a ladye, a Princesse, in the middest of many 
other businesses, in that infirmitie of sexe, and sundrie other impedimentes to a 
free minde, such as learning requireth, can do all these thinges to the wonder of 
all hearers, which I say young gentlemen may learne better at home, as her 
Majestie did, and compare themselves with the best, when they have learned so 
much, as her Majestie hath by domesticall discipline.  (212) 
 
As we saw with Ascham, the logic is that if Elizabeth’s learning wasn’t impeded or 
prevented by the infirmity of her sex and the physical constraints appropriate to it, then 
there is no reason for men, who are mentally and physically more capable, to travel 
abroad for theirs.  What makes such a comparative justification even possible is that the 
masculinization of learning within the nonviolent context of court society now makes it 
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okay for men to embrace a queen’s “domesticall” discipline as a legitimate method by 
which to turn their sons into men.   
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Chapter Six: 
Ass-Wiping Intelligence: Memory, Forgetting, and Social Control in François 
Rabelais’s Gargantua (1534) 
 
 In a November 30, 1532 letter to Desiderius Erasmus, François Rabelais attempts 
with “respectful affection” to explain just how influential Erasmus has been to his 
(educational) development: 
I have called you [my most humane Father], I would also call you my ‘mother’, if 
by your indulgence that were permitted me.  Indeed, pregnant women, we learn 
from daily experience, nourish a fetus they have never seen, and protect it from 
the harmful effects of the surrounding air.  You have taken precisely that trouble: 
you had never seen my face, even my name was unknown to you, and [yet] you 
have given me education, you have never ceased to feed me with the purest milk 
of your divine learning; whatever I am, whatever I am good for, it is to you alone 
I owe it: if I did not make this known, I would be the most ungrateful of men at 
present and to come.  (Rabelais, Complete Works 796)  
  
For Rabelais, the affective possibilities of fatherhood cannot fully and accurately 
represent the intimate bond that he has to Erasmus, because father-child bonding, as most 
other relationships, usually begins with or significantly involves some sort of visually and 
socially mediated recognition.  Therefore, in an effort to imagine, explain, and justify his 
deep affection for Erasmus, someone who had never even seen him and has only recently 
learned of his existence, Rabelais analogizes their relationship to the non-visual 
somatically and therefore feelingly rooted connection between a pregnant woman and her 
fetus.  In Rabelais’s masculinist appropriation of this uniquely mother-child bond, 
Erasmus’s body of work becomes a protective and nourishing womb— an ideal 
gestational-educational space— wherein the fetal-uneducated Rabelais began to develop 
into the learned man that he has ultimately become.   
In “A Womb of His Own,” an important early contribution to early modern body 
studies, Katherine Maus explains that many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century writers 
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associated the creative imagination with the female body, because the female body and 
particularly the womb provided the kind of safe metaphorical place for poets [to] 
discover their poetic identity and freedom” (192): “The appeal of the woman’s body . . . 
for a man who wants subjective refuge seems to be the way it is closed in upon itself, the 
way her interior is protected by opaque bodily perimeters” (193).  However, Erasmus’s 
feminized body of work does not function solely as a protective and potentially liberating 
womb-like enclosure; it also functions as a nourishing lactating breast, producing “the 
purest milk of [Erasmus’s] divine learning.”  Therefore, beyond the initial use of the 
female body to fully express the deep affective bond between virtual strangers, there is 
something else about the female body and embodiment more broadly that leads Rabelais 
to feminize both the inside and the outside of Erasmus’s body of work.   
As the connecting, materializing center in a letter about a textually mediated and 
indirect educational relationship, the female body also significantly reveals the 
importance of material embodiment to early child development and education.  This 
importance, of course, granted women a crucial and therefore unsettling role in early 
modern patriarchal society, and Rabelais’s masculinist appropriation at once admits and 
denies that importance by using the pregnant and lactating body of a woman to 
materialize the body of work of the most learned man in northern Europe.  In that regard, 
as if to forget the female body and the role of women that he has just imaginatively 
exploited, Rabelais continues by giving Erasmus sole credit for his educational 
development: “whatever I am, whatever I am good for, it is to you alone I owe it.”  In 
opposition to precisely this type of misogynist forgetting, much feminist scholarship has 
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demonstrated the importance of (women’s) embodiment to Renaissance thought.73  
However, this scholarship, focused as it is on the political and interpretive materialization 
of the female body, tends to ignore or give short shrift to the bodies of children and the 
embodied nature of early child development and education.  In terms of Rabelais’s letter, 
how are we to understand the body of the dependent and vulnerable child that he 
imagines himself to be vis-à-vis Eramsus’s feminized body of work?  Because no early 
modern writer confronts children’s embodiment in quite the humorous, offensive, and, 
above all, illuminating way that Rabelais does, I have decided to devote this chapter to a 
reading of his second chronicle Gargantua (1534).  Generally, I argue that part of what 
Rabelais owes Erasmus, as his educational father and mother, is an understanding of the 
fluidly and vulnerably constituted bodies of children rooted in classical educational and 
medical theories.  And specifically, in the course of illustrating the importance of 
classical and medical theories to both Erasmus’s and Rabelais’s understanding of 
embodiment, memory, and free will, I argue that the Abbey of Thélème is founded on a 
forgotten bodily-centered educational process that manipulates the Galenic “six non 
naturals”74 with specific spatiotemporal techniques in an effort to transform anarchic 
freedom into disciplined freedom. 
--- 
At the end of Gargantua, after the Utopians have defeated the invading forces of 
the choleric Picrochole and the titular character sets about attending to and rewarding his 
                                                 
73 As I have variously pointed out, the seminal text in that regard is Gail Kern Paster’s The Body 
Embarrassed.  Other early contributions are Karen Newman’s Fashioning Femininity, Katherine Maus’s 
Inwardness (which I have already referenced), and Barbara Correll’s The End of Conduct.   For more recent 
contributions, see Eve Keller’s Generating Bodies and Gendered Selves and the anthology edited by 
Kathryn Moncrief and Kathryn McPherson entitled Performing Maternity in Early Modern England. 
74 The six non natures are food and drink, repletion and evacuation, sleep and waking, air, motion and rest, 
and emotions 
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men for their heroic service, Brother John, perhaps the most heroic of the soldiers, rejects 
the initial offer of monastic lands and requests instead the construction of a new 
monastery: the Abbey of Thélème.  This monastery, as Brother John and Gargantua 
imagine it, will be an anti-monastery, distinguished by the elimination of all the rules, 
regulations, and structures that characterize other monasteries.  It will mix men and 
women, allow marriage, and promise wealth.  Also, there will be no perpetual residency 
and no fully enclosed walls, because walls incite discontent and “all kinds of 
conspiracies” (115); and there will be no fierce hour by hour scheduling and no clocks, 
because “the worst waste of time . . . was counting the hours” (116).  The question that 
sets off this ostensibly, revolutionary collaborative planning reveals an important 
classical and early modern assumption about political authority: “And how should I 
govern others,” Brother John confesses to Gargantua, “when I don’t know how to govern 
myself?” (115).  That is, classical and early modern educational and political theorists 
accepted self-governance as a prerequisite to effective political rule.  But the Abbey 
somehow seems to provide Brother John a paradoxical way around his managerial 
deficiencies, for in a society founded on the one-clause constitution “DO WHAT YOU 
WILL” (124) the governance of the self and others becomes unnecessary. 
While such a society naturally raises questions about individual conduct and 
social order, no such concerns hamper Thélème or its creators.  Despite Brother John’s 
confessed lack of self-governance and his penchant for drinking and erotic humor, he, as 
I have indicated, acts bravely in defense of Utopia; he does, in other words, what he’s 
ultimately suppose to do.  The same thing can be said of the Thélèmites.  As Alcofribas, 
the narrator, explains, 
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Their lives were not ordered and governed by laws and statutes and rules, but 
according to their own free will. . . .  because free men and women, wellborn, well 
taught, finding themselves joined with other respectable people, are instinctively 
impelled to do virtuous things and avoid vice.  They draw this instinct from nature 
itself and they name it ‘honor’” (124; my italics).  
 
By natural-instinctive free will, it is likely that Rabelais, in the spirit of Erasmian political 
thought, means our distinguishing capacity as human beings to live virtuously in 
accordance with reason.  For instance, In The Education of a Christian Prince (1516), 
after establishing coercive or intimidating rule as tyrannical and “common agreement” 
between subjects and a prince as essential to legitimate Christian rule, Erasmus concludes 
that control over educational institutions is key to forming or even creating consenting 
subjects:  “A prince who is about to assume control of the state” Erasmus tells us, “must 
be advised at once that the main hope of a state lies in the proper education of its youth” 
(212).  And what is proper to a Christian humanist like Erasmus is that children— who 
are “pliable” and “amenable to any system of training”—   “may learn the teachings of 
Christ and that good [classical] literature which is beneficial to the state.”  This is the 
ideological content that, once internalized during childhood, will make subjects so 
compliant that “there will be no need for many laws or punishments, for the people will 
of their own free will follow the course of right” (213; my italics).  As we will consider 
later in this discussion, there are a number of theoretical analyses of social control under 
capitalism— including Marxian false consciousness, Gramscian cultural hegemony, 
Althusserian ideology, and Foucauldian power— that have certainly helped us 
understand non-coercive methods of social control.  And although this study has been 
deeply influenced by many of them, it is important for us to keep in mind that Eramsus’s 
theoretical assumptions are specific to the religious and political context of the early 
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modern world.  That is, the acknowledgement of free will and consensual rule, modeled 
as it is after God’s rule over humanity, is a moral imperative intended to establish the 
divine sanction of a Christian ruler’s power over his subjects.  The logic is that only 
tyrants use violence and fear as methods of rule, and whoever reduces his subjects to this 
kind of slavery, as Erasmus terms it, will ultimately find himself surrounded by enemies. 
With the religious and political function of formal education in mind, it is 
revealing that this disciplinary-humanizing process is excluded from Thélème, a society 
founded on the same humanistic principles: 
All of [the Thélèmites] had been so well educated that there wasn’t one among 
them who could not read, write, sing, play on harmonious instruments, speak five 
or six languages, and write easy poetry and clear prose in any and all of them.  
There were never knights so courageous, so gallant, so light on their feet, and so 
easy on their horses, knight more vigorous, agile, or better able to handle any kind 
of weapon.  There were never ladies so well bred, so delicate, less irritable, or 
better trained with their hands, sewing and doing anything that any free and 
worthy woman might be asked to do.  (124-125; my italics)  
 
Ironically, Thélème is a well educated society without any educational institutions.  
Everyone is well educated, but there is no account of how they got that way and what that 
process entailed.  All we know is that it happened somehow and somewhere before they 
entered Thélème.  Because there are men and women and marriage is allowed, 
presumably there is sex and therefore there are children.75  But we are left to wonder 
                                                 
75 I want to thank John Parkin, a “French Literature I” co-panelist at the 2010 Renaissance Society of 
America conference in Venice, Italy for pointing out that the Thélèmites don’t seem to marry after all.  In 
chapter fifty five, Alcofribas explains, “when the time arrived that any man in the Abbey should wish to 
leave (at the request of his parents or for some other reason), he took one of the ladies with him— the one 
who accepted him as her suitor— and they wedded each other; and so well had they dwelt together in 
Thélème in loving-friendship that they continued all the more to do so in marriage, loving each other as 
much at the end of their lives as on the first day of their wedding” (374).   It is important that the women 
consistently occupy a passive position.  But, in any event, the heterosexual interpersonal “realities” of 
Thélème fall short of Brother John’s earlier (chapter fifty) institutional endorsement of marriage, sexuality, 
and presumably reproduction.  While Thélèmite marriage is reduced to “loving [presumably Platonic] 
friendship,” post-Thélèmite marriage makes no mention of children.  It appears that Rabelais eliminates 
children as the point or consequence of heterosexual relations and the attempt of marriage to regulate 
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whether the matter of primary education represents a planning oversight or whether we 
are to assume that the children are sent away to educational institutions— perhaps some 
sort of boarding school— until young adulthood.  Also, Thélème’s population is managed 
by a (horribly) restrictive admissions policy.  It will only admit “beautiful, well formed, 
and cheerful” (116) women and “handsome, well formed, and cheerful” (116) men.  
There is also no room for the mentally disturbed or intellectually disabled.   
These systematic exclusions establish a physically, emotionally, and intellectually 
homogenous society with no need for the kinds of complex theories of cultural, 
economic, and somatic difference that the realities of our own society compel us to work 
through in the form of laws and institutional practices.  In Thélème, to be free is simply 
to be educated, and to be educated is simply to be free.  It is as if Rabelais through this 
dialogue between Brother John and Gargantua attempts to secure the consensual rule of 
the Thélèmites by going beyond Erasmus.  That is, it is not enough to exercise the 
greatest care over schools to establish a specific, disciplined form of free will; a ruler, in 
what we might term Orwellian fashion, must also place those disciplinary institutions out 
of sight and presumably out of mind— erase them, in other words, from the individual 
and collective memory of the Thélèmites— to create the illusion that disciplined freedom 
is anarchic freedom.  What better way to control people than to persuade them that they 
are free to “DO WHAT [THEY] WILL.” 
This chapter seeks to expose this illusion by drawing our attention precisely to the 
anxious and perhaps unpleasant “realities” that Thélème works so hard to exclude, 
“realities” centered on the complicating variety and vulnerability of the bodies and minds 
                                                                                                                                                 
reproduction so as to avoid altogether the problems associated with sexuality and generally the anxieties of 
what Bakhtin terms the “bodily lower stratum.”   
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of children as well as those theories and practices developed to address them. To that end, 
we need only begin with a consideration of Gargantua’s own early educational 
experience.  After returning from war with the Canarrians, Gargantua’s father, 
Grandgousier, identifies something in Gargantua that inspires him to change the method 
and purpose of his son’s education:   
 But I tell you [Grandgousier tells Gargantua’s governesses] that this one 
discussion, which my son and I have just had, right here in front of you, I . . . 
understand [in the same way that Philip of Macedonia identified Alexander’s 
aptitude for horse training] that [Gargantua’s] understanding has something divine 
about it— so acute, subtle, profound, and yet serene— and will attain to a 
singularly lofty degree of wisdom, provided he is well taught.  Accordingly, I 
wish to put him in the hands of some scholarly men [in the same way that Philip 
put Alexander in the hands of Aristotle] who will teach him everything he is 
capable of learning.  And to this end I propose to open my purse as freely as need 
be.’ (38) 
 
The divine understanding— or what Alcofribas also terms “good sense and marvelous 
comprehension” (37) — that Grandgousier identifies in the five-year old Gargantua is the 
systematic method by which the child determines the best instrument with which to wipe 
his ass: ‘But, to make a long story shorter,’ Gargantua concludes,   
‘it’s my solemn opinion that there is no ass wiper like a fluffy goose, if you keep 
its head between your legs.  On my honor this is the truth.  Because you feel a 
miraculous voluptuousness in your asshole, as much from the soft smoothness of 
that goose down as from the good warm bird, as this is steadily communicated 
right into the asshole and up to the upper intestines, all the way through to the 
heart and the brain.’ (37) 
 
Despite the benefit of Freud’s serious exploration of infantile sexuality and personality 
development, at first blush, the location of divine comprehension in the treatment of the 
ass might seem to us like just another one of Rabelais’s ridiculous— or, to some, 
offensive— expressions intended to conjure laughter or outrage, or both.   But, for as 
humorous or offensive as it might be to us and certainly was to Rabelais’s audience, the 
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association of ass and intelligence— of a humorous bodily-centered low culture and a 
spiritual rationally-centered high culture— reflects a distinctively Renaissance 
convergence: “[Laughter],” Bakhtin argues in his study of Rabelais, “emerged but once in 
the course of history. . .and entered with its popular (vulgar) language the sphere of great 
literature and high ideology” (72).76  The fluffy goose notwithstanding, if we take 
seriously Bakhtin’s insight that “laughter has a deep philosophical meaning” (66), then it 
behooves us to explore what serious messages might be encoded in this hilariously 
outrageous father-son dialogue about ass wiping.  Indeed, as Freud attributes the 
omission of any mention of sexual development from early twentieth-century studies of 
child development to the infantile amnesia of authors guided by strong “considerations of 
propriety” (40), my contention is that considerations of propriety, variously experienced 
as shame, embarrassment, and humor, conspired and continue to conspire to affect the 
forgetting of these unpleasant aspects of early child development.       
There have, however, been several notable scholarly attempts to take Rabelais’s 
sexual and scatological humor seriously. 77  And for each of these attempts, discovering 
the seriousness encoded in Rabelaisian laughter required attending to the contingent 
nature of codes of conduct in the early modern period. That is, understanding Gargantua 
                                                 
76  Here is Bakhtin’s detailed explanation of this distinctive Renaissance convergence: “Rabelais, 
Cervantes, and Shakespeare represent an important turning point in the history of laughter . . . . 
The Renaissance conception of laughter can be roughly described as follows: Laughter has a deep 
philosophical meaning, it is one of the essential forms of truth concerning the world as a whole, concerning 
history and man; it is a peculiar point of view relative to the world; the world is seen anew, no less (and 
perhaps more) profoundly than when seen from the serious standpoint.  Therefore laughter is just as 
admissible in great literature, posing universal problems, as serious.  Certain essential aspects of the world 
are accessible only to laughter” (66).        
77 Stephen Greenblatt argues that “Rabelais’s work must be understood not as the naïve self-expression of 
an unregenerate popular spirit, but as a sophisticated and brilliant [oppositional] response” (68) to a world 
increasingly committed to social order and the regulation of manners; Gail Kern Paster, emphasizing 
Rabelais’s obstetrical knowledge as a physician, offers “a deliberately literal and unamused feminist 
rereading of” (208) Gargantua’s birth “to complicate and ironize” (208) the way that other critics— 
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within the early modern context of the lowering thresholds of shame and embarrassment 
as well as the courtiziation of the feudal warrior— what Norbert Elias terms “the 
civilizing process”78— is essential to understanding Rabelaisian freedoms and, more 
importantly for our purposes, identifying the contraction of those freedoms as Rabelais 
moved from Pantagruel to Gargantua “eraser in hand,” as Richard Helgerson describes 
him, “canceling and correcting the more outrageous liberties the first book had dared” 
(115).79  
 Gargantua’s adolescence— which in Rabelais’s ridiculous time-scheme begins as 
early as three years old— is  characterized by the lack of bodily discipline that we see 
throughout Pantagruel: 
Gargantua grew and was taught all the proper discipline, by his father’s orders, 
and those years went by just as they do for ordinary children.  He drank, ate, and 
slept; he ate, slept, and drank; and he slept, drank, and ate.  
He was always wallowing in mud and muck, making his nose smutty, his 
face dirty, wearing out his shoes, his mouth open as he chased flies, running 
wildly after butterflies. . . .  He pissed all over his shoes, shat on his shirt, blew his 
nose on his sleeves and in his soup, and splashed and paddled and dabbled 
everywhere.  
                                                                                                                                                 
specifically, Bakhtin and Greenblatt— have denied or ignored the importance of gender difference in 
Rabelais’s  celebration of the grotesque body.    
78 In Ritual and Early Modern Europe, Edward Muir provides a summary of Elias’s study of the “civilizing 
process”: ‘In examining the history of manners [Elias]pointed to the sixteenth century as a critical moment 
in transforming human behavior through the spread of heavily ritualized social graces.  Adopting ‘civilized’ 
or ‘courtly’ manners inculcated a high level of self-control over the behavior of the upper classes. . . .  The 
self-control implied by the new manners required the conscious, rational regulation of emotional expression 
and physical processes in what might be seen as an effort to subordinate the lower body to the upper body” 
(125).  Elias deeply influences several studies of early modern manners and embodiment: Paster’s, 
Schoenfeldt’s, Correll’s, etc.  These studies, however, ultimately focus attention on the adult, gendered 
body, despite the fact that Erasmus’s educational treatises are central to Elias’s conclusions.      
79 Richard Helgerson, Richard Berrong, and Michael Schoenfeldt have each pointed out that Gargantua 
(1534) is a serious re-writing of Pantagruel (1532) with a conservative code of conduct at its core that 
would have been acceptable “in any polite Renaissance court” (Helgerson 110).  In “The Burdens and Joys 
of Freedom: An Interpretation of the Five Books of Rabelais,” Wayne Rebhorn argues that Thélème 
reflects Rabelais’s hope that freedom and human reformation are compatible and  that that equation begins 
to dissipate in the last three of his books.  Along with Helgerson and Berrong, I argue instead that Rabelais 
begins to contract freedoms in Gargantua and that Thélème exemplifies that contraction through a complex 
process of forgetting or mystifying the loss of freedom and the emergence of disciplinary limitations.         
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This little lecher was always feeling up his nurses, groping up and down 
and all around—whoopsy daisy!—and he was already beginning to make use of 
his codpiece.  Every day his nurses decorated it with lovely bouquets, blooming 
flowers, beautiful flowers, gorgeous garlands; they spent hours working it back 
and forth between their hands like doctors shaping a suppository.  
(31-32; my italics) 
 
Gargantua’s “adolescence” illustrates the dark-side of Thélèmite freedom.  That is, in a 
world that construes the absence of discipline as “proper discipline,” a world, in other 
words, governed by the anarchic potential in “DO WHAT YOU WILL,” gluttony, 
laziness, aimlessness, filthiness, juvenile lechery, and sexually abusive nurse-maids 
characterize the early formative life of every “ordinary” child.  While several critics have 
suggested that we understand the serious turn in Gargantua in terms of early modern 
court politics and a shift in the conceptions of aristocratic identity, the parental-
patriarchal anxieties around the sexualization of children and the (sexual) abuse at the 
hands of nurse-maids also arguably initiates a recalibration of humor in a more restrained 
and therefore more acceptable form.  Indeed, the sexualization of children, which appears 
nowhere in Pantagruel, arguably represents Rabelais attempting to cancel and correct or, 
in the terms that I have established, forget the first chronicle’s liberties.   
This process of forgetting begins with Grandgousier asking Gargantua’s 
nursemaids if they had “kept [his son] fresh and clean” (34) in his absence.  In terms of 
the anarchic “proper discipline” that characterizes Gargantua up to this point, this 
question, consistent with a Utopian society, comes out of nowhere.  As we have seen, 
Gargantua’s childhood and Rabelais’s world have been everything but fresh and clean.  
In that regard, Grandgousier’s question sets in motion the transformation of freedom 
from anarchic freedom focused on filth and illicit sexual contact to disciplined freedom 
focused primarily on nonsexual cleanliness.   
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It is also important to note that Gargantua, not the lascivious nursemaids, answers 
Grandgousier “that he had made sure that, nowhere in all the land was there a boy 
cleaner than he was” (34; my italics), for the elimination or marginalization of women is 
central to the completion of Rabelais’s forgetful transformation.  Indeed, Rabelais as 
Alcofribas constructs women and their bodies in much the same negative way as the 
medical and educational treatises we examined in the previous chapter.  First, against 
Grandgousier’s warning, Gargantua’s mother, Gargamelle, inconveniently triggers her 
labor during a feast as a result of her gluttonous ingestion of tripe: “But in spite of [his] 
cautionary words,” Alcofribas tells us, “she ate sixteen barrels, two casks, and six pots 
besides.  Oh, the lovely load of shit that must have swollen up inside her!” (16).  Once 
Grandgousier realizes that his wife is in labor, he attempts to comfort her by encouraging 
her to look forward to the Lethean joys of motherhood: 
She ought to be encouraged by the imminent arrival of her little baby.  It was 
certainly true that the pain would make her feel bad, but it would all be over very 
soon, and the happiness that always followed a birth would completely wipe away 
all the discomfort.  Nothing would be left but a memory.80 
“I’ll prove it to you,” [Grandgousier] said.  “God— our Savior Himself—
declares in the Gospel according to Saint John, chapter sixteen [,verse twenty-
one], “A woman in labor is sad, yes, but once she has her child she remembers 
nothing of all her pain.”  (20)   
 
Biblical authority notwithstanding, the promise of the memory-erasing function of the joy 
of motherhood proves little comfort to Gargamelle.  In a state of delirium, she both 
blames her husband (specifically his penis) for her labor pain and questions his ability to 
understand the gender-specific nature of what she’s experiencing.  “‘Ha!’ she said.  ‘It’s 
easy enough for you to talk—and all other men.  By God, I’ll do everything I can, since 
                                                 
80 M. A. Screech’s translation eliminates any memory of labor and delivery, which is more consistent with 
the promise of the Biblical passage: “the ensuring joy [of motherhood] would soon so take away the pain 
that even the memory of it would not remain” (225).  
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it’s what you want.  But I wish to God you’d cut it off’” (20).  Grandgousier is initially 
confused and then amazed that his wife asks him to cut off his penis.  But he is so willing 
to comfort her— so committed to resisting the usual exclusion of men from the birthing 
room or area in this instance— that he agrees to do it.  “‘Holy cow!  If that’s what you 
want, tell them to bring me a knife’” (21).  Gargamelle apologizes and retracts her 
request but reiterates that “‘it’s all because of that tool of yours, which makes you feel so 
good’” (21).  At this point, Grandgousier appears to get the message that the only 
available role for him and his tool in this obstetrical drama is that of a villain, and his 
departure from the scene of labor and delivery figuratively honors Gargamelle’s earlier 
delirious request for his literal emasculation.  But before he leaves, he attempts to retain 
his patriarchal authority by instructing her on precisely how to give birth:  
“Be brave, be brave!” said he.  “Don’t worry about anything.  I’ll just get myself 
something to drink.  Remember: when you’ve got all your oxen harnessed to the 
plow, and they’re hauling away at it, just let the lead ox do the job.  If you start to 
feel really bad, I won’t be far off.  Just cup your hands around your mouth and let 
out a good yell.  I’ll come right back.”  (21)  
              
Despite Gargamelle moaning, crying, and wailing soon after his departure, Grandgousier 
never comes back.  Instead, “midwives came from everywhere, to help her” (21).  
Contrary to Paster’s claim that the midwives, “summoned as if by instinct on hearing 
Gargamelle’s cries” (212), “displace the father at the scene” (212; my italics),  it is 
important to note, as I have just pointed out, that Grandgousier decides to leave the scene 
on his own and never actually interacts or clashes with the midwives.  And while his 
departure arguably represents an anticipatory maneuver  to avoid his eventual 
displacement by medical women, we should not, however, interpret it as well  as his 
absence from the scene of delivery as anything more than a qualified-ostensible  
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relinquishment of patriarchal authority.  In fact, Grandgousier’s authority or more 
generally patriarchal authority continues unbroken in Alcofribas’s narrative presence and 
specifically his negative representations of midwives and Gargamelle’s laboring-birthing 
body: 
Groping around underneath, [the midwives] found some fleshy excrescences, 
which stank, and they were sure this was the baby.  But in fact it was her asshole, 
which was falling off, because the right intestine (which people call the ass gut) 
had gone slack, from too much guzzling of tripe. . . . 
 Then one of them, a dirty old hag who was said to be a great doctor . . . 
made her a good stiff astringent—so ghastly that every sphincter in her body was 
locked up tight, snapped so fiercely shut that you couldn’t have pulled them open 
with your teeth, which is pretty awful to think about. . . . 
 This was not useful.  It made her womb stretch loose at the top, instead                 
of the bottom, which squeezed out the child, right into a hollow vein, by means of 
which he ascended through the diaphragm up to her shoulders, where that vein is 
divided in two.  Taking the left route, he finally came out the ear on the same side. 
    (21) 
 
Rabelais’s midwives are as incompetent as any of the ones represented in masculinist 
obstetrical treatises,81 as they mistake a prolapsed anus for Gargantua’s crowning head 
and specifically the dirty old hag inexplicably administers a powerful astringent that 
ultimately prevents a nature birth.  As the previous chapter illustrates, women’s 
intellectual inferiority was rooted in their bodily inferiority.  And in this specific instance, 
the incompetence of the midwives is rooted in the ability of their bodies to experience 
Gargamelle’s birthing incontinence.  Ironically though, the dirty old hag’s malpractice, 
which presumably would have jeopardized the child’s life as well as the mother’s, spares 
Gargantua passage through and association with Gargamelle’s incontinent and filthy 
lower bodily stratum by initiating the miraculous upward “Herculean routing of his own 
birth” (Paster 213) through his mother’s left ear.  As Paster concludes, “The episode of 
 134 
 
Gargamelle’s labor and Gargantua’s birth thematizes the opposition of male culture 
against female nature, male control and individuation against female uncontrol and the 
undifference of bowel and womb” (211). 82  Significantly, speech registers that male 
culture, control, and individuation, and, as importantly, draws our attention away from or 
effects our forgetting of the messy traumatized female body that we all emerge from.  
Like Gargantua’s verbal displacement of the nursemaids when Grandgousier asks if they 
had kept the child fresh and clean, Gargantua verbally displaces the midwives and 
Gargamelle’s body when he emerges from her ear shouting “Drink! Drink!”  (21).  After 
the painful realities of Gargamelle’s labor drives Grandgousier away from the scene of 
labor and delivery, nothing less than a miracle is needed to forget the inadequacy of 
biblical-patriarchal knowledge and authority suggested by his departure.  That miracle 
comes in the form of a talking new born who develops into a child obsessed with 
keeping—and talking about keeping— his ass clean.   
        The brief exchange between father and son about ass-wiping, which significantly 
represents the male child’s empowering emergence from his mother’s body and the care 
of morally suspect women, initiates a quest to find a learned man capable of 
implementing an educational program committed to cleaning up the body and shaping the 
mind.  However, Gargantua’s first two teachers, Tubalcain Holofernes and Blowhard 
Birdbrain, are abject failures because they represent the dangerous anarchic freedoms that 
Rabelais is attempting to forget and Grandgousier is attempting to replace; they are both 
                                                                                                                                                 
81 Rabelais repeats this negative view of midwives in Pantegruel.  After Gargantua’s wife, 
Bigmouth/Babedec, dies in childbirth, Alcofribas reports, “‘But what on earth are you doing?’ [Gargantua] 
said to the midwives— wise women all (where? where? my friends, I can’t see any!)” (142).      
82 Paster also suggests, “Gargantua may be said to have escaped the Augustinian shame of ordinary birth 
between urine and feces” (212), and “Such a clean birth is the result not of the womb’s expulsive power . . . 
but of the rebellious, upward thrust of the phallic hero” (212).        
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syphilitic university dons—in fact, syphilis kills Holofernes— committed to the 
unproductive, time-consuming educational program that characterized, in Rabelais’s 
view, Sorborne education.  Significantly, in A Declamation, Erasmus provides a sarcastic 
but ultimately sober warning about these kinds of teachers: 
It shows marvellous [sic] foresight, indeed, when boys who are scarcely four 
years old are sent to schools presided over by a master who is a complete 
unknown, a boor, a man of dubious morals, often mentally deranged and subject 
to spells of madness, or afflicted with the falling sickness or that horrible sickness 
commonly known as the “French pox.”  (325) 
 
We find Grandgousier, as a transitional father-figure, in the process of understanding the 
shortcomings of the scholasticism that defined his own early education and, at the same 
time, imperfectly figuring out the humanistic program that should replace it for his son.  
It is, in that sense, understandable that his first choices are poor ones.  But it is also 
important that we see him as precisely the kind of concerned parent— a parent sensitive 
to the consequences of poor education— that Erasmus depended on for the initiation of 
an educational revolution.  “By the time his father could see,” Alcofribas tells us, “that 
although he was studying as hard as he could, and spending all his time at it, he didn’t 
seem to be learning much and, what’s worse, he was becoming distinctly stupid, a real 
simpleton, all wishy-washy and driveling” (39).  After these failures, Grandgousier 
selects Powerbrain to teach Gargantua after witnessing one of Powerbrain’s students— 
aptly named Fortunate Rightway— demonstrate his superior learning: 
And he was so well-groomed, so beautifully dressed, so clean and neat in every 
respect, so courteous in his bearing, that he nearly resembled a little angel than a 
human being. . . . 
 Then Rightway after asking his master’s permission to proceed, stood on 
his feet, his hat in his hands, his face open, his lips red, his eyes confident, his 
glance fixed on Gargantua with modesty appropriate to his age, and began both to 
praise and to glorify Grandgousier’s son. . . .  All of this was spoken with such 
extraordinary tactful gestures, with a pronunciation so clear, a voice so elegant, 
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and in language so elegant and such good Latin, that he more nearly resembled a 
kind of ancient Gracchus, or Cicero, or Ennius than a young person of his own 
time.  (40)  
 
Beginning with the experience of “a miraculous voluptuousness in [Gargantua’s] 
asshole,”83 the child’s body is no longer a site of potentially destructive and subversive 
filth and sexual desire but a site of disciplined and clean pleasure essential to the 
civilizing process that began to re-define aristocratic identity and court politics in the 
sixteenth century.  However, a couple questions remain: what could a fictional giant’s 
ass-wiping intelligence possibly have to do with the military aptitude and Aristotelian 
education of Alexander the Great? And, how are we to understand the embodied mind 
and its complex relationship to intelligence, bodily health and cleanliness, and moral 
conduct?84    
 As a medical doctor, Rabelais also understood the materialization and habituation 
of the embodied mind in terms of Galenic humoralism, a theory of psychophysiology 
which asserts that the body is comprised of four fluids that determine intellectual ability 
and emotional states of mind.  In her study of madness and gender in early modern 
culture, Carol Thomas Neely usefully explains,  
In the [literary and medical] texts I examine, the human being is still conceived as 
a unified package of body, mind, fantasy, and soul.  Emotional and mental affects 
are caused by and registered in the body.  The body is traversed by canals (veins, 
arteries, spirits) which circulate the four humors (black bile or melancholy, yellow 
                                                 
83 In an informative etymological study entitled “Is the Fundament a Grave?,” Jeffrey Masten argues that, 
in the early modern period, the fundament/rectum/anus was thought “foundational” to subjectivity.   
84 Grandgousier’s comparison of Alexander and Gargantua seems to fail in that it associates two radically 
different subjects shaped by radically different educational aptitudes and expectations.  That is, Alexander’s 
horse-training military aptitude would make more sense to a medieval chivalric culture than to a 
Renaissance culture shaped by the emerging behavioral exigencies of court society.  Perhaps because 
Grandgousier’s realization itself represents a momentous shift from a medieval to an early modern 
understanding of the subject and education, that is, a transformative instance in the sociopolitical 
constitution of masculine identity which initiates the development of a new (humanistic) educational 
program, it only makes sense that he would struggle to understand his son’s aptitude in terms other than the 
medieval ones available to him.   
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bile or choler, phlegm, and blood) and animal spirits through three unifying 
systems. . . .  Disorders of the mind, like other disorders, are believed to be caused 
by humoral imbalance and can be cured by righting this.  (71-72) 
 
The same psychophysiological assumptions shape Rabelais and Erasmus’s understanding 
of the embodied mind.  The anarchic freedom and inefficiency of Gargantua’s previous 
education drove him mad by throwing his humors out of balance, and, as a result, 
Grandgousier invites Rabelais himself into the text with his God-given medical 
knowledge85 to prepare Gargantua’s body and mind for a proper educational program: 
The learned doctor, proceeding according to his profession’s canonical rules, first 
purged the young man with a sovereign remedy for madness, Anticyrian 
hellebore, which powerful herb quickly cleaned away all the deterioration and 
perverse habits to which his brain had succumbed.  This procedure had the 
advantage, also, of making Gargantua forget everything he had learned from his 
early teachers. (57; my italics) 
 
As we have seen with the materialization of the mind at the center of Erasmian 
disciplinary habituation, this passage reveals that the formation of the early modern 
subject was deeply rooted in and determined by the classically defined body.  Also, by 
making his titular characters giants and explaining their gigantism in terms of the biblical 
stories of the Fall and Cain’s murder of Abel, Rabelais makes the problem of 
embodiment and its importance to early modern subjectivity undeniable and therefore 
interpretively unavoidable.  As the first chronicle explains, the ancestors of Gargantua 
and Pantagruel were, in a sense, punished with gigantism— a kind of hyperbolic 
corporeality or bodily corruption— for eating giant medlar apples borne by trees 
nourished in the ground soaked in Abel’s blood.  And in the same way that “the voice” of 
                                                 
85  In both his study of renaissance laughter (Laughter at the Foot of the Cross) and his critical edition of 
Gargantua and Pantagruel, M. A. Screech explains the publication history that brings Rabelais in and out 
of this scene: “Behind the expert who cures [Gargantua]— ‘a learned doctor of the time named Seraphin 
Calobarsy’— stands Phrançoys Rabelais.  When [in 1542] he was obliged to drop the anagram because 
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that blood, as the Bible characterizes it, refuses to be denied, ignored, or forgotten by 
crying out from the ground to alert God of Abel’s murder, that bloody voice also speaks 
loudly and largely in its effects on the earth, the apples and other vegetation, and, most 
importantly, the bodies of those who consume the literal and figurative fruits of 
murderous sin.  The voice-of-blood figuration powerfully represents the “matereality” of 
the human condition in a synecdochical conflation of mind and body that would have 
made literal sense to Rabelais’s early modern readers.86  In other words, it would have 
made sense, as I have been arguing, for early modern society to think of speech, 
language, and mind in terms of the health or condition of the body and the fluids that 
course through it.87  In that sense, for Rabelais, the brain and the mind that it produces are 
not mystified, abstract, or de-materialized sites of subject formation, but literally 
manipulable, material parts of the body.  That is to say that the powerful purgative that 
restores or perhaps creates the conditions for Gargantua’s sanity literally purges or 
cleanses his embodied mind of all its accumulated bad habits as well as any memory of 
his previous teachers and their  maddening educational program. 
 It is within the context of this dynamic interconnection of mind and body that 
Powerbrain subjects Gargantua to an educational program that simultaneously cares for 
                                                                                                                                                 
somebody else had pirated it, he replaced it by Maistre Theodore, a name which brings to the fore God and 
his gifts .  Rabelais saw his medical profession as God-given” (Laughter 251).    
86 As Katharine Maus suggests, “Renaissance speech habits can make it difficult to know when what seems 
to us a bodily analogy is really an analogy; when we are dealing with metaphor and when with a bare 
statement of fact— and whether, many times, this kind of distinction is even germane” (196).   
87 For both Erasmus and Rabelais and generally the early modern period, bodily fitness free from physical 
deformity is a sine qua non of cognitive ability.  Although these types of associations have long been 
discredited, they still have popular force as evidenced in debates about whether intelligence is linked to 
race. For instance, they exist in the form of essentialist and therefore racist notions that  assume, despite the 
determining importance of socioeconomic status and educational access, a link between racial embodiment 
and intellectual-linguistic aptitude: the surprisingly or notably articulate black person, in other words.    
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the body and the mind or, as I have been arguing, for the mind as a part of the body.  
Here is a partial sketch of Gargantua’s new program:  
• He woke up at 4:00 a.m. and would be given a massage while someone read a 
biblical passage to him. 
 
• He then would pass the bodily waste (a process presumably triggered by the 
massage) in a private place, while Powerbrain repeated the passage “clarifying 
and explaining the more obscure and difficult points” (57). 
 
• After that, they would return to his sleeping quarters to reflect on astronomical 
questions. 
 
• He was then dressed and groomed, while his previous day’s lesson was repeated. 
 
•  He would then recite the lessons by heart for “two to three hours, though 
ordinarily they stopped when he was fully dressed” (58). 
 
• He then read for three hours. 
 
• After that, they went outside to play games, during which time they continued to 
discuss the reading assignment. 
• After working up a sweat or growing tired, “they had a vigorous massage, and 
were wiped clean; they’d change their shirts and, walking quietly, would go to see 
if dinner was ready” (58; my italics). 
 
• “And as they waited they’d recite, clearly and eloquently, remembered portions of 
the lesson” (58; my italics). 
    
With an educational program that perceives cognitive development as part of bodily care 
or vice versa, it only makes sense that one’s treatment of one’s ass as a liminal site 
connecting and separating the internal and external body would be a good way to 
evaluate intelligence as well as predict the likelihood of educational success.  Although 
Grandgousier is apparently not familiar with what a proper education entails when he 
initially identifies the wisdom of Gargantua’s ass wiping, he rightly concludes that 
wisdom and learning involves a constant, really obsessive, engagement with both the 
body’s internal and external functioning.  Indeed, as Alcofribas tells us, in this new 
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program, “no hour in the day was wasted” (57); that is, Gargantua’s instruction would 
continue throughout the day without the kinds of aimless pockets of dead-time that made 
his previous education so inefficient and therefore so potentially dangerous.  Even 
meals— or perhaps, as I’ve been suggesting, especially meals— are thought 
indispensible teaching-learning opportunities, for it is at those times “they’d often have 
[authoritative classical texts] brought right to the table” (38) in an effort to fix in 
Gargantua’s memory a clear understanding of his food and its preparation.   
In his largely persuasive study of the dietary basis of early modern embodied self-
fashioning, Michael Schoenfeldt tells us,  
The consuming subject was pressured by Galenic physiology, classical ethics, and 
Protestant theology to conceive all acts of ingestion and excretion as very literal 
acts of self-fashioning.  At each meal, the individual was enmeshed in [a] process 
. . . [of] ‘remak[ing] himself  by methodical and disciplined action.’  
           (11; my italics)  
 
Subjectivity defined in terms of methodical and disciplined dietary actions enmeshed in 
practical and ideological systems of bodily care is certainly what we see in Gargantua’s 
educational program.  However, like most studies of early modern embodiment, 
Schoenfeldt’s analysis concerns itself primarily with adult bodies.  Childhood— to say 
nothing of the importance of gender88 and race89— placed children in a radically different 
relationship to regimes of bodily care.90  That is, children were not enmeshed in a process 
                                                 
88  See note 21. 
89 See Mary Floyd-Wilson’s English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama for an examination of the 
geo-humoral nature of somatic/racial difference in the early modern period.     
90 The relative silence on the peculiarity of children’s embodiment might reflect the continuing influence of 
Philippe Ariès’s (now infamous and untenable) argument that there was no concept of childhood until the 
seventeenth century.  This study is therefore intended as an addition to the growing number of studies that 
re-evaluate Ariès argument.  In her study Forgotten Children, Linda Pollock provides what is perhaps the 
most systematic critique of Ariès’s argument: “Unfortunately, the very vagueness of Ariès’ definition [ of a 
concept childhood] negates his whole argument: it would be impossible not to realise that a child was 
different from an adult, children are all too dependent on adult care and protection. . . .  The point at issue is 
not whether there was a concept of childhood in the past, but whether this concept has become more 
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of self-fashioning or remaking but a process concerned primarily with helping them 
survive the most vulnerable stage of life.   
 This fundamental difference between child and adult fashioning brings us back to 
the importance of early habituation, which Gargantua’s program reflects in its repetition 
of the auxiliary verb “would” as well as its attention to hourly scheduling.  Significantly, 
the care with which Rabelais (through Powerbrain) situates Gargantua within a network 
of repetitive daily activities defined by specific times, locations, and durations reflects an 
important shift in the understanding of time from the medieval to the early modern 
period.  As a result of a confluence of economic, political, and technological factors in 
fifteenth-century Florence, an optimistic view of civic purpose and human possibilities— 
which we have already begun to witness in Erasmus and Rabelais— developed with a 
conception of time as an antagonistic force: “New ideals,” as Ricardo Quinones explains 
in The Renaissance Discovery of Time, “emerge to form the arsenal of human possibility.  
Children, fame, fidelity in love, all those areas that lend continuance to human life are 
endorsed as hopeful responses to devouring time” (16).91  The proliferation of 
educational treatises like Gargantua’s program as well as educational institutions 
throughout the sixteenth century certainly suggests that early modern educational 
theorists and well-to-do parents began to take seriously the importance of equipping 
children with the skills, knowledge, and distinguishing cultural capital necessary to 
                                                                                                                                                 
elaborated or changed through the centuries” (97).  Gargantua bears out Pollock’s point in that the change 
in Gargantua’s educational program isn’t initiated by a commensurate increase in Grandgousier’s 
realization that his son is a child in need of care and training.  Rather, as I have suggested, it is initiated by 
changes to the perception of time and acceptable behavioral norms.         
91 In many ways this essay is a response to or a development of Quinones’s fifth chapter devoted to 
Rabelais.  While he discusses the emerging and distinguishing relationship between time and educational 
theory and practice in the Renaissance, Quinones does not explore the ways in which early modern 
medicine, specifically the mind-body interconnection of Galenic materialism, informs the Rabelaisian 
body. 
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perpetuate the wealth and reputation of their families beyond the death of any one 
member.  But we might ask what enabled early modern theorists to think of children— 
the most vulnerable members of society— as weapons against the inevitability of death.  
As I have illustrated, in the humoral-based theory of Galenic materialism, the 
development of the mind has everything to do with the embodied realities of mortality, 
and Gargantua’s program illustrates that repetitive hourly scheduling as a method of 
habituation is the kind of care that creates and maintains healthy bodies and sane minds.  
Therefore, unlike most historical-economic analyses of disciplinary time, which argue 
that tools of time measurement—clocks, hourglasses, and bells—served the exigencies of 
the emerging capitalist mode of production, I am arguing that disciplinary time and its 
tools also served to establish and maintain psychophysiological health. 
 Significantly, many of the educational treatises and timetables of the period are 
just as concerned with the placement and condition of children’s bodies.  That is, while 
every major educational theorist from Vives to Milton variously argues that the close 
regulation of the non-naturals—particularly, exercise, sleep, and eating— is crucial to the 
health and learning of children, many timetables explicitly situate those bodies within 
temporally regulated disciplinary networks.  For instance, the 1560 Westminster 
timetable reads: 
At 5 o’clock that one of the Monitors of Chamber . . . shall intone “Get up.”  They 
shall immediately all get up and, kneeling down, say Morning Prayers . . . .  
Prayers finished they shall make their beds . . . .  Then two and two in a long line 
they shall all go down to wash their hands; when they come back from washing 
they shall go into school and each take his place.  (Leach 507) 
 
Similarly, a passage from the Eton timetable from around the same time reads: 
Ten O’clock [:] The prepositor of school crises, “Rise for prayer.”  These standing 
erectly from both parts of the school follow the words, someone designated at the 
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discretion of the prepositor leading. . . .  [Eleven O’clock]: Thence two by two in 
a long row they all proceed into the hall.  Dinner finished, they return to school in 
the same way they left. (Baldwin 355) 
  
These passages illustrate the important role that timetables—and implicitly tools of time-
reckoning and time-management like clocks, bells, and hourglasses—played in the 
process of habituation that Erasmus recommends and describes.  Also, early modern 
schools were tightly regulated, enclosed architectural spaces, as indicated by the 
children’s movements in and out of the schools for praying, washing, and eating.  For 
instance, John Colet’s St. Paul’s School was the prototype of early modern English 
grammar schools, and, as Erasmus describes it in a letter to Justus Jonas in 1520, it had 
“no corners or hiding places; nothing like a cell or closet.  The boys have their distinct 
forms or benches, one above the other” (qtd. in Seaborne 12).  Also, the 1599 plan for “a 
school house to be built in Tiverton” (Stowe 190) explains that the building should be 
“well walled and inclosed with a strong wall, the goinge in and forthe to be at one only 
place with a fair strong gate with a little dore as is usual in the Schooles” ( qtd. in Stowe 
190).  While many theorists have somewhat anachronistically interpreted this 
spatiotemporal rigor in terms of the docility and habits of labor best suited to the 
exigencies of the capitalist mode of production, Erasmus, later early modern educational 
theorists, timetables, and school statutes show that this process of habituation was 
primarily about protecting and disciplining the sinfully inclined bodies of the most 
vulnerable and therefore potentially most subversive members of a early modern society.  
As I began this discussion, the psychophysiological construction of the free 
willing subject is forgotten and therefore mystified by the time the Thélèmites and 
perhaps we as readers reach Thélème at the end of Gargantua’s chronicle.  But, in light of 
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this mystification, it may strike us as somewhat ironic that after beginning with a literal-
physical act of purgative forgetting, Powerbrain, as reflected in the educational program’s 
repetition, is obsessed with Gargantua’s ability to remember his lessons.  It is, however, 
important for us to keep in mind that forgetting and remembering, which represent the 
interconnected bases of subject formation, take place in an embodied mind vulnerable to 
natural changes to or manipulations of external-environmental and internal-somatic 
factors.  As John Sutton asserts, 
The humoral subject’s interwoven medical, mental, mnemonic, moral, and 
metaphysical plight, therefore, can’t be understood by considering the vulnerable 
humoral body and the fleeting spirituous brain in isolation from the world. . . .  
[And in] the early modern period, as now, the vulnerable embodied brain 
constructed, used, and [leaned] on nonbiological supports. (20) 
 
In this theory of the fluidly or porously constituted mind, nothing is ever completely or 
securely forgotten or completely or securely remembered.  Therefore education is a 
crucial part of a continuous disciplinary process necessary for a healthy and virtuous life 
of the embodied mind.92   
The danger of this continuous process is that it threatens established sociopolitical 
power by continuously exposing it as well as the subjects it constructs to the fact of its 
construction.  As we have seen, Rabelais’s Thélème and Eramsus’s habituation offers a 
quite hopeful solution— hopeful, that is, for early modern rulers— by asserting that the 
absorptive ability of children’s bodies and minds enables the deep and determinative 
internalization of those dietary and disciplinary regimes, so deep and determinative that 
once those children become adults they will act virtuously of their own free will without 
                                                 
92 See Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr.’s Memory and Forgetting in English Renaissance Drama for an exploration 
of the importance of embodiment and environmental factors to early modern memory, forgetting, and 
ultimately subjectivity.  Sullivan concludes, “memory is both internal and external, cerebral and bodily.  In 
addition, it is a kind of action, one that occurs across body and environment” (11).   
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constant discursive and spatiotemporal reminders in the form of rules, regulations, laws, 
punishments, walls, clocks, etc.   
While this understanding of embodiment, action, and social control is obviously 
specific to the early modern context that I have attempted to reconstruct, it also bears a 
striking and perhaps illuminating resemblance to recent developments in theories of 
subjectivity that take seriously the embodied nature of early formative development.  For 
instance, Mary Thomas Crane points out that most early modern scholarship on subject 
formation, shaped as it is by the textual-discursive bias of psychoanalytic and historicist-
materialist theories, generally has not explored the determinative role of the body in this 
process.  In an effort to do so, Crane, drawing on the research finds of cognitive science, 
tells us:  
[Cognitive science] posit[s] a prediscursive or “subsymbolic” stage of 
development, when an infant experiences perceptual, sensorimotor, and visceral 
stimuli that enables her to become conscious of herself as inhabiting a body in 
space . . . . 
Thought itself, then, is built upon and from sensory experiences of 
embodiment.  Although we can describe these schemas only with words, research 
in varying fields of cognitive science continues to indicate that language is not the 
primary medium of thought.  (“Male Pregnancy” 272)93 
 
In the Erasmian-Rabelaisian assumptions and the research findings of cognitive science,94  
                                                 
93 Crane continues to draw on cognitive science to attempt what she describes as “a more radical 
materialism than does current Marxist theory” in her book-length study Shakespeare’s Brain.   I quote this 
earlier version of chapter 5 (“Male Pregnancy and Cognitive Permeability in Measure for Measure”), 
because it provides what I find a more thorough explanation of how cognitive science might affect our 
understanding of language, the body, and thought, and how that understanding might affect the way we 
interpret texts, specifically early modern texts rooted in a similar notion of mind-body reciprocity. 
94 In “Touching Words: Embodying Ethics in Erasmus, Shakespearean Comedy, and Contemporary 
Theory,” Donald R. Wehrs similarly argues that Erasmus’s treatment of the body anticipates the body-
centered theories of Levinasian ethics, Kristevan psychoanalysis, and the research findings of cognitive 
science.  “Erasmian early modern humanism,” Wehrs asserts, “conceives subject formation in terms of [a] 
mutually modifying dialogue between the body and discourse, nature and culture, a dialogue that, in 
Erasmus, accords women an agency and cultural centrality denied them both by classical accounts of 
maternal civilizing nature and post-Cartesian identifications of subjectivity with disembodied 
consciousness” (1).  Wehrs goes on to illustrate how the importance of embodiment and the agency that 
that importance accords women in Erasmian thought shapes Shakespeare’s treatment of the ethical crises at 
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“Language,” as Crane further concludes, “is a relatively late stage of thought and only 
imperfectly represents the brain activity that lies behind it” (“Male Pregnancy” 272).  But 
if this is the case, if language is such a late imperfect stage of thought and therefore 
subject formation, we must then re-consider, as we have already begun to do with 
Erasmus and Rabelais, the nature of language as part of a material embodied process and 
then explore the implications of that process to how we interpret texts and the embodied 
subjects that produce them. 
   To continue with Crane, her definition of a cognitive reading provides a 
methodological framework for just such an exploration: “A cognitive reading looks for 
traces of prediscursive spatial shapings of language, for example, in images and words 
that cluster, in radial categories, around spatial concepts, such as agency and 
containment” (“Male Pregnancy” 274).  Although, as academicians, we cannot help but 
privilege linguistic texts and the words that constitute them as the primary vehicles of our 
embodied communications, Crane attempts to find traces of the prediscursive embodied 
basis of subject formation in language itself.  However, by focusing exclusively on 
language, that is, on images and word clusters, Crane’s account of Shakespeare’s brain 
seems ultimately not that different from other discursively-focused theoretically informed 
readings of Shakespeare.  Therefore, as Michael Torrey understandably concludes, “one 
does not necessarily feel, after reading [Crane’s cognitive readings of Shakespeare’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
the center of several comedies; he pays particular attention to Measure for Measure, which is also the main 
text of Crane’s essay/chapter “Male Pregnancy and Cognitive Permeability in Measure for Measure.”  
Crane’s argument, which Wehrs extensively draws on, is that proto-Foucauldian readings of the play, 
which conceive of power as essentially disembodied, do not take into account that Shakespeare’s various 
uses of the word “pregnant” establishes subjectivity and power as essentially embodied and therefore 
penetrable or vulnerable to the eternal world.  Also, while Wehrs rightly criticizes Barbara Correll’s 
subordination of the body and therefore women’s role in the ethical formation of children, he, by neglecting 
Erasmus’s misogynous distrust of women  and the charge in A Declamation that fathers  take control of the 
earliest stages of child development, overstates women’s agency.         
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plays], that one has witnessed Shakespeare’s mind at work much more than one does 
after reading a strong critical text written within a different critical framework” (589).  
While my intention has not necessarily been to offer a more radical materialist reading of 
embodied cognition than Crane’s, I have, however, focused less on language or discourse 
per se than on, to borrow and blend Foucauldian and Althusserian language, the 
apparatuses of disciplinary power more directly linked to the prediscursive stage of 
cognitive development: namely, clocks, bells, hourglasses, timetables, and walls.  
Although language certainly bears traces of that prediscursive stage, the danger of 
focusing on language, as I have attempted to illustrate in the case of Thélèmite freedom, 
is that it potentially functions to occlude or forget the apparatuses crucial to prediscursive 
development and therefore our understanding of embodied subjectivity.        
In that regard, I have been deeply influenced by Foucault’s sense that there is a 
potentially deceptive function of egalitarian juridical-ideological frameworks vis-à-vis 
non-egalitarian disciplinary mechanisms.  However, as Lois McNay points out, although 
Foucault “draws attention to the way in which disciplinary power does not pass through 
consciousness . . . [,] by not providing a more active notion of the acting subject, [his] 
idea of discipline is in danger of becoming a technical principle of bodily constraint” 
(101).  Even in his later work on “the care of the self,” which establishes a more 
“productive notion of the ‘reflexive’ subject” (97), he fails to think through the 
embedded, though dynamic, materiality of embodied identity central to the generation of 
behavioral dispositions.  In short, Foucault’s oeuvre is marked by “an unresolved 
vacillation between determinism . . . and voluntarism . . .” (96).   
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For McNay and myself, Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice— specifically his 
notions of habitus and le sense pratique (practical sense or feel for the game)— offers an 
understanding of embodiment and “the subtle inculcation of power relations upon the 
bodies and dispositions of individuals” (99; my italics) more consistent with and 
therefore more useful to an understanding of the porously constituted body of early 
modern humoralism.  According to Bourdieu, social practices are the strategic, largely 
unconscious, improvisational actions that people perform through the time and space of 
specific social fields.  That is, we act the way we do not because of our powers of 
individual decision-making or the controlling forces of structural determinism but out of 
a practical sense of what to do; and that practical sense or doxa, as Bourdieu also terms it, 
is generated by the habitus, which he describes as “embodied history, internalized [at an 
early age] as a second nature and so forgotten as history” (56).  Cognitive science and the 
history of the early modern embodied mind help us remember and therefore understand 
the subtle inculcation or internalization of the embodied-forgotten history that shapes our 
view of the world and our actions within it.95  As I have argued, Thélèmite society 
eliminates that early formative educational field to ensure the forgetting of the body as an 
essential prediscursive site of subject formation.  And in an effort to remember that 
embodied-forgotten history and perhaps facilitate, in the spirit of Foucault’s “care of the 
self,” thinking about potentially liberatory constructions of embodied subjectivity, this 
chapter had to follow those mystified references to education all the way back to that 
crucial period of ass wiping when the discourses of shame, embarrassment, and humor 
                                                 
95 See Paul Connerton’s How Societies Remember (specifically chapter 3 “Bodily Practices”) for a 
historically and theoretically informed reading of the importance of embodied habitual performances in the 
conveying and sustaining of individual and collective memory. 
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conspired in the form of disciplinary regimes to have us conceal, deny, make light of, and 
ultimately forget the serious fact that we are hopelessly-- or perhaps hopefully—
embodied subjects. 
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Chapter Seven: 
Women’s Bodies, Gender-Appropriate Learning, and Political Agency in Humanist 
Thought 
 
The previous three chapters primarily focused on the way that Erasmus and other 
educational theorists of the early modern period materialized learning as a manly activity 
and then situated the vulnerably and porously constituted bodies of boys and young men 
within protective spatiotemporal networks of disciplinary control.  But, as we have also 
seen, male embodiment and performative masculinity necessarily depend on negative-
oppositional-threatening constructions of women.  Therefore, this chapter as well as the 
next will shift attention to the equally important matter of girls’ and women’s education.  
Over the course of this chapter, I will demonstrate the way in which early modern 
educational theorists of girls’ and women’s education also drew on biblical and medical 
notions of embodiment and pay particular attention to the resultant complex implications 
to women’s intellectual and political agency.   
But first, in order to learn something about the patriarchal system of the early 
modern period and its views on women’s education, it would be useful to take a close 
look at one of its most famous critics: Sir Thomas More.96  In a 1523 letter of reply to his 
                                                 
96 This suggestion  represents a slight modification of  Noam Chomsky’s rule of thumb for analyzing 
thought control or the manufacture of consent in modern democratic societies.  In a December 9, 1984 
address given at the Community Church of Boston entitled “The Manufacture of Consent,” the renowned 
linguist and political activist Noam Chomsky bleakly describes the powerful “mechanisms and practices of 
indoctrination” (136) in democratic societies “to which we are subjected and which all too often we serve 
as willing or unwitting instruments” (136).  “A useful rule of thumb is this,” Chomsky sagely informs us, 
“If you want to learn something about the propaganda system, have a close look at the critics and their tacit 
assumptions.  These typically constitute the doctrines of the state religion” (126).  That is, as Chomsky 
goes on to explain, in order for critics of the system “to achieve respectability, to be admitted to the debate, 
they must accept without question or inquiry the fundamental doctrine that the state is benevolent [and] 
governed by the loftiest intentions” (132).  Differences in political systems notwithstanding, Chomsky’s 
analysis presents important points of connection with humanistic theories of education.  For instance, both 
theories are committed to non-violent methods of (thought) control, and both recognize the importance of 
managing historical memories in such as way that ultimately serves the dominant ideology or, as Chomsky 
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eldest daughter, Margaret Roper, after explaining how shocked and incredulous Reginald 
Pole, who he describes as a virtuous and learned young man,97 is by the display of Latin 
mastery in her “most charming” (More Letters 154) letter, More reflects on what it means 
for Margaret or any woman to be educated in his society:                                           
Meanwhile, something I once said to you in joke came back to my mind, 
and I realized how true it was.  It was to the effect that you were to be pitied, 
because the incredulity of men would rob you of the praise you so richly deserved 
for your laborious vigils, as they would never believe, when they read what you 
have written, that you had not often availed yourself of another’s help: whereas of 
all the writers you least deserve to be thus suspected.  Even when a tiny child you 
could never endure to be decked out in another’s finery.  But, my sweetest 
Margaret, you are all the more deserving of praise on this account.  Although you 
cannot hope for an adequate reward for your labor, yet nevertheless you continue 
to unite to your singular love of virtue the pursuit of literature and art.  Content 
with the profit and pleasure of your conscience, in your modesty you do not seek 
for the praise of the public, nor value it overmuch even if you receive it, but 
because of the great love you bear us, you regard us— your husband and 
myself—as a sufficiently large circle of readers for all that you write. 
 In your letter you speak of your imminent confinement.  We pray most 
earnestly that all may go happily and successfully with you.  May God and our 
blessed Lady grant you happily and safely to increase your family by a little one 
like his mother in everything except sex.  Yet let it by all means be a girl, if only 
she will make up for the inferiority of her sex by her zeal to imitate her mother’s 
virtue and learning.  Such a girl I should prefer to three boys.  Good-bye, my 
dearest child.  (More 155) 
 
In this complex expression of fatherly love, pride, and pity, More represents Margaret not 
as proof of women’s intellectual equality but an exception to the rule of women’s 
inferiority.  As a reflection of the period’s misogyny, it was difficult, arguably 
impossible, for him to categorically rethink her mastery of Latin, as it was difficult for 
Pole and most men of the period to believe his account of it.  These difficulties are rooted 
in the belief, as I have already discussed in my chapter-one discussion of Galenic 
materialism, that women were thought intellectually inferior because physically inferior.  
                                                                                                                                                 
terms it, the state religion.  Also both recognize the constraining effects of that ideology on possibilities for 
acceptable and even intelligible speech. 
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In that regard, it is significant that More concludes this letter by acknowledging 
Margaret’s pregnancy and imminent labor and delivery, by identifying, in other words, 
the peculiar material-bodily basis of her intellectual inferiority, before sharing his hope 
that she has “a little one like his mother in everything except sex” (my italics) or at least a 
girl who “makes up for the inferiority of her sex.”  More’s pity, however, is also and 
relatedly about the absence of any professional outlet or recognition for  the “laborious 
vigils” that Margaret spent in the advancement of her learning.   
Since the rediscovery of the classical tradition and the emergence, in particular, of 
Ciceronian political thought in Quattrocento Italy, the life of the stoic sage— the vita 
contemplativa or the vita solitaria—was no longer justifiable.  In this new 
sociopolitically engaged milieu, the point of education, specifically the emphasis on 
rhetoric in the studia humanitatis, was to prepare boys for public or political service.  As 
we might imagine, the inability to contribute to society in some meaningful way— the 
inability to do what your education prepared you to do and expect—  often resulted in a 
profound identity crisis for the products of that system; we need only read More’s own 
struggle to reconcile his hankering for the monastery with his sense of sociopolitical duty 
in the book-one dialogue of Utopia to get a sense of the extent to which public 
recognition and service defined educational and professional success.98  More pitied his 
daughter because her sex-gender difference effectively barred her from succeeding by 
these standards.  In fact, because women’s public speech was associated with sexual 
license, any learned woman bold enough to pursue public distinctions had to confront 
                                                                                                                                                 
97 More was prescient in his assessment, for Pole would go on to become the Archbishop of Canterbury.   
98 Another powerful example of that crisis is Sir Thomas Wyatt’s pained expression of political exile in his 
epistolary satire “To Mine Own John Poins.” 
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questions about her chastity. 99  So More’s particular challenge, as an advocate of 
women’s education, is to critique his society’s skepticism about women’s educability as 
well as its association of women’s education with lasciviousness in precisely the 
misogynistic terms that his society could understand and would possibly accept.  To that 
end, by praising Margaret’s singular love of virtue and her contentment with the profit 
and pleasure of her conscience, More’s letter engages in what Pierre Bourdieu might 
describe as a process of a turning that pitiful necessity of Margaret’s limitations into the 
gender-specific virtue of the contented modesty of a socio-politically detached 
conscience.100   
In another letter written to William Gonell, one of his children’s tutors, just a few 
years earlier in 1518, More seems directly to contradict his society’s view of women’s 
inferiority, when he asserts that men and women “are equally suited for the knowledge of 
learning by which reason is cultivated” (More 105).  However, elaborating on the 
agricultural metaphor, he immediately makes a conditional concession that reveals 
women’s bodies once again qualifying their intellectual equality: “But if the soil of a 
woman be naturally bad, and apter to bear fern than grain, by which saying many keep 
women from study, I think, on the contrary, that a women’s wit is the more diligently to 
be cultivated, so that nature’s defect may be redressed by industry” (More 105).  
                                                 
99 See Grafton and Jardine’s chapter two (“Women Humanists: Education for What?”) of From Humanism 
to the Humanities for a discussion of the association of learning and promiscuity, particularly as it relates to 
the lives of two Quattrocento women: Isotta Nogarola and Cassandra Fedele.      
100  In Logic of Practice, Bourdieu explains, “if a very close correlation is regularly observed between the 
scientifically constructed objective probabilities (for example, the chances of access to a particular good) 
and agents’ subjective aspirations (‘motivations’ and ‘needs’), this is not because agents consciously adjust 
their aspirations to the exact evaluation of their chances of success. . . .  In reality, the dispositions durably 
inculcated by the possibilities and impossibilities, freedoms and necessities, opportunities and prohibitions 
in the objective conditions . . . generate dispositions objectively compatible these conditions. . . .  The most 
improbable practices are therefore excluded, as unthinkable, by a kind of immediate submission to order 
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Although More’s “if” indicates that he doesn’t share this view of women’s nature and 
educability, these materializing and therefore masculinizing terms of cultivation— terms, 
in other words, of a masculinist and largely agricultural society— shift attention away 
from the basis of More’s initial assessment of cognitive equality to the material realities 
of embodiment, specifically sex-gender difference.  And by materializing women in this 
way— by identifying their reproductive peculiarity and accepting the metaphorically 
“bad soil” of  their defective bodies— More concedes that women are not equal to men 
and therefore not fit for the intellectual or public spheres.   
But the question remains, what’s the point of educating women in good letters, 
even if we accept that it’s possible to do so?  More’s 1518 letter to Gonell gives us an 
answer that by now we might expect.  This letter is actually a response to one of 
Gonell’s, which expresses his concern with the way in which More’s educational 
program was threatening to debase or limit Margaret’s “lofty and exalted character of 
mind” (More 104).  More’s defense is that an educational program should aggressively 
discourage a desire for public approval— which he variously describes as pride, 
haughtiness, and vainglory— and encourage “most whatever may teach them piety 
towards God, charity to all, and modesty and Christian humility in themselves” (105).  Of 
course, these educational goals were  not gender specific.  John, More’s son, was trained 
in the same educational philosophy as his sisters, and More’s own refusal to take the Oath 
of Supremacy— a refusal that led to his removal from public life, his imprisonment, and 
ultimately his execution— is indisputable evidence that his religious integrity was more 
important than what he determined was immoral public service.  The difference is that he 
                                                                                                                                                 
that inclines agents to make a virtue of necessity, that is, to refuse what is anyway denied and to will the 
inevitable” (54).        
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and his son had a choice.  For his daughters, learned piety was the only option, and, as I 
have said, More focuses on that option as a way of turning a misogynistic necessity into a 
gender-specific virtue. 
The paradoxical nature of More’s misogynistic argument— the tension, in other 
words, between women’s intellectual equality and the reality of their somatically-rooted 
inferiority— reveals “not More’s confusion alone” as Lisa Jardine describes it, “but. . .[a 
more general] underlying cultural confusion” (5) about the nature and role of women in 
the classical and biblical traditions that early modern humanists inherited. That is, while 
Aristotelian-inspired misogyny and Christianity traditionally pathologized women as the 
irrational and immoral weaker vessel, classical mythology and history as well as early 
modern history are littered with representations of powerful learned women, such as the 
Muses, Pallas Athena, Minerva, Dido, Cleopatra, Zenobia, Christine de Pizan, Isotta 
Nogarola, Elisabetta Gonzaga, etc.  More’s co-educational home school was an attempt 
to resolve this mixed message, and it proved persuasive enough to change the mind of the 
most significant educational theorist of the sixteenth-century: his friend and fellow 
humanist Desiderius Erasmus.  In a 1521 letter to the French humanist Guillaume Budé, 
Erasmus explains, 
Again, scarcely any mortal man was not under the conviction that, for the female 
sex, education had nothing to offer in the way of either virtue or reputation.  Nor 
was I myself in the old days so completely free of this opinion; but More has quite 
put that out of my head.  For two things in particular are perilous to a girl’s virtue, 
idleness and improper amusements, against both of these the love of literature is a 
protection.  There is no better way to maintain a spotless reputation than faultless 
behaviour, and no women’s chastity is more secure than her’s who is chaste by 
deliberate choice.  Not that I disapprove the ideas of those who plan to protect 
their daughter’s honour by teaching them the domestic arts; but nothing so 
occupies a girl’s whole heart as the love of reading.  And besides this advantage, 
that the mind is kept from pernicious idleness, this is the way to absorb the 
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highest principles, which can both instruct and inspire the mind in the pursuit of 
virtue.  (297) 
 
More’s education of virtuous daughters helps Erasmus realize that the love of literature is 
an effective means of socio-sexual control, because that love— the occupation of a girl’s 
whole heart in the love of reading— makes the “deliberate choice,” or, as Chomsky 
would say, the indoctrination of the faultless behavior of chastity more secure than 
traditional domestic training.  As several early modern historians and literary critics have 
argued, the point of a humanistic education was not simply to produce free individuals as 
much as free, willing, or consensual male subjects.  For Erasmus, what More’s co-
educational home school proves is that a humanistic education could do the same thing to 
and for women.  That is, with the right curriculum— one which, as More recommends, 
excludes or limits rhetoric and history and strongly emphasizes religious figures like St. 
Jerome and St. Augustine and other ancient authors who promote women’s moral probity 
and humility— classical learning promised to socialize women to accept their confined 
roles as domestic partners.               
By way of contrast, Sir Thomas Elyot is the only major educational theorist of the 
sixteenth century to reject this intellectual and political confinement in The Defence of 
Good Women (1540): a Platonic dialogue which captures the centuries-long debate or 
confusion that humanists like More and Erasmus variously attempted to resolve.  At the 
decisive point in the dialogue, Candidus, the dialogue’s defender of women, overwhelms 
Caninus, the dialogue’s Aristotelian misogynist, with an impressive list of female 
classical figures intended to demonstrate women’s educational and political ability: 
And perdy, many arts and necessary occupations have been invented by 
Women, as I will bring now some unto your remembrance.  Latin letters were first 
 founded by Lisostrata, called also Carmentis.  The VII liberal arts and poetry by 
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 their maidens called the Muses.  Why was Minerva honored for a goddess?  But 
 because she founded first in Greece, planting or setting trees: also the use of 
 armor: and as some do testify, she invented making of fortresses, and many 
 necessary and notable sciences.  Also that the wits of women be not unapt to 
 laudable studies, it appears by Diotima and Aspasia two honest maidens. . . .  
Hundreds of such women are in stories remembered, but for speed of time I will 
pass them over, since I trust that these be sufficient to prove, that the whole kind 
of women be not unapt unto wisdom. . . .  As concerning strength and valiant 
courage, which you surmise to lack in them, I could make to you no less 
replication, and by old stories and late experience prove, that in armies women 
have been found of no little reputation, but I will omit that for this time, for as 
much as to the more part of wise men it shall not be found much to their 
commendation: Saving that we now have one example among us, as well as of 
fortitude as of all other virtues, which in my opinion shall not be inconvenient, to 
have at this time declared, and so of this matter to make a conclusion.   
(sig. D5r-D6v) 
 
Zenobia, the third-century Syrian queen who conquered Egypt and successfully resisted 
Roman invasion, is the “real-life” embodiment of Candidus’s argument, and his inclusion 
of her— his inclusion of a virtuous and powerful woman speaking for women— at the 
end of the dialogue is presented as the coup de grace against Caninus and the other 
opponents of women’s educational and political equality.  However, there is a striking 
inconsistency between Candidus’s laudatory introductory description and Zenobia’s 
“actual” embodied presence in the dialogue.  Despite proving herself an exceptional ruler 
and military leader, what brings her to Rome and into the dialogue is her eventual defeat 
at the hands of the Roman emperor Aurelian.  As a prisoner of war pardoned for her 
“nobility, virtue, and courage,” she paradoxically represents an equality qualified by the 
military superiority of men. 
This qualification is also borne out in the dialogue itself.  Zenobia immediately 
expresses deep anxieties about accepting Candidus’s invitation to dinner because 
venturing out of her home at night will likely raise questions about her chastity.  “For I 
dread infamy,” she tells Candidus, “more than even I did the loss of my liberty” (D8r).  
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After assuring her that “no such thing shall happen” (D8r) because she is in the company 
of “no men but of honest condition” (E1v), Candidus proceeds to ask the questions 
intended to illustrate the type of educational program appropriate to women as well as 
why educated women ultimately make the best rulers.  Zenobia’s answers reveal an 
educational program, much like More’s and Erasmus’s, where women are educated in 
moral philosophy with an emphasis on prudence, constancy, and obedience to their 
husbands.  As Elyot through Zenobia explains, the specific goal of such a program is to 
instill within women the ultimate virtue of Temperance: 
But in a woman [, Zenobia declares,] no virtue is equal to Temperance, whereby 
in her words and deeds she always uses a just moderation, knowing when time is 
to speak, when to keep silence, when to be occupied, and when to be merry.  And 
if she measures it to the will of her husband, she does the more wisely: except it 
may turn them both to loss or dishonesty.  Yet then should she seem rather to give 
him wise counsel, than to appear dishonest and sturdy.  (sig. E2r; my italics) 
 
Constance Jordan argues that, in the second sentence, Zenobia “insists that a wife is 
exempt from these constraints on her freedom if her husband’s wishes ‘may turn them 
both to loss and dishonesty’” (195).  However, the loose punctuation so typical of early 
modern prose and the repetition of the vague pronoun “it” makes this a particularly 
slippery or difficult-to-interpret passage that seems, at least, to raise questions about the 
simplicity of Jordan’s reading.  In other words, while the first “it” seems to refer to a 
clearly defined understanding of “Temperance,” by the time we reach the second “it,” the 
effects of the conditional statement and the modifying clause transforms “it” and 
“Temperance” in an important— although confusing— way.  In that regard, it is 
reasonable to read the second “it” as representing a wife’s temperance wisely measured 
to her husband’s will and the “except” clause as saying that if she doesn’t do so—if she 
doesn’t measure it wisely— her unwillingness or inability will hurt them both.  
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Therefore, rather than freeing a wife from her husband’s will, as Jordan would have it, 
this passage arguably suggests the exact opposite, that is, the responsibility for what he 
does falls solely on her ability to counsel him wisely. 
 This enormous responsibility, which, of course, makes Zenobia and all women 
convenient Eve-like scapegoats, is a consequence of Candidus’s bold inversion of the 
somatic basis of sex-gender inequality articulated at the beginning of the dialogue.  That 
is, after establishing that rational greatness, not physical strength, is that which 
distinguishes humanity from other animals, Candidus proceeds to dismantle the 
Aristotelian correlation between women’s physical weakness and their moral and 
intellectual inferiority.  By this logic, men are less rational than women because they are 
stronger and therefore more inclined to potentially tyrannical physical force, and women, 
by virtue of their relative weakness and subsequent reliance on reason factored as 
“Discretion, Election, and Prudence,” are “more perfect [human beings] than men” (sig. 
D4v) with the potential to rule more justly.       
This reversal represents an interesting feminization of nonviolent humanistic 
theories of educational and political rule.  Indeed, the same gender-specific educational 
training in moral philosophy that prepared Zenobia to serve her husband— King 
Odaenathus— as a wise, temperate and, above all, obedient wife prepared her for the 
rational and nonviolent— that is, the just and effective rule—of her people after his 
death.  During her reign, she explains to Candidus, she “made Justice chief ruler of [her] 
affections” (E5v), which enabled her to enact the kinds of policies that “added much 
more to [her] empire, not so much by force, as by renown of trust and politic governance” 
(E5r).  In fact, these policies prove so effective “that diverse of [Palmyra’s] enemies . . . 
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chase rather to leave [the hostility of their own country], and to remain in [Palmyrene] 
subjection” (E5r).  As I point out in earlier chapters, Norbert Elias identifies the way in 
which the emergence of absolute monarchies in the sixteenth century initiated the 
transformation of aristocratic feudal warriors into nonviolent courtiers.  In this new 
political order, aristocrats achieved political legitimacy not through demonstrations of 
physical might or military prowess but through the demonstration of “heavily ritualized 
social graces” (Muir 125).  Humanists like Erasmus and More extended this behavioral-
political transformation to absolute monarchs or princes by charging that war and violent 
rule are tyrannical, and they implored princes to acknowledge the free will of their 
subjects and rule them, as God rules all humanity, consensually.   
The Defence is Elyot’s contribution to this behavioral-political ethos.  However, it 
is significant, as I have already noted, that the masculinist-military ethos of Aurelian 
Roman imperialism wins out in the end.  Even more paradoxically, not only does 
Zenobia’s education prepare her for marriage and nonviolent just rule, it also prepares her 
for Roman captivity.  That is, through her study of “noble philosophy” she “acquired 
such magnanimity” that once in Rome she is able to “keep in as straight subjection all 
[her] affections, and passions” (sig. E5r).  And if we consider more closely the irenic 
policies of her rule, it becomes clear that nonviolent self-control ultimately means the 
acknowledgement of male authority.  First, in order to protect “the name of a woman” 
from the contempt of the people, Zenobia tells us that she “always stayed abroad among 
[her] nobles and counselors, and said [her] opinion, so that it seemed to them all, that it 
stood with good reason” (E4r-E5v); also, she tells us that she often reminded the people 
of the liberty and honor they received “by the excellent prowess of [her] noble husband 
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showing to them [her] children . . . exhorting them with sundry orations to retain their 
fidelity” (E5v).  In both instances, the legitimation of men— nobles, counselors, and the 
memory of her late husband— sanctioned her rule by protecting her from charges that she 
ruled “womanly” (E4r), which in these instances is implicitly factored as emotional and 
irrational.  Therefore, despite Elyot’s efforts to invert the somatic basis of sex-gender 
inequality, Zenobia’s own political strategies reveal a woman trapped within traditional 
notions of sex-gender difference, ruling her empire as any woman would have ruled her 
household.  In the final analysis, Elyot’s feminization of nonviolent rule seems, at best, 
ambivalent and, at worst, ironic.101 
As I have explored in my chapter devoted to Ascham’s The Schoolmaster, Plato 
practically disqualifies or, at least, significantly minimizes the importance of the sexed-
gendered body in book five of the Republic with Socrates’s argument for qualified equal 
education and political responsibilities for men and women of the guardian class.  No 
major educational theorist of the sixteenth century was able or willing to go that far.  
However, their promotion of a Greek and Latin curriculum for women logically points in 
the direction of transcendent Platonic equality.  Although these educational theorists 
attempted to have it both ways, that is, to unlock the door to women’s equality only to 
leave it shut, their complex constructions of educated women are still logically and 
imaginatively threatening to the early modern patriarchal system.  Indeed, complexity is 
                                                 
101 In Book I Canto 9 of The Faerie Queene, Edmund Spenser powerfully represents this tension between 
Christian nonviolent piety and a chivalric military ethos in one of Despair’s arguments that leads Redcrosse 
Knight to the brink of suicide: “All those great battels, which thou boasts to win,/Through strife, and bloud-
shed, and avengement,/Now praysd, hereafter deare thou shalt repent:/For life must life, and bloud repay” 
(43: 381-384).  In the next canto, after Redcrosse’s mind and body have been restored in the House of 
Holiness, Contemplation explains that Redcrosse’s  hands will be washed of  the “guilt of bloudy field/For 
bloud can nought but sin, and wars but sorrowes yield” (60: 539-540) before he enters the new Jerusalem. 
Redcrosse expresses his desire to stay in new Jerusalem and abandon military service for a life of peaceful 
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always more threatening to a social order than simplicity, no matter how confusing, 
paradoxical, ambivalent, and/or ironic. 
With that in mind, it is my contention that Juan Luis Vives, the Spanish humanist 
and tutor to the English princess Mary Tudor, attempts to resolve the confusion around 
women’s education in the direction of a bodily-centered simplicity in his educational 
treatise The Instruction of a Christen Woman (1524).  Like More, Erasmus, and Elyot, 
Vives cites classical, biblical, and contemporary examples of learned women throughout 
his treatise and recommends curricular-ideological content intended to ensure chastity 
and wifely obedience.  However, he goes beyond the other theorists in vividly and 
repeatedly explaining or materializing women’s socio-sexual inferiority in terms of 
biblical and Galenic regimes of bodily discipline:               
Phisitians and suche as wryte the natures of mennes bodies, and specially Galene 
in the boke of Helthe sayth, that the bodies of chyldren and yonge men, and those 
that be in lustie age, bothe men and women, be very hotte of naturall heate: and 
that all meates that encrease heate, be very noysom for them: and that hit is good 
for them to use all colde thing in meates and drynkes. . . .  Wherfore our saviour 
sayth: Take you hede to your selfe that your hartes be nat over commen with 
surfet and dronkennes, and the cares of this lyfe.  (35) 
 
It is significant, as we have seen in Ascham’s The Schoolmaster, that bodily hotness is 
not a sex-gender specific condition, but one that generally afflicts young children and 
young adults of both sexes.  But where Ascham employs physical exercise as a 
nonviolent method of regulating and harnessing that hotness for the purposes of 
performative masculinity, Vives recommends the sparse and bland diet of classical and 
medieval asceticism to tamp down that hotness in young women to levels consistent with 
                                                                                                                                                 
contemplation.  This tension is never resolved; the best that Contemplation can do is remind Redcrosse of 
his commitment to the Faerie Queene.         
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their limited place in early modern society.102  This diet eliminates anything that might 
stir the natural heat of the youthful body— particularly hot meates and wine— and 
includes frequent fasting and meals consisting of modest portions of fruits, bread, and 
water. 
Interestingly though, after citing Saint Jerome’s dictum that “Hit is better that the 
stomake ake than the mynde, and to rule the body than to do hit service, and stagger in 
goying than in chastite” (36), Vives only lists male biblical and classical examples of that 
ascetic tradition: Hilarion, “the heremite” who “lyved in wyldernes with small food” and 
“weried his body with fasting” (36); the disciples of Christ, “who knewe, that the 
noryshemenets of holy men sente by the grace of god were but simple and small to 
content nature, without pleasure” (36); Elisha, who “noryshed hym selfe and the children 
of the prophetes with wylde herbes, and he byddeth, make swete the bytter meate with 
flower, and nat with suger” (36); John the Baptist, who “was fed in [the] deserte with 
grashops and wyld hony” (36); Daniel, who God nourished with “brede baken under the 
asshes, and a cuppe of water” (36); Elijah who God sent “a cuppe of water. . .from 
heaven to refreshe hym with” (36) during a period of despair; Socrates, “the father of 
Philosophie dyd get by sobre dyet, that he was never infected with any sore or jeopardous 
sicknes” (36); and Seneca, according to Tacitus, despite his riches “fedde hym selfe with 
frute ad water: and therefore his body was brought so lowe, that whan his veynes were 
opened, ther wolde almost no blode renne out” (36).  Similar to Elyot’s ambivalent or 
ironic feminization of nonviolent rule, ascetic biblical and classical men exemplifying 
                                                 
102 Vives’s recommendation of an ascetic diet for women is a good example of how diet connects to and 
complements what Gail Kern Paster describes, in her critique of Michael Schoenfeldt’s emphasis on the 
empowerment of Galenic physiology, as “the realities of social and gender hierarchy” (21).  For an 
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dietary habits for women reveal, once again, a significant tension in the period between 
the nonviolent piety of Christian humanists and the violent performative masculinity 
characteristic of aristocratic men.  In a question, what does it say about ascetic classical 
and Christian masculinity— about ascetic life in general— that these men follow a 
dietary regimen that Vives thinks appropriate to early modern women?  The difference, 
as I have also suggested with More’s co-educational home school, is that asceticism, like 
piety, represented a debatable choice for men, while it represented for women one of the 
ways in which early modern society attempted to justify the constrained place that they 
occupied.       
In any event, this tension, common somatic hotness, and distinguishing regimes of 
sex-gender performativity all raise potentially subversive, confusing, or, in Judith 
Butler’s terms, troublesome questions about sex-gender distinction in the period. But, as I 
have suggested, Vives’s representation of women’s bodies and the ascetic dietary 
regimen appropriate to them also effectively or practically reifies and essentializes 
women as fundamentally weaker than and therefore inferior to men in mind and body or 
mind because of body.  This myth of inferiority is, as we have seen, is rooted in the story 
of the Fall.  And although Vives at one point stresses the important role that mothers play 
in the early formative development of children,103 he also insists that women aren’t fit to 
be teachers and bases that insistence on Eve’s originary indiscretion: 
But I gyve no licence to a woman to be a teacher, nor to have authorite of the man 
but to be in silence.  For Adam was the first mayde, and after Eve, and Adam was 
                                                                                                                                                 
exploration of the connection between diet and empowered masculinity, see my chapter-five discussion of 
Rabelais’s Gargantua.  
103 In book 2, chapter 11, Vives states, “For the babe fyrste hereth her mother, and fyrst begynneth to 
enforme her speche after hers.  For that age can do nothing it selfe, but counterfeit and folowe other: and is 
counnyng in this thing only.  She taketh her fyrst conditons and information of mynde, by suche as she 
hereth, or seeth by her mother.  Therfore it lyeth more in the mother, than men wene, to make the conditons 
of the children” (145).  It is, however, significant that that infant child is gendered female.   
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nat betrayed, the woman was betrayed in to the breche of the commandement.  
Therfore because a woman is a fraile thygne, and of weake discretion, and that 
maye lightlye be disceyved: whiche thing our first mother Eve sheweth, whom the 
devyll caught with a light argument.  Therfore a woman shulde nat teache, leste 
whan she hath taken a false opinion and beleve of any thing, she spred hit into the 
herars, by the autorite of maistershyp, and lightly bringe other into the same 
errour, for the lerners commenly do after the teacher with good wyll.  (23-24) 
 
In keeping with the mind-body unity of Galenic physiology, Vives registers the dangers 
of women’s “weake discretion” in terms of Eve’s failure of what amounts to a Satanic 
food test.  That is, a proper or improper diet is what ultimately distinguishes the pre- from 
the post-lapsarian mind-body nexus, and Satan “betrays,” as Vives terms it, Eve instead 
of Adam— women instead of men—because he identified in her the kind of weakness 
that “a light argument” might persuade to abandon the nourishing or fortifying innocence 
of the Edenic diet for the sinful and therefore lust-provoking fruit of the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil.  Indeed, as Vives goes on to explain in chapter five of book 
two entitled “Of the concorde of maryed couples,” women’s cognitive inferiority factored 
as a lack of discretion is ultimately rooted in a gender-specific defect of the stomach: 
For the man is nat so yrefull as the woman.  And that is nat in mankynde onlye, 
but also in all kyndes of beastis, as Aristotle saythe.  For males, bycause they have 
more bolde stomackes, and are more lusty of corage, therfore be they simple and 
lesse noysome, for they have the more noble myndes.  And females contrary be 
more malicious, and more set to do harme.  Wherfore the woman wylbe takyn 
with light suspicions, and ofte complayne and vex their husbandes, and anger 
them with pervyshe puelyng: but the man is easyer to reconcile than the woman.  
Lykewise, as of men he, who is most stomacked unto a woman, nor lusty coraged, 
wyl remembre injury longest, and seke for vengeance the most violently, nor can 
be content with a mean revengeance. (110) 
 
This passage importantly references Aristotle’s somatic theory of women’s inferiority to 
illustrate the extent to which the stomach and implicitly digestion are as sexed and 
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gendered as any other part and function of the body. 104  In this instance, Vives represents 
the stomach as the determinative site of socio-sexual control, and men are ultimately 
“simple and less noysome”— that is, more controlled— not because they function within 
a society designed for the perpetuation of their own masculinist interests, but because 
they have “more bolde stomackes,” which also means they are “more lusty of corage” 
and “have the more noble myndes.”  Antithetical to Elyot’s/Candidus’s reversal of 
women’s somatically-based inferiority and defense of  their nonviolent rule, Vives 
identifies women’s lack of control— that is, their lack of discretion, their violent 
argumentativeness, and their tendency to hold grudges and seek revenge — with their 
abdominal weakness.     
So, although both men and women seem to have the same capacity for hotness 
and men can exhibit weak-stomached womanly characteristics, women, by virtue of their 
originary abdominal and digestive weakness, have always already lacked dietary and 
therefore socio-sexual control.  In chapter eight of book one, which is entitled “Of the 
ordrying of the body in a virgin,” Vives again references Eve’s dietary indiscretion in the 
process of imploring parents to regulate their daughters’ diet:  “And they ought to 
remembre that our first mother for meate [that is, food] was caste out of paradise.  And 
many yonge women that had been used to delicate meates . . . have gone forth from home 
and jeoperded theyr honestie” (34-35).  Indeed, the wrong diet, as Vives goes on to 
explain in chapter sixteen of the same book (“Howe the mayde shall seke an husbande”), 
results in the kind of irrational and materialistic behavior that renders women unable to 
                                                 
104 This gendering of the stomach and digestion complicates Michael Schoenfeldt’s downplaying of gender 
difference in Bodies and Selves.  Even in Schoenfeldt’s otherwise instructive reading of eating as a 
physiological and ethical phenomenon in Paradise Lost, the sociopolitical significance of sex-gender 
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maintain the chastity of their already vulnerable minds and bodies.  In Vives’s estimation, 
these undisciplined women conduct themselves like animals— female wolves to be 
specific— who end up choosing men who are no better than animals themselves.105  “Oh 
folysshe mayde” he castigates these women, “whiche haddest leaver have contynuall 
sorrowe in golde and sylke, than have pleasure in wollen cloth: whiche had leaver be 
hated and beaten in rayment of purple and ryche color, than be loved and set by in a 
course garmet of meane colour” (78).106  In this powerful expression of Christian anti-
materialism, the abdominal and dietary weaknesses of undisciplined women distort their 
intellectual and sensory perceptions to the point that the feeling and sight of expensive 
materials— gold, silk, purple, and other rich colors—  anesthetizes them to their unhappy 
lives with abusive husbands.   
Because women are essentially incapable of controlling themselves, Vives 
implores parents to regulate their daughters’ diets, as I have already illustrated, and, as 
importantly, to limit their public exposure: 
Wher to shulde I tell how much occasion of vyce and noughtynes is abrode?  
                                                                                                                                                 
difference— the difference between Eve’s eating and Adam’s eating—is, for the most part, only cursorily 
registered.     
105 In terms of the female-wolf analogy, Vives states, “Wherfore it was well and aptlye spoken, that a 
countrey man of myne sayd, that the nature of women was in chosynge men, lyke unto the female wolves: 
Whiche amonge a great sorte of males, take the fouleste and worste favoured” (78).  In terms of the male-
animal analogy, he states, “And in tyme passed I thought it had bene a fable, that men tell, howe Pasyphae 
the queen of Candy, dyd lye with a bulle . . . but nowe me thynketh them all lykely inough to be true, when 
I se women can fynde in theyr hartes, to tomble and lye with vicious and fylthy men, and dronkerdes, and 
braulers, and dawysh, and brayneles, cruell and murderars.  For what difference is between them and asses, 
swyne, bores, bulles, or beares?”  (77-78). 
106 We find a comparable anti-materialistic strain of thought in Vives’s major educational treatise for boys 
entitled De Tradendis Disciplinis (1531), which translates as The Transmission of Knowledge.  But in that 
instance, the profit motive— the desire or anxiety for money—poisons the zeal for intellectual research 
central to realizing the fruit or goal of education for men: public service.  For women, limited as they are to 
marriage and the domestic sphere, this anti-materialistic strain of thought takes on a distinctively 
embodied-materialistic quality.  Both instances bear a striking resemblance to the  anti-materialism of Sir 
Thomas More’s community-of-property solution to humanity’s proud and unjust nature in Utopia.  For 
More, the only hope for a just social order begins with or is premised on a reorientation of the body and 
therefore the mind to material possessions.    
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Wherfore the poet seemeth to have sayd nat without cause: It is nat lauful for 
maydes to be sene abrode.  Howe moche were hit better to abyde at home, than go 
forth and here so many judgementes, and so dyvers upon the, and so many 
jeopardies? (58) 
 
But when it is absolutely necessary for a maiden to leave home— for example, to attend 
Mass—Vives charges that “afore she go forth at dore, let her prepare her mynde and 
stomake none other wyse, than if she went to fyght” (58) and that she should be “well 
covered, leste [she] either gyve or take occasion of suavyng.  A Christen mayde ought to 
have nothing a do with weddynge feastis, bankettes, and resortynges of men” (66).  In 
this restrictive view of women’s place in early modern society, there is, of course, little 
need for anything in the way of formal humanistic learning, especially rhetoric or 
eloquence.  Indeed, the only books he recommends are those that “may teche good 
maners” (23).  Unlike a man, who should “have knowlege of many and diverse things 
that may both profet hym selfe and the common welthe” (23), a woman, in Vives’s 
estimation, “is a fraile thynge, and of weak discretion” (23-24) that must avoid the public 
sphere and spend her virtually confined existence engaged in “the study of wysedome . . . 
whiche dothe enstruct [her] maners, and enfurme [her] lyvyng, and teacheth [her] the 
waye of a good and holy lyfe” (22-23). 
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Chapter Eight: 
“Cothing but sit, and sit, and eat, and eat”: Rhetorical Agency and Conviolent 
Performative Masculinity in The Taming of the Shrew (1594) 
 
 Although, in the specific context of the Elizabethan period, Shakespeare 
arguably takes advantage of the confusion around women’s education and political 
authority in his construction of a number of complex and arguably empowered heroines, 
The Taming of the Shrew, one of his earliest comedies written at about the same time that 
the last edition of Instruction was published,107 seems to side with Vives’s bodily-
centered simplicity.  Indeed, despite its overall playful nature, this festive comedy is 
punctuated at key points by serious potentially disruptive Vivesian messages that center 
on the embodied nature of morality and education, that, at once, strain the play’s festive 
tone as they make subtle but sober critiques of Paduan corruption.108  In what follows, I 
argue that Petruchio’s109 tortuous taming ritual significantly focuses on the gendered 
                                                 
107 See Beauchamp, Hageman, and Mikesell’s “History of the Tudor Text” in the University of Illinois 
Press edition of Vives’s Instruction.   
108 My commitment to a serious reading of the play is much indebted to Lynda Boose’s oft-cited essay 
“Scolding Brides and Bridling Scolds: Taming the Woman’s Unruly Member.”  Near the beginning of this 
essay, Boose explains, “To insist upon historicizing this play is to insist upon placing realities from the 
historically literal alongside the reconstructive desires that have been written onto and into the literary text.  
It is to insist upon invading privileged fictions with the realities that defined the lives of the sixteenth 
century ‘shrews’— the real village Kates who underwrite Shakespeare’s character.  Ultimately, it is to 
insist that a play called ‘The Taming of the Shrew’ must be accountable for the history to which its title 
alludes.  However shrewish it may seen to assert an intertextuality that binds the obscured records of a 
painful women’s history into a comedy that celebrates love and marriage, that history has paid for the right 
to speak itself, whatever the resultant incongruities” (241; my italics).  Although Boose’s politically self-
conscious insistent historical materialism is consistent with my own commitment to what I have come to 
term the ethics of literary and historical interpretation, her “old historicist” violent realities/nonviolent 
fictions interpretive binary prevents her from sufficiently explaining Shakespeare’s/Petruchio’s relatively 
mild taming technique.  Boose is therefore left to assume that Shakespeare’s “humane but effective 
methods for behavioural modifications” ( 257) represents the obscuring  nature of festive comedy, and it is 
therefore her assumed responsibility as a politically engaged literary critic to discover and reveal the “real” 
violent histories of women’s oppression only alluded to in The Taming.  While the generic constraints of 
comedy or fiction generally certainly can function to obscure and romanticize brutal historical realities, my 
contention is that literary texts, as historical texts themselves, can also comment, as I think is the case in 
The Taming, on contentious social historical issues like the proper education of women.  That is to say that 
Shakespeare’s/Petruchio’s nonviolent taming technique represents a real prescriptive alternative to the 
violent historical realities at the center of Boose’s analysis.                            
109 Although, in what appears the interest of correct Italian pronunciation, the edition of the play that I’m 
using (The -orton Shakespeare [1997]) changes the 1621 Folio spelling of “Petruchio” to the Italian 
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body as essential to individual and societal reformation.  But for as much as Taming is 
about taming a shrewish woman, it is also significantly about a crisis of masculinity.  The 
play, in other words, raises important questions, as do many of Shakespeare’s other texts 
(Othello, Hamlet, Titus, Coriolanus, The Rape of Lucrece, etc.), about the appropriate 
nonviolent role of men in domestic and political life.  Petruccio’s nonviolent taming 
technique, therefore, demonstrates to the other male characters and perhaps 
Shakespeare’s audience that the translation of traditional male aggression to the 
nonviolent domestic and politic spheres is necessarily played out on the woman’s body.  
 The play opens by establishing the embodied terms of those critiques.  Not unlike 
many well-born and well-to-do young men in the period, Lucentio travels to Padua, a 
“nursery of arts” (1.1. 2), to pursue “[a] course of learning and ingenious studies” (1.1. 9) 
intended “[t]o deck his fortunes with his virtuous deeds” (1.1. 16).  As I have argued in 
the previous two chapters, this definition of education as a virtuous deed points to the 
way that educational theorists like Erasmus and Ascham materialized education as an 
embodied-manly activity in an attempt to persuade potential patrons that it was not 
antithetical to traditional aristocratic definitions of manhood.  It is therefore significant 
that Lucentio’s command that his servant Tranio evaluates his intended course of study 
comes in the form a dietary, specifically drinking, metaphor: 
 And therefore, Tranio, for the time I study, 
 Virtue and that part of philosophy  
 Will I apply that treats of happiness 
 By virtue specially to be achieved. 
 Tell me thy mind, for I have Pisa left 
 And am to Padua come as he that leaves  
 A shallow plash to plunge him into the deep, 
 And with satiety seeks to quench his thirst. (1.1. 17-24) 
                                                                                                                                                 
spelling “Petruccio,” I retain the Folio spelling primarily to remain consistent with most of the criticism on 
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Of course, Lucentio’s scholarly enthusiasm represents the passion for learning that 
humanists themselves exemplified and attempted to spread.  But his decision to analogize 
it to potentially excessive or gluttonous drinking also suggests what is perhaps a youthful 
disregard or ignorance of the fact that, with the proliferation of available ancient texts, 
there is a point at which learning, like eating and drinking, becomes dangerous or 
unhealthy to the mind and the body.110  In other words, by recklessly diving into the deep 
pool of Paduan learning without the direction of a wise and mature tutor as well as a 
manageable course of study structured by an academic timetable, there is a good chance 
that he will be overwhelmed— that he will drown.  That he looks to Tranio for 
educational advice only highlights the extent of his lack of guidance, for Tranio’s 
evaluative recommendation dangerously inverts the proper relationship between learning 
and the body: 
 Mi perdonate, gentle master mine. 
   I am in all affected as yourself, 
 Glad that you thus continue your resolve 
 To suck the sweets of sweet philosophy. 
 Only, good master, while we do admire  
 This virtue and this moral discipline, 
Let’s be no stoics nor no stocks, I pray, 
Or so devote to Aristotle’s checks 
As Ovid be an outcast quite abjured. 
Balk logic with acquaintance that you have, 
And practise rhetoric in your common talk. 
Music and poesy use to quicken you; 
The mathematics and the metaphysics, 
Fall to them as you find your stomach serves you 
No profit grows where is no pleasure ta’en. 
In brief, sir, study what you most affect.  (1.1. 25-40) 
                                                                                                                                                 
the play.          
110 See Gerhard Dohrn-Van Rossum’s History of the Hour (252-260) and Bushnell’s chapter four 
(“Harvesting Books”) of A Culture of Teaching for informative discussions of the humanist response to that 
proliferation.  Central to that response is the development of the kinds of timetables  that I discuss in my 
chapter-six discussion of Gargantua.       
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In his critique of Aristotelian moderation and his advocacy of Ovidian eroticism, Tranio 
ensures the play’s festive tone and comic trajectory; that the play will not be concerned 
with the already-resolved and therefore pointless and boring matter of bodily self-
discipline but the erotic or Ovidian challenges to it.  To that end, he picks up on 
Lucentio’s dietary metaphor, agreeing that his master should be resolved “to suck the 
sweets of sweet philosophy,” in the process of encouraging him to allow his “stomach,” 
that is, his appetite or his youthful desires, to guide his Paduan course of study.  
 However, the problem, as I have said, is that this advice inverts one of the major 
selling-points of humanistic education.  As we have seen with Vives and other 
educational theorists of the period, a sound and thoughtfully implemented educational 
program promised to develop proper character in large part by controlling the erotic 
desires or, in keeping with Tranio’s and Vives’s characterization, the stomachs of 
pubescent bodies.  This inversion creates the conditions for the parental nightmare of 
sexually promiscuous children that humanistic educational theorists variously describe, as 
it immediately leads to the displacement of the character-shaping function of education 
by those socio-sexual interests and erotic desires.  That is, before Lucentio has a chance 
to enter a classroom at the University of Padua or at least hire a tutor, the sight of Bianca 
on the streets of Padua triggers a mild but dangerously distracting form of lovesickness: 
 O Tranio, till I found it to be true 
 I never thought it possible or likely 
 But see, while idly I stood looking on 
 I found the effects of love in idleness, 
 And now in plainness do confess to thee, 
That art to me as secret and as dear 
As Anna to the Queen of Carthage was, 
Tranio, I burn, I pine, I perish, Tranio, 
If I achieve not this young modest girl. 
Counsel me, Tranio, for I know thou wilt.  (1.1. 142-152) 
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As Carol Thomas Neely explains, “[l]ovesickness is a somatic disease of inflamed and 
congested genitals leading to disordered fantasies” and is “characterized by 
uncontrollable erotic desires for unconventional or unattainable objects [that demand and 
deserve] satisfaction” (99).  Furthermore, in both classical and early modern medical 
theory, “lovesickness is usually characterized as a disease of upper-class men” (Neely 
103), for, in the words of the seventeenth-century scholar Robert Burton, “it rageth with 
all sorts of and conditions of men, yet it is most evident among such as are young and 
lusty, in the flowre of their yeares, nobly descended, highly fed, such as live idly and at 
ease” (qtd. in Neely 103).111  Indeed, Lucentio is one of those lusty upper-class, highly 
fed, idle young men.  However, by analogizing himself to Dido and implicitly Bianca to 
Aeneas and later in the same scene analogizing Bianca to Europa and implicitly himself 
to Jove (1.1. 161-164), he raises important questions about the educational content most 
appropriate to male as well as female sex-gender identity and performativity. 112That is, in 
the spirit of the imitative pedagogy central to the early modern grammar school, it is 
likely, as Lynn Enterline suggests in The Rhetoric of the Body, that school boys “learned 
their figures for ‘moving’ eloquences precisely by identifying with the various suffering 
female voices in Ovid’s poetry that they were so assiduously encouraged to imitate” 
(166).  Indeed, it appears that Lucentio takes those gender-troubling Ovidian grammar 
school lessons to heart, as he identifies with “the love in idleness” of Dido’s effeminacy 
rather than the active manly fortitude that allows Aeneas to abandon domestic comforts 
                                                 
111 See Carol Thomas Neely’s “Destabilizing Lovesickness, Gender and Sexuality: Twelfth -ight and As 
You Like It” from Distracted Subjects: Madness and Gender in Shakespeare and Early Modern Culture.   
112 As Lynn Enterline suggests in The Rhetoric of the Body, the centrality of Ovidian poetry in the 
curriculum of Elizabethan grammar schools and especially Shakespeare’s references to and creative 
retellings of several of those narratives of raped, mutilated, or otherwise devastated women give us a “sense 
of how precarious the business of reproducing properly gendered subjects might have been—even in the 
exclusively ‘male’ world of the school” (166). 
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in favor of his imperialistic destiny.113  The second analogy, while situating Lucentio in a 
more appropriate dominant masculine position, goes too far in that direction, as it 
identifies him with the violent satisfaction of undisciplined and therefore unethical sexual 
desire.  Setting the stage, as it were, between these two analogies, it is as if Shakespeare 
is subtly critiquing the Ovidian-based education of the early modern curriculum and 
questioning whether men can remain in and in control of the potentially effeminating, 
comically-oriented sphere of the home without jeopardizing their manhood.  Therefore, 
instead of endorsing Tranio’s recommendation that Lucentio [b]end [his] thoughts and 
wits to achieve” (1.1. 171-172) his erotic desires for Bianca, The Taming represents the 
“coital cure” of lovesickness discourse, as Neely terms it, as lacking the stoical credibility 
of the very educational treatises that Tranio obliquely and disparagingly references. 
 Like the masculinist interventions that justify the displacement of women in 
chapter one, The Taming works to transform the domestic sphere into a place for men to 
be men or perform masculinity by, in large part, nonviolently controlling and ultimately 
displacing women.  In The Taming, there are no learned and/or authoritative women to 
complicate, impede, or prevent this work; there are no nurses or midwives or powerful 
aristocratic women; there are no wives like the merry wives of Windsor, Lady Macbeth, 
Gertrude, and there are no daughters like Portia, Desdemona, Viola, or even Olivia.  
While Katherine and Bianca variously challenge patriarchal authority, they, unlike the 
other female characters, are not represented as fully formed or educated women who 
serve a fairly fixed and even predictable narrative function.  In other words, The Taming 
is not about dealing with the problems that smart and resourceful women pose to the 
                                                 
113 Patricia B. Phillippy argues what explains the Lucentio’s gender reversal is that Shakespeare, following 
George Turberville’s English translation of Ovid’s Heroides, rejects traditional gender roles and the 
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patriarchy; it is about men figuring out their own gender-appropriate roles in the domestic 
sphere by, in large part, figuring out the type of education that might prevent those 
problems by preventing the development of those women.   
However, despite the absence of threatening women, masculine intervention in 
the home is no easy task, as men, particularly fathers, struggle to do the right thing in 
accordance with the disciplinary recommendations of humanistic theory.  We have 
already seen this struggle as it relates to the education of a son, for, contrary to the advice 
of theorists like Ascham and Mulcaster, Vincentio compromises his parental control by 
allowing Lucentio to study abroad.  In this case, the Vivesian critique of Paduan 
corruption comes near the end of the play, when Vincentio unexpectedly visits Padua and 
disrupts the comical play of impersonations that allows Lucentio to woo Bianca.    
Specifically, in response to Tranio’s playful questioning of his right to beat Biondello for 
refusing to acknowledge him as his master, Vincentio seriously laments, 
What am I sir?  Nay, what are you, sir? O immortal  
gods, o fine villain, a silken doublet, a velvet hose, a scarlet 
Cloak, and a copintank hat—O, I am undone, I am undone! 
While I play the good husband at home, my son and my ser- 
vants spend all at the university.  (5.1. 54-58) 
This disruptive lamentation reminds us that Lucentio has lost his way; that the purpose of 
his journey through Padua was not to play with different identity positions in a quest for 
love but to get an education.  Vincentio, therefore, is initially so stunned and confused by 
what he finds that he even suspects that Tranio has murdered Lucentio.  Again, he denies 
Tranio’s appropriation of his son’s name— “Lucentio?”— and then laments, “O, he hath 
murdered his master!” (5.1. 73).  Although these lamentations expose the serious paternal 
anxieties always already nervously grumbling just beneath the surface of festive comedy, 
                                                                                                                                                 
privileging of the military concerns over domestic or amorous one.           
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Vincentio also significantly goes on to reveal that those anxieties are part of a 
fundamental crisis of masculine identity.  That is, after the rhetorical what-am-I-what-
are-you questioning, Vincentio seems to reveal an uneasiness with his role as master, 
father, and husband in a world where performing manhood represents an unstable and 
unsatisfying struggle to “play the good husband at home” while his son and servants 
waste time and money literally trying on different identities in the pursuit of love away at 
school.  In a sense, what we hear from Vincentio is a later-life equivalent of Lucentio’s 
oscillation between oppositional classical models of masculinity, now threatening to 
break down into a complete identity crisis.  In other words, against the nostalgic model of 
traditional performative manhood represented in the Induction by a Lord taking a break 
from the hunt to make a fool out of a beggar, Vincentio’s lamentation sounds a sober note 
about whether his domestically- and educationally - oriented life constitutes a legitimate, 
sufficiently liberating ways of being a man.   
Indeed, his lamentation nervously echoes back to and against the festive play-
within-a-play framing of the induction, where the Lord’s “practise” (Induction 1.32) or 
practical joke on Sly illustrates that the mere manipulation of dietary and sensory 
circumstances— “wrapp[ing] him in sweet clothes,” “rings put upon his fingers,” and 
placing “A most delicious banquet by his bed” (Induction 1.34-35)— can even cause a 
beggar to “forget himself” and think himself a lord.  But in a world where elite masculine 
identity becomes a slippery and uncertain measure of one’s ability to trade, consume, and 
adorn status-granting commodities, this type of sensory-induced materialistically-
triggered forgetfulness is not— indeed, cannot be— fundamentally the vehicle of playful, 
comic intrigue, but rather the kind of social corruption that threatens to destabilize the 
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prevailing social order and therefore the authority of the traditional ruling elite.  Unlike 
Sly, Vincentio and the other wealthy merchants are direct threats to that traditional 
manhood, and, ironically, his Vivesian critique—his critique of a silken doublet, a velvet 
hose, scarlet cloak, and a high-crowned hat— therefore represents a self-critique, as it 
echoes monarchical- and aristocratic- backed sumptuary laws intended to prevent the 
destabilizing effects of merchant capital.114 
But because The Taming allegorically displaces and challenges this destabilizing 
socioeconomic threat onto the playful and youthful romantic love at the center of festive 
comedy, the struggle or, perhaps more precisely, the failure of one father to manage the 
education of his son is intimately connected to the failure of another father to manage the 
education of his daughters.  In fact, as I have already referenced, it is Baptista’s public 
display of his daughters as commodities on the Paduan marriage market that triggers 
Lucentio’s lovesickness and subsequent play of identities to begin with.  After he 
explains to Hortensio and Gremio, the main suitors for Bianca, the interrelated terms of 
betrothal, that someone will have to marry the shrewish and therefore undesirable and 
valueless Katherine in order for the silent and therefore more desirable and valuable 
Bianca to become marriageable, it is Katherine who identifies and critiques, in the form 
of a question, her father’s and presumably Paduan corruption as represented by his 
scheme to marry her and Bianca off: “I pray, sir, is it your will/To make a stale of me 
amongst these mates?” (1.1. 57-58).  This shrewish questioning critique is not unlike 
Vincentio’s Vivesian lamentation in that it threatens the play’s festive tone and comic 
trajectory.  Of course, the difference is that, as a woman, Katherine is not authorized to 
                                                 
114 For instructive discussion of early modern sumptuary laws, see Richard Halpern’s The Poetic of 
Primitive Accumulation (19-60), Frank Whigham’s Ambition and Privilege, and Frances Elizabeth 
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question male prerogatives, especially in public, and, like all of her other potentially 
disruptive comments and questions, this one is immediately and easily pathologized as 
evidence of the kind of shrewishness that renders her undesirable and therefore 
unmarriageable.  Indeed, although her question is addressed to her father, Hortensio 
interjects in a way that effectively deflects attention away from its serious implications: 
“‘Mates’, maid?” he asks, “How mean you that?  No mates for you/Unless you were of 
gentler, milder mould” (1.1.57-58).  It is as if he doesn’t or simply can’t hear the full 
force of her question, as he focuses on “mates” to suggest that her main objective as a 
woman is or should be to get a husband.  Speaking of herself in the third-person, 
Katherine immediately rejects his (male) deafness to her lamentation by assuring him that 
marriage “is not half-way to her heart” (1.1. 62) and further assures him, in the most 
colorfully violent terms, that, if she were interested in marriage and specifically in 
marrying him, she’d abuse him: “her care should be,” she continues in the third- person, 
“To comb your noodle with a three-legged stool/And paint your face, and use you like a 
fool” (1.1. 63-65).  Katherine’s third-person threat of violence as well as her later actual 
acts of violence result from a gendered crisis of communication; that is, she desperately 
attempts to be heard (and, if not heard, violently felt) in a masculinist system unwilling or 
unable to take seriously the discontent of the women it oppresses.   
However, in the relatively nonviolent context of Paduan society, violence, 
especially violence perpetrated by women, is as easy to pathologize as shrewishness, and, 
in fact, is represented as the inevitable performative outcome of shrewishness.  In that 
spirit, after her threat, Hortensio and Gremio need only dismiss her as a devil from which 
they pray for God’s deliverance; Tranio, who along with Lucentio overhears the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Baldwin’s Sumptuary Legislation and Personal Regulation in England.     
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exchange, also dismisses her as an entertaining but “stark mad or a wonderful froward” 
(1.1. 69) wench; and Lucentio, as we have seen, is so distracted by Bianca’s “silence” 
and“[m]ild behaviour and sobriety” (1.1. 70-71) that he hardly notices her or her 
shrewishness.  But of all the responses to her, Baptista’s is the most telling, because, 
though he is the initial addressee, it is almost as if he, like Lucentio, doesn’t even hear 
her.  The next time he speaks it is to inform Hortensio, Gremio, and Bianca that he has 
decided to remove Bianca from public: “Gentlemen, that I may soon make good/What I 
have said— Bianca, get you in” (1.1. 74-75).   
Although it is arguable that this decision is a direct response to Katherine’s 
unpromising exchange with the suitors, it is not clear how it is supposed to work— how 
removing Bianca from public will make Katherine more desirable.  The main reason for 
this strategic uncertainty is that it fails to directly address the “problem” of Katherine’s 
shrewishness.  And directly addressing that problem means addressing it as a problem of 
social corruption and education.  In terms of the educational theorists we have 
considered, what is fundamentally wrong with Baptista is that he defines his love for his 
daughters in terms of the satisfaction of their intellectual pleasure instead of a 
responsibility to instill within them socio-sexual discipline.  After Bianca apparently 
begins to cry in response to Baptista’s decision to “mew her up” (1.1. 88), as Gremio 
describes it, Baptista continues with a promise of compensatory love: “And let it not 
displease thee, good Bianca,/For I will love thee ne’er the less my girl” (1.1. 76-77).  
Significantly, this guilty promise reveals that for Baptista love has been defined by 
allowing his daughters the relative freedom of public exposure that his betrothal scheme 
now forces him to restrict.  And although Bianca’s crying reflects just how spoiled that 
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freedom has made her (“a pretty peat!” [1.1. 78], as Katherine mocks), she allays 
Baptista’s guilt by assuring him that her books and instruments will keep her company 
and thereby take the place of her freedom: “My books and instruments shall be my 
company,/On them to look and practice by myself” (1.1. 82-83; my italics).  While I will 
return to the interpretive as well as sociopolitical implications of her revelation of 
independent study, for now it is sufficient to note that learning emergences as an 
alternative way for Baptista to express his love, which allows him to more confidently 
reiterate his decision to confine her:     
Gentlemen, content ye.  I am resolved. 
Go in, Bianca. 
And for I know she taketh most delight 
 In music, instruments, and poetry, 
 Schoolmasters will I keep within my house 
 Fit to instruct her youth.  If you, Hortensio, 
 Or, Signor Gremio, you know any such, 
 Prefer them hither; for to cunning men 
 I will be very kind, and liberal 
 To mine own children in good bringing up. 
And so farewell, Katherina, you may stay, 
For I have more to commune with Bianca.  (1.1. 90-101) 
Like the goal of learned piety in Thomas More’s home school as well as the treatises 
devoted to girls’ and women’s education, confined learning or studying potentially 
represents a practical solution to Baptista’s and, more generally, Paduan corruption, in 
that it is a solitary activity that removes women from public view and therefore out of 
what Katherine characterizes as a state of virtual prostitution.  However, as we have 
already seen with Tranio, Baptista’s corrupt ethos of freedom, pleasure, and profit 
reduces confined learning to nothing more than a stunt ultimately intended to increase his 
daughters’ marriage-market value. 
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Ironically, as Baptista’s lazy and we might even reasonably conclude stupid 
decision to ask Bianca’s suitors to recommend schoolmasters suggests, he doesn’t appear 
to realize that it is actually his corrupt misunderstanding and mishandling of his 
daughters’ education that exposes them to the kinds of ideas and interactions antithetical 
to the inculcation of a silent, sober and therefore marriageable disposition.  In fact, 
despite Gremio’s corrupt but confident declaration “O learning, what a thing it is!” (1.2. 
148), this nescience about the power of learning and specifically its shrew-making 
potential pervades the Paduan play world.  While all the suitors— Hortensio, Gremio, 
and Lucentio— devise impersonation schemes that employ the cover of learning, 
learning, as superficially and materially represented by academic commodities like 
clothing, musical instruments, (fairly bound) books, and (perfumed) paper, functions for 
them as little more than materialistic cover, as little more than deceptive and simplistic 
props or tools of amorous and economic motives.  Even Gremio’s expression of faith 
amounts to nothing more than the expression of a fool, as Grumio immediately comments 
in an aside: “O this woodcock, what an ass it is” (1.2. 154).  
The specific problem that Baptista and the other characters seem unaware of is 
that, of those props, (classical) books, no matter how superficially handled, contain 
potentially corrupting and destructive ideological content available to anyone 
intellectually curious enough to open them.115  Books, in other words, are potentially 
volatile erotic objects, and educational theorists attempted to defuse, as it were, their 
                                                 
115 Written at about the same time as The Taming, Titus Andronicus more explicitly explores the tragic 
consequences of such bookish curiosity, as particularly represented by Aaron’s villainous manipulation of 
the most destructive aspects of the classical tradition, aspects that center on sexual violence.  And, of 
course, at the end of his career, Shakespeare continues to explore this link between education and sexual 
violence in his representation of Caliban’s attempt to rape Miranda during his language lessons: “You 
taught me language,” Caliban lashes out at Prospero and or Miranda, “and my profit on't/Is I know how to 
curse” (1.2. 366-367).     
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explosiveness by either morally framing them or banning the most offensive ones 
altogether.  Vives, for instance, criticizes schoolmasters for teaching their scholars 
“Ovidis bokes of love” (27); and, in the specific case of women, concludes,  
Therfore a woman shuld beware of all these bokes, likewise as of serpents or 
snakes.  And if there be any woman, that hath suche delyte in these bokes, that 
she wyl nat leave them out of her handes: she shuld nat only be kept from them, 
but also, if she rede good bokes with an yll wyl and lothe therto, her father and 
frendes shuld provyde that she maye be kepte from all redynge.  And so by 
disuse, forgette lernynge, if it can be done. (27) 
 
This caveat is a far cry from what we have seen so far in The Taming, for, if Katherine 
and Bianca are any indication, women are free to read whatever they desire in a corrupt 
university town with all kinds of potentially explosive books available in great supply.  
But significantly, it doesn’t appear that Katherine and Bianca have been reading or desire 
to read the offending classical books of love that Vives primarily has in mind.  Or if they 
have been, they haven’t been doing so in the corrupting way that Vives fears.  If 
anything, what makes the women threatening to the patriarchal establishment is that their 
likely reading choices and practices, reflected in Katherine’s violent shrewishness and 
Bianca’s delight in solitary and independent study, almost turns them so completely 
against romantic love and eroticism that it almost turns them completely against 
marriage.   
While the association of shrewishness with lasciviousness was a commonplace 
one in the Renaissance, by denying it in this way, by, in other words, linking 
shrewishness to educational piety or even a celibate proto-feminist critique, Shakespeare 
suggests that the dangers of improper learning extend far beyond the problem of 
women’s sexuality or erotic desire.  Focusing on the act-three scene of Bianca’s 
instruction, several literary critics have variously commented on precisely what 
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Shakespeare is saying about those dangers.  For instance, Kim Walker suggests that “the 
play reproduces the anxieties attendant on the education of women that are visible in 
pedagogical treatises and conduct books of the sixteenth century” (192) and specifically 
argues that “[Bianca’s] Latin lesson becomes a sight/site of female duplicity” (199); 
Thomas Moisan, paying particular attention to what he assumes is Lucentio’s selection of 
Penelope’s letter to Ulysses from Ovid’s Heroides, suggests that “the use of a Latin 
lesson as camouflage for Lucentio’s pursuit of Bianca” represents, as I have already 
similarly suggested, a commodifying domestication of learning that “epitomizes the uses, 
or misuses, to which education and formal ‘learning’ are put throughout the play” (104); 
and Patricia Phillippy also similarly argues that by dramatizing Lucentio’s use of the 
Heroides as a tool to court Bianca, “Shakespeare presents the Heroides not as a source of 
moral exempla, but of pleasure, and goes on to cast humanist education itself—or more 
specifically, its all-too-easy manipulation— as a dangerous and seductive interloper in 
the household” (42).  But while I generally agree with these assessments and specifically 
the suggestion that Bianca’s act-three assertiveness anticipates her act-five shrewishness, 
my concern is that they underestimate the extent of her control during the scene of 
instruction by either implicitly or explicitly assuming that the passage from the Heroides 
is Lucentio’s selection.  That is, if the goal of all the suitors is to open Bianca up to their 
amorous designs, then it doesn’t make sense that Gremio would have included the 
Heroides— a book Erasmus and Vives thought “more chaste” (qtd. in Moisan 111) than 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses and Art of Love— in his packet of lavishly bound “books of love” 
or, even if he did, that Lucentio would have selected an excerpt from Penelope’s 
epistle— which Erasmus further classifies as “wholly chaste” (qtd. in Moisan 111)— for 
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Bianca’s language lesson.  It doesn’t make sense, in other words, for Lucentio to select a 
passage taken from a letter that emphasizes both a woman’s faithful chastity as well as 
what the Elizabethans would have recognized as a petulant or shrewish rhetorical 
sophistication. 
 However, what does make sense is the possibility, if not likelihood, that the 
Heroides is one of the books she presumably owned before her formal instruction, that is, 
one of the books she references in act one, where she expresses the desire (to continue) to 
study independently.  What I’m suggesting here is that independent study and 
shrewishness are linked, and that Baptista’s irresponsibly lazy philosophy of liberal 
education is dangerous mainly because it allows his daughters to independently explore 
and discover classical models of rhetorical/linguistic agency contained in books like 
Ovid’s Heroides.  In that regard, there is nothing surprising about Bianca’s declaration of 
scholarly independence during the act-three scene of instruction.  The scene itself begins 
with the two counterfeit tutors quarreling over whether lessons in music or Latin should 
come first, when Bianca intervenes to explain that she is actually in charge: 
Why, gentlemen, you do me double wrong 
To strive for that which is my choice. 
I am no breeching scholar in the schools. 
I’ll not be tied to hours nor ‘pointed times, 
But learn my lessons as I please myself.  (3.1. 16-20; my italics) 
Significantly, Bianca defines herself against school boys and her home against the 
characteristically oppressive milieu of the early modern grammar school, which subjected 
or “tied” those boys to a rigid and grueling eleven-hour academic timetable.  Early in act 
1 scene 1, Katherine also expresses a similar resistance to such grammar-school 
discipline, when she asks Baptista, "What,’/shall I be appointed hours, as though belike I 
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knew not what to/and what to leave?” (1.1. 101-103).  However, in the specific case of 
Bianca, several literary critics have pointed out that a potentially demystifying or 
deconstructive bit of dramatic irony characterizes her declaration, for, after all, she, as all 
female characters on the early modern stage, was played by “a boy actor who presumably 
was or had been just such a breeching scholar” (Walker 198).  That is, as Moisan 
explains, in this and other instances, The Taming “calls attention to its own theatricality . 
. . [ultimately making] it more difficult for its audience to differentiate the female 
character Bianca from the boy actor and theatrical apprentice playing her, and, thus, a 
more complex matter to accept unblinkingly Bianca’s assertion that she is ‘no breeching 
scholar’” (Moisan 108).  Also, building on Karen Newman’s oft-cited feminist argument 
that this attention to theatrical artifice specifically exposes “‘woman’ . . . as a cultural 
construct by ‘the very indeterminateness of the actors’ sexuality, of the woman/man’s 
body, the supplementarity of its titillating deconstruction’ ” (198), Walker rhetorically 
asks “who is speaking here [when Bianca declares her independence]?” (198) and then 
concludes it “may be read as a voice that exposes the shrewish woman as cultural 
construct” (198) as well as a “voice that reaffirms the incipient shrew by doubling it with 
the boy actor’s resistance to ‘proper’ adult male authority” (198).  Consistent with what I 
have suggested about the performative fluidity of sex-gender differentiation in medical 
and educational treatises, these readings importantly draw attention to that fluidity and its 
implications to rhetorical-linguistic agency as represented and revealed by the all-male 
performative realities of the early modern theater.  However, these readings also give 
short shrift to a small but significant complicating detail: namely, the boy actor playing 
Bianca was neither a woman nor a breeching scholar, but a boy possibly conscripted from 
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a grammar school and therefore the male puberty rite, as Walter Ong characterizes it, of 
its violent masculinizing rigors.116  Therefore, like the home as well as the traditional 
aristocratic view of learning, the theater, as Stephen Gosson characterizes it in The 
School of Abuse (1579), represented an effeminating threat to traditional military-oriented 
notions of masculine development and performativity.  So, although The Taming 
explicitly explores the implications of women’s learning and specifically the 
unauthorized and therefore dangerous speech it enables, its representation of male 
domestication (in the home, the school, and the theater) and specifically the “de-
breeching” effeminization of grammar school boys obliquely references the performative 
crises of masculinity initiated by both the nonviolent theories of humanistic learning and 
the emerging nonviolent exigencies of court society. 
 Shakespeare presents Petruchio’s nonviolent taming of Katherine as the solution 
to this crisis.  From the initial act-one miscommunication with Grumio that ends with him 
wringing Grumio’s ear to his act-four verbal and physical abuse of his servants in the 
seclusion of his country house, Petruchio displays a propensity for violence that 
highlights just how unmanly the other male characters are and how effeminating Padua’s 
urban-educational milieu is.  Therefore, as the play-logic would have it, what he brings to 
that world is the corrective energy of an aristocratic military ethos necessary to keep 
women in their silent and subordinate place.  For instance, when Gremio questions 
whether Petruchio has “a stomach” (1.2. 189) to woo a shrewish “wildcat” (1.2. 191) like 
Katherine, Petruchio assure him that he does in a series of rhetorical questions: 
 Why came I hither but to that intent? 
Think you but a little din can daunt mine ears? 
                                                 
116 See Wendy Wall’s Staging Domesticity (177) and Stephen Orgel’s Impersonations (65-67) for brief but 
intriguing discussions of the conscription of grammar school boys into theater companies.      
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 Have I not in my time heard lions roar? 
 Have I not heard the sea, puffed with winds, 
 Rage like an angry boar chafèd with sweat? 
 Have I not heard great ordnance in the field, 
 And heaven’s artillery thunder in the skies? 
 Have I not in a pitchèd battle heard 
 Loud ‘larums, neighing steeds, and trumpets’ clang? 
 And do you tell me of a woman’s tongue, 
That gives not half so great a blow to hear 
As will a chestnut in a farmer’s fire? 
Tush, tush—fear boys with bugs.  (1.2. 193-205)  
These are certainly not the sounds of the Paduan street, home, or schoolroom, but  
Petruchio’s suggestion is that his exposure to them— his exposure to the sounds of the 
hunt, the sea, and the battlefield and the violent masculinizing training that they 
metonymically represent— has actually prepared him to tame the shrewish Katherine.  
On the other hand, the Paduan men’s fear of Katherine’s shrewishness suggests a lack of 
comparable training that effectively renders them no better than cowardly superstitious 
boys afraid of the relatively soft sound of a shrewish woman’s voice, which Petruchio 
comparatively describes as not even half as loud as a chestnut popping in a farmer’s fire.  
But Petruchio’s function is not to bring the violence of the hunt, the sea, or the 
battlefield to Paduan society but to demonstrate to the other men (the male characters and 
presumably the male auditors and readers alike) that his military prowess and male 
bravado can be channeled or translated to meet the emerging nonviolent needs of early 
modern society, specifically as represented by the decidedly more delicate domestic 
matters of women’s taming and marital negotiations.  However, as the acts of violence 
that we have already considered as well as the one instance where Petruchio threatens to 
“cuff” (2.1 216) Katherine illustrate, The Taming does not represent this civilizing 
process as an uncomplicated, easy, or automatic one.  That is, despite Petruchio 
 188 
 
distinctive braggadocio, such as warning Baptista that he is “rough . . . and woo not like a 
babe” (2.1. 135), the Paduan milieu significantly imposes the kind of disciplinary 
handicap that presumably produces shrewish women and makes controlling or correcting 
one as shrewish as Katherine nearly impossible or, as Gremio characterizes it, Herculean: 
“Yea, leave that labour to great Hercules,” Gremio sarcastically responds to Petruchio’s 
insistent and ostensibly foolish desire to woo Katherine, “And let it be more than 
Alcides’ twelve” (1.2. 253-254).  While an expression of doubt predictably and even 
understandably uttered by an old and impotent man, its association of an impossible 
domestic task with Hercules’s mythic feats of ultra-masculinity also ironically represents 
precisely the kind of figurative-imaginative thinking that enables Petruchio to redefine 
traditional male aggression. 
Significantly, we have already seen this kind of thinking in the imaginative-
rhetorical strategies of a number of the period’s educational theorists: Erasmus, Coxe, 
Elyot, Ascham, and Mulcaster.  And like theirs, what in large part makes Petruchio’s 
domestication of manhood a persuasive alternative to the physical violence of the hunt 
and the battlefield is that it allows him the performative expression and satisfaction of 
symbolic violence through his rhetorical domination of Katherine.  As Grumio bluntly 
assures Hortensio, 
I pray you, sir, let him go while the humour lasts.  O’ 
My word, an she knew him as well as I do she would think 
scolding would do little good upon him.  She may perhaps call 
him half a score knaves or so.  Why, that’s nothing; an he begin  
once he’ll rail in his rope-tricks.  I’ll tell you what, sir, an she 
stand him but a little he will throw a figure in her face and  
so disfigure her with it that she shall have no more eyes to see 
withal than a cat.  You know him not, sir.  (1.2. 108-110; my italics)                   
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Despite the failed communication between master and servant that initially reveals 
Petruchio’s problematic propensity for physical violence, what Grumio reveals about his 
master— what he knows more intimately and violently than Hortensio— is that he is a 
warrior-scholar with a figuratively dangerous and disfiguring tongue to match his literally 
dangerous and disfiguring hands.  That is, by analogizing Petruchio’s rhetorical skill to 
aggressive and violent physical action, he, like humanistic educational theorists, 
materializes and masculinizes learning in a way that presents it as a legitimate alternative 
to traditional aristocratic violence.  In his first example, as we have also seen in 
educational treatises, he likens Petruchio’s likely future verbal assault on Katherine to a 
physical exercise, specifically a mastery of rope climbing not unlike the one 
recommended and illustrated by Gerolamo Mercuriale in De Arte Gymnastica. (see Fig. 
9)  And in the second instance, he plays on the word “figure,” which significantly means 
“external form” or “to bring into shape” (OED), to describe the way in which Petruchio 
will so violently throw, bring into shape, or performatively materialize a figure of speech 
in Katherine’s face that it will leave a blinding disfigurement.  On one hand, Grumio’s 
assurance is an accurate description of Petruchio’s rhetorical prowess in that it instantly 
stuns Katherine; after verbally dueling him to a stalemate, she is at a loss and can’t help 
but ask, “Where did you study all this goodly speech?” (2.1. 255).  But on the other hand, 
his second performative analogy fails to add up because it is not clear how violently 
blinding a woman to the point where her eyes  look like the contracted ones of a cat could 
possibly represent or equal a nonviolent rhetorical method by which to silence a shrewish 
woman.  In other words, the disfiguring violence of his description is so excessive and his 
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eyes-mouth analogy such a complex and incompatible stretch that it is hard to imagine 
anything but the real violent disfiguring blinding of a woman.   
As I have argued in the case of educational treatises, these figurative and 
performative materializations represent tenuous sublimations of traditional male 
aggression that retain the potential to spill over into real violence.  Significantly, 
Grumio’s excessive descriptive violence and analogical failure draw attention to the 
substitute nature of that sublimation and thereby threaten to trigger the realization of that 
potential.  In a sense, Grumio is not just a victim of Petruchio propensity for violence; he, 
as his analogy illustrates, also represents it.  For instance, before Petruchio catalogues his 
masculinizing experiences, Grumio’s interjection takes his master’s examples to their 
literal conclusion: “Will he woo her?  Ay, or I’ll hang her” (1.2. 193). This homicidal 
expression highlights the extent to which Grumio is like the id that Petruchio must deny 
in himself in the nonviolent context of Paduan society. 
That denial centrally involves Petruchio selecting a metaphor for Katherine’s 
taming more consistent than Grumio’s unstable disfiguring one with Paduan nonviolence; 
and the one that he selects, the one that allows him to retain the masculinizing energy of 
the hunt and the battlefield without the attendant violence, is that of falcon taming (see 
Fig. 10).  In his fairly comprehensive book-length study of Shakespeare’s extensive use 
of hunting imagery and metaphors, Edward Berry focuses his discussion of The Taming 
on Petruchio’s use of this metaphor and argues that “[t]o respond adequately to this play, 
we must come to terms with [falcon-taming] as its central metaphor” (97); and only then, 
he continues, might we be able “to discover . . . a way of ‘saving the play from its own 
[disturbing misogynistic] ending’ without either evading or romanticizing its main action, 
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that of ‘taming’ a woman” (97; my italics).117  Indeed, over the years, this evasive and 
romanticizing commitment has characterized a simplifying tendency of many 
conservative and feminist interpretations.  Although Berry acknowledges as much, by 
retaining, at least partially, the role of interpretive savior, he ends up suggesting “a more 
radical way to save the play” (115) that, I think, similarly simplifies or evades its 
complexities.  That is, in keeping with his argument that Shakespeare is generally 
skeptical of the hunt and aristocratic culture, he develops Coppélia Kahn’s 
“unconventional and brilliantly provocative argument” (119) to suggest that “the device 
of the Induction . . . is no more than a self-consciously farcical and satirical slice of 
Shakespeare’s [world]” (119), a slice that makes Petruchio’s male aristocratic 
braggadocio as well as his falcon-taming metaphor possibly no more than “a source of 
satiric laughter” (119). 118  Perhaps because I don’t think The Taming is in need of 
salvation, that is, as long as our understanding of Shakespeare and “the Canon” is honest, 
mature, and encompassing enough to include subtle and complex representations of early 
modern sexism, I see Petruchio’s falcon-taming metaphor as much more than a source of 
satiric laughter or even, as Berry also more cynically suggests, one that “is insidious 
precisely because” (99) it is nonviolent and therefore ostensibly more humane than 
typical shrew-taming stories.   
Perhaps so concerned to save the play, Berry and other critics miss, evade, or 
simply struggle to make sense of the fundamental question of why Petruchio chooses a 
nonviolent metaphor of shrew-taming to begin with.   But, as I have already suggested, if 
we think of Petruchio as a warrior-scholar converted by the nonviolent ethos of 
                                                 
117 Berry takes the “saving the play” quotation from Lynda Boose’s “Bridling Scolds” essay.    
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humanistic educational theory, it becomes clear that the falcon-taming metaphor 
represents a response to the civilizing process and the resultant crisis of masculinity that 
threatened to render violently-oriented aristocratic men sociopolitically insignificant and 
therefore the subjects of the potential farcical satiric laughter that Berry identifies.  In 
other words, accepting the general plausibility of Berry’s satiric-laughter suggestion, the 
falcon-taming metaphor represents a response to that laughter, not one of its triggers.     
With that in mind, we are in a position to consider Petruchio’s most extensive 
articulation of the falcon-taming metaphor.  At the end of act 4 scene 1, after Petruchio’s 
has subjected Katherine to a series of ostensibly foolish and mad tactics (the verbal 
jousting that I have already briefly referenced [2.1.], his embarrassing conduct before, 
during, and after the wedding [3.2], and denying her sleep and food while sequestering 
her away in his tyrannically-managed country home [4.1.]), he explains his conduct in a 
lengthy soliloquy: 
Thus have I politicly begun my reign, 
And ‘tis my hope to end successfully. 
My falcon now is sharp and passing empty, 
And till she stoop she must not be full-gorged, 
For then she never looks upon her lure. 
Another way I have to man my haggard, 
To make her come and know her keeper’s call— 
That is, to watch her as we watch these kites 
That bate and beat, and will not be obedient. 
She ate no meat today, nor none shall eat. 
Last night she slept not, nor tonight she shall not. 
As with the meat, some undeserved fault 
I’ll find about the making of the bed, 
And here I’ll fling the pillow, there the bolster, 
This way the coverlet, another way the sheets, 
Ay, and amid this hurly I intend 
That all is done in reverent care of her, 
And in conclusion she shall watch all night, 
                                                                                                                                                 
118 See chapter four (“Coming of Age: Marriage and Manhood in Romeo and Juliet and The Taming of the 
Shrew” of Coppélia Kahn’s Man’s Estate: Masculine Identity and Shakespeare.      
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And if she chance to nod I’ll rail and brawl 
And with the clamour keep her still awake. 
This is a way to kill a wife with kindness, 
And thus I’ll curb her mad and headstrong humour, 
He that knows better how to tame a shrew, 
Now let him speak. ‘Tis charity to show.  (4.1. 169-192) 
For Petruchio, language or speech for its own sake— what we might term mere academic 
speech— is part of what’s wrong with a university town like Padua.  When Tranio 
(impersonating Lucentio) introduces himself to the others as a competing suitor for 
Bianca with a reference to Paris and Helen of Troy, Petruchio, almost with the sober  
cynicism of Hamlet’s “Words, words, words” (2.2. 192) impatiently asks, “Hortensio, to 
what end are all these words” (1.2. 246).  Also, although his taming of Katherine begins 
with an extensive demonstration of his rhetorical mastery, he reaches a point where he 
again appears to lose patience and insists on “setting all this chat aside” (2.1. 260).  In 
that light, at the end of the above passage, he presents the falcon-taming metaphor as a 
practical, solutions-oriented form of speech and, in the spirit of male aristocratic 
competitiveness, challenges other men to out-speak and out-perform him.  In other 
words, what this passage illustrates is a performative relationship between language and 
action essential for the satisfaction of a warrior-scholar like Petruchio.  What is 
conveniently lost in his attention to the patient and nonviolent taming process is the fact 
that it is a process which culminates in the pleasure derived from the coordinated hunting 
and killing of other animals. In this passage, satisfaction instead comes in a safe and 
acceptable form of violence redirected away from women’s bodies to domestic objects: 
against food and dishes earlier in the scene; the pillow, the coverlet, and the sheets in this 
passage; and, as we will explore later, a hat and a gown in act 4 scene 3.  In short, the 
prescriptive metaphor of an aristocratic sport like falcon taming forces this redirection 
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and therefore a patient, nonviolent, and ethical method by which to achieve and exercise 
“real” physical power over women and even, as his claim of a “politicly begun . . . reign” 
suggests, subjects in a kingdom than mere words or brute force. 
This redirection, however, does not result in a proto-Cartesian dematerializing 
transcendence or subordination of the body in favor of a mind in complete control or 
completely controlled by whatever curricular-ideological content.  As we have seen in 
educational treatises and most explicitly in Erasmus’s The Education of a Christian 
Prince, nonviolent methods of social control or what Erasmus describes as Godlike 
consensual rule identify and materialize the body as essential to the production of 
obedient subjects.  Petruchio’s falcon-taming method-metaphor is practically no different 
from the methods developed in those treatises, for they are all founded on classical, 
primarily Galenic theories of the humoral body.119  Specifically, in the gendered economy 
of this way of thinking, Katherine’s problem is that her body, as reflected in her violent 
shrewishness, is too hot.  In other words, as Gail Kern Paster describes in her latest book-
length study Humoring the Body, Katherine is a “humoral subject distempered by too 
much heat . . . [and] must be cooled in order to be socialized as a wife” (88).  Indeed, 
Petruchio’s falcon-taming method makes possible just such a cooling off of her body by 
allowing, as Paster also describes,  “the transformation of her environment through 
manipulation of the six Galenic nonnaturals of air, diet, rest and exercise, sleeping and 
walking, fullness and emptiness, and passions” (88).  But if we recall Petruchio’s 
propensity for violence, his body is also too hot for the nonviolent milieu of Paduan 
society and must be subjected to the same manipulation.  Earlier in act 4 scene 1, after 
                                                 
119 While those treatises are at best ambivalent on the specific health benefits of falcon taming, they share 
with Petruchio the belief in the importance of the body and exercise to an educational program.   
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verbally abusing and physically threatening his servants for serving burnt meat, he 
explains to Katherine,  
I tell thee, Kate, ‘twas burnt and dried away, 
And I expressly am forbid to touch it  
For it engenders choler, planteth anger, 
And better ‘twere that both of us did fast, 
Since of ourselves ourselves are choleric, 
Than feed it with such overroasted flesh. 
Be patient, tomorrow’t shall be mended, 
And for this night we’ll fast for company. 
Come, I will bring thee to thy bridal chamber.  (4.1. 151-159) 
Of course, this expression of mutual bodily deprivation would fit neatly into romanticized 
readings of the play that suggest, despite or because of Petruchio’s nonviolent 
domination, the emergence of a sensitive, companionate understanding of marriage.  
However, as I have been arguing, what we see here instead reflects a fundamental 
redefinition of manhood that brings men anxiously close to women by prescribing for 
them comparable nonviolent dispositions and regimens of bodily care.  As Paster 
identifies, “the violent behavior manifest in both husband and wife . . . become humoral 
manifestations of the unruly bodiliness they must contain in order to earn their place in 
the community” (132).  Yet for Paster there is a key sex-gender difference: “Petruchio’s 
self-taming,” she continues, “can only be partial, his boorishness incompletely defined, 
because he needs a store of choler in order to maintain dominion over his wife” (132).  
While a tenable claim in light of the humoral economy of bodily difference that Paster so 
thoroughly and persuasively historicizes, it seems to me that it misses the point that his 
choleric disposition— his propensity for violence, as I have termed it—is out of place in 
the nonviolent Paduan play world.  Therefore, his self-subjection to his taming method 
represents an attempt to cure it.  Indeed, the point of that method, of his attempt to 
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implement a nonviolent praxis of male domination, is to render unruly violent 
boorishness unnecessary.   
Within these affective and behavioral limitations, male domination becomes an 
essentializing and simplifying matter of maintaining a sexist understanding of bodily 
difference.  In other words, all Petruchio has to do to create and securely mystify a belief 
in the rightness of male dominion, even as his taming of Katherine and his self-taming 
expose it as a process of domination, is demonstrate his superior ability to endure the 
challenges of bodily deprivation.  We never hear from him the equivalent of Katherine’s 
“But I, who never knew how to entreat,/Nor never needed that I should entreat,/Am 
starved for meat, giddy for lack of sleep” (4.3. 7-9).  As the embodied hybridized 
compromise of a warrior-scholar, he complains about a lot of things, but, unlike 
Katherine, he never complains about the cold, the lack of food, or the lack of sleep—  
conditions which would not have been uncommon to the battle-tested warrior or the 
ascetically-oriented scholar.  
This difference as well as the nature of his complaints, of course, returns us to the 
morally-based, bodily-centered, anti-materialistic simplicity of Vives’s educational 
theory.  That is, in the course of redefining male authority in terms of a superior capacity 
to endure physical deprivation, Shakespeare through Petruchio also significantly engages 
in a process of translating traditional male aggression into a nonviolent form of power 
based on sententious moral probity.  While we have already explored his critique of 
Paduan speech, its Vivesian strain most clearly begins to emerge before the wedding, 
when he arrives late and “fantastically dressed.”  After the other characters question 
whether he intends to marry Katherine in “these unreverent robes” (3.3. 105), as Tranio 
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significantly describes them, and insists that he change into something appropriate to the 
occasion, Petruchio refuses: “Good sooth, even thus.  Therefore ha’ done with words./To 
me she’s married, not unto my clothes” (3.2. 109-110).  Despite playfully continuing that 
she will wear him out sexually before he can wear out his wedding clothing, the 
seriousness of an implicit Vivesian Christian anti-materialism— that dietary excess and 
the resultant corrupt materialism threaten the marital union of dangerously and differently 
embodied souls  — penetrates that bawdy festive surface nonetheless.  In short, his 
fashion statement as well as its irreverent performative enactment during the wedding 
ceremony is as much a material critique of Paduan materialism as it is a source of festive 
laughter.   
 Significantly, the act 4 scene 3 fitting scene represents perhaps the most 
extensive example of that critique.  After the taming method has rendered Katherine “as 
cold as can be” (4.3. 37), as she complains to Hortensio, Petruchio tests whether that 
coldness has extinguished her materialistic desires by teasing her with food, promises of 
fashionable luxury items, and a return to the corrupt and corrupting materialistic milieu of 
Paduan society: 
Kate, eat apace, and now, my honey love, 
Will we return unto thy father’s house, 
And revel it as bravely as the best, 
With silken coats, and caps, and golden rings, 
With ruffs, and cuffs, and farthingales, and things, 
With scarves, and fans, and double change of bravery, 
With amber bracelets, beads, and all this knavery. 
                    
Before Katherine can finish eating, assuming that she has a chance to start, he invites the 
haberdasher and the tailor to present her with a cap and a gown as examples of their 
fashionable “knavery.”  While “knavery” in this context most plausibly means “[t]ricks 
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of dress or adornment” (OED), Petruchio’s Vivesian anti-materialism as well as the other 
serious critiques of Paduan corruption mentioned at the outset of this section also 
strongly implies its primary definition: “dishonest and crafty dealing; trickery, roguery” 
(OED).  In other words, the point that Petruchio goes on to make in somewhat of a 
drawn-out manner— a manner perhaps resulting from an attempt to simultaneously 
evoke the quite different meanings of the word knavery— is that the technical trade skills 
feeding, as it were, Padua’s corrupt consumer culture is itself a reflection of that 
corruption.  Indeed, his criticism of the fashionable workmanship of the Haberdasher’s 
cap and the Tailor’s gown represents an indirect way of criticizing that culture.  
Specifically, he criticizes the cap as appearing to have been “moulded on a porringer—/A 
velvet dish.  Fie, fie, ‘tis lewd and filthy/Why ‘tis a cockle or a walnut-shell,/A knack, a 
toy, a trick, a baby’s cap” (4.3. 64-67).  The analogies proliferate, as he goes on to 
describe it as “[a] custard coffin, a bauble, a silken pie” (4.3. 82).  He likewise criticizes 
the sleeve-design of the gown: “What’s this—a sleeve?” he sarcastically asks, “‘Tis like a 
demi-cannon./ What, up and down carved like an apple-tart?/Here’s snip, and nip, and 
cut, and slish and slash,/Like to a scissor in a barber’s shop” (4.3. 88-91).120  Although it 
may appear insensitive and even a little sadistic for Petruchio to discredit these examples 
of contemporary fashion in terms of various banqueting foods, that is, to use food 
analogies in front of his starving wife, his nonviolent and therefore relatively 
compassionate taming method is, in fact, based on linking, as Vives does, a corrupt taste 
for luxurious clothing to a corrupting diet of dangerously unhealthy food.  In short, the 
                                                 
120 In her economically-based historicist study of early modern women’s subjectivity, Natasha Korda 
argues that “in likening the commodities that are brought in after supper to banqueting conceits, commonly 
known as ‘voids’ or ‘empty dishes,’ Petruchio . . . emphasizes the commodity’s lack of substance or stuff” 
(69).     
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success of his method depends on starving Katherine of both.  And in that spirit, the 
scene ends with one of his strongest expression of Vivesian anti-materialism: 
 Well, come, my Kate.  We will unto your father’s 
 Even in these honest, mean habiliments. 
 Our purses shall be proud, our garments poor, 
 For ‘tis the mind that makes the body rich, 
And as the sun breaks through the darkest clouds, 
So honour peereth in the meanest habit. 
What, is the jay more precious than the lark 
Because his feathers are more beautiful? 
Or is the adder better than the eel 
Because his painted skin contents the eye? 
O no, go Kate, neither art thou the worse 
For this mean furniture and mean array.  (4.3. 163-174) 
Although this expression seems, on one level, to elevate the mind above the body, it is 
important to keep in mind that, in terms of the psychological materialism of the period, 
the mind, housed as it is in the material intricacies of the brain, is part of the body.121  
And from that site, “it makes the body rich”; wealth, in that regard, is an internalized 
material-intellectual quality, radiating from within the body, not reflected in the clothes 
that adorn it.  As I explore throughout this study and especially in my chapter-five 
discussion of Gargantua, medical and educational theorists of the period variously assert 
that a mind nourished with the proper food and knowledge is, in some ways, a truer sign 
of wealth than a poorly nourished one in a well-adorned but unhealthy body.  The 
excesses of food and fashion in Paduan society are dangerous for that reasons, and, once 
Petruchio and Katherine return to Padua, he expresses as much with a laconic but 
powerfully moralistic response to Lucentio’s final-scene presentation of the banquet 
                                                 
121 See chapter three (“Seed or Goad: Educating the Humanist Subject”) of Mary Thomas Crane’s Framing 
Authority for an interesting and thorough discussion of how the classical, Aristotelian theory of faculty 
psychology, which basically posits that memory and imagination are located in the central part of the brain 
and serve as messengers between the senses and the rational faculty, informed Renaissance educational 
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which follows the “great good cheer” (5.2. 10) of what was surely an already substantial 
main meal: “Nothing but sit, and sit, and eat, and eat” (5.2. 12).    
 Of course, these sententious Vivesian expressions rest uneasily with many of 
Petruchio’s other expressions: his skillful penchant for bawdy puns, his macho assertions, 
his violent outbursts, his profit-seeking approach to marriage.  But while that is certainly 
the case, it is also true that such expressive inconsistency represents the sociopolitical and 
psychological compromises that make us all richly complex and often conflicted subjects; 
that, in a distinctively modern sense, make us all too human.  Specifically, what I am 
suggesting here is that, in terms of the civilizing process and the resultant crisis of 
masculinity, Petruchio’s expressive complexity represents a historically contingent 
example of the affective and behavioral tensions that defined for men in the early modern 
period— and, in different but strikingly related ways, continue to define for men today— 
the conflicted challenging complexities of masculine subjectivity. 
 The point of the play, as its title promises, is also and primarily to dramatize an 
effective and acceptable way in which to tame Katherine’s speech and thereby deny her 
the same expressive range and therefore the same fullness of character or expressive 
humanity that characterizes Petruchio.122  Several literary critics, however, have argued 
that the play ultimately fails to deliver on this promise; that Katherine’s own rhetorical 
mastery— her competitive faculty for puns and irony— empowers her to cleverly and 
                                                                                                                                                 
theory.  Also, see Crane’s Shakespeare’s Brain for her suggestive use of cognitive theory in an attempt to 
reconstruct that brain and its material environment from word clusters in a number of Shakespeare plays.        
122 I want to thank my Fall 2009 Shakespeare class at Colgate University (“Shakespeare’s Language and the 
Politics of Sexual Violence”) for insisting, despite my warnings against thinking of characters as if they are 
people, that the female characters “lack character development” and are therefore unsatisfying .  The class’s 
insistence helped me see that, indeed, Shakespeare is doing something significant in terms of gender and 
character development.  While I feel like the play begins with a promise of development, particularly as 
represented by Katherine’s peculiar silences, early Vivesian critiques, and rhetorical gamesmanship, I 
agree, as I will discuss, that the taming method ultimately arrests and reverses that development.      
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“gradually shift her roles without abandoning her [shrewish] identity” (Neely, Broken 
-uptials, 30).123  The problem, however, is that these critics struggle to reconcile their 
celebratory readings of her resilient rhetorical agency with what Lynda Boose 
humorously and, in light of Petruchio’s taming method, ironically terms Katherine’s 
final-scene “pièce de non résistance” (240).  For Boose, these critics are committed to 
liberating Katherine “from meaning what she says” (241), and what she says, as Boose 
insists, represents “the construction of a woman’s speech that must unspeak its own 
resistance and reconstitute female subjectivity into the self-abnegating rhetoric of 
[Katherine’s] famous disquisition on obedience” (239).   
In that final scene, the men play on and within the constraints of the hunting 
metaphors so central to Petruchio’s domestication of male aggression to question the 
authority of the newly-married men over their wives.  The back and forth of the 
competitive masculinity reaches such a pitch that Petruchio dares the others to put up or 
shut up, as he challenges them to wager a hundred crowns on “whose wife is most 
obedient/ To come at first when he doth send for her” (5.2. 68-69).  Of course, Petruchio 
wins the bet, but then he significantly insists on showing “more sign of [Katherine’s] 
obedience,” more sign, as he continues, of “Her new-built virtue and obedience” (5.2. 
                                                 
123 In chapter three of Fashioning Femininity (“From Family Politics and Shakespeare’s Taming of the 
Shrew”), Karen Newman offers what is perhaps one of the strongest defenses of Katherine’s rhetorical 
agency.  Specifically, Newman initially points out that Katherine’s shrewishness— her “independent 
appropriation of speech” (41)— represents the period’s “anxiety about rebellious women and particularly 
their rebellion through language” (40).  However, in an attempt to preserve Katherine’s linguistic 
power/agency, she focuses on developing a complex and, it seems to me, strained application of Luce 
Irigaray’s psychoanalytic concept of mimeticism.  And as a consequence, she doesn’t explore the 
pessimistic possibility of her change and what that change has to do with the taming method.  For other 
notable attempts to argue for Katherine’s rhetorical agency, see Carol Thomas Neely’s Broken -uptials 
(27-31) and John Bean’s  "Comic Structure and the Humanizing of Kate in the Taming of the 
 Shrew."  Also, for a critique of those attempts that informs my own position, see chapter 2 (“Cultural 
Materialism, Othello, and the Politics of Plausibility”) of Alan Sinfield’s Faultlines: Cultural materialism 
and the Politics of Dissident Readings.          
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121-122; my italics).  First, he orders her to retrieve Bianca and the Widow, which she 
does; he then orders her to throw her cap “underfoot” (5.2. 126), which she also does; and 
when the other women object to her compliance with such an anti-materialistic gesture, 
he orders her to “tell these headstrong women/What duty they do owe their lords and 
husbands” (5.2.134-135), which she does in away, as I have already summarized, that has 
vexed directors, audiences, and literary critics alike.  Because of that history, it is, I think, 
appropriate at this point to consider her disquisition on wifely obedience in its entirety:       
 Fie, fie! unknit that threatening unkind brow, 
And dart not scornful glances from those eyes, 
To wound thy lord, thy king, thy governor:     
It blots thy beauty as frosts do bite the meads, 
Confounds thy fame as whirlwinds shake fair buds, 
And in no sense is meet or amiable. 
A woman moved is like a fountain troubled, 
Muddy, ill-seeming, thick, bereft of beauty; 
And while it is so, none so dry or thirsty 
Will deign to sip or touch one drop of it. 
Thy husband is thy lord, thy life, thy keeper, 
Thy head, thy sovereign; one that cares for thee, 
And for thy maintenance commits his body 
To painful labour both by sea and land, 
To watch the night in storms, the day in cold, 
Whilst thou liest warm at home, secure and safe; 
And craves no other tribute at thy hands 
But love, fair looks and true obedience; 
Too little payment for so great a debt. 
Such duty as the subject owes the prince 
Even such a woman oweth to her husband; 
And when she is froward, peevish, sullen, sour, 
And not obedient to his honest will, 
What is she but a foul contending rebel 
And graceless traitor to her loving lord? 
I am ashamed that women are so simple 
To offer war where they should kneel for peace; 
Or seek for rule, supremacy and sway, 
When they are bound to serve, love and obey. 
Why are our bodies soft and weak and smooth, 
Unapt to toil and trouble in the world, 
But that our soft conditions and our hearts 
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Should well agree with our external parts? 
Come, come, you froward and unable worms! 
My mind hath been as big as one of yours, 
My heart as great, my reason haply more, 
To bandy word for word and frown for frown; 
But now I see our lances are but straws, 
Our strength as weak, our weakness past compare, 
That seeming to be most which we indeed least are. 
Then vail your stomachs, for it is no boot, 
And place your hands below your husband's foot: 
In token of which duty, if he please, 
My hand is ready; may it do him ease.  (5.2. 140-183) 
Not too long before she delivers these words, Baptista anticipates them with his initial 
response to the tamed-falcon-like way in which she obeys Petruchio’s command: “she is 
changed,” he declares with amazement, “as she had never been” (5.2. 119).  Simply, 
these are not the subversive words of the liberally educated woman at the beginning of 
the play; this is not the same rebellious Katherine speaking as late as the previous act.  
First, she orders Bianca and the Widow— and by extension all women124— to stop 
casting threatening angry looks at their husbands, because the ruling patriarchal demands 
of female beauty pathologizes anger in women as a disfiguring emotion fundamentally 
antithetical to normative happy wifely obedience.  As Katherine concludes, the only thing 
that a husband wants and needs from a wife is “love, fair looks, and true obedience” (5.2. 
157).  Furthermore, to emphasize the incompatibility of anger with that constrained role, 
Katherine continues by reifying anger with a number of pathologically materializing 
analogies.  Anger in a woman is like the frosts that bite the meadows; it is like the 
whirlwinds that shake the delicate buds; and, most significantly, it is like an exogenous 
disturbance to a clean fountain, a disturbance which makes the fountain’s water muddy 
                                                 
124 Boose insightfully argues that “Having ‘fetched hither’ the emblematic pair of offstage wives who have 
declined to participate in this game of patriarchal legitimation, Kate shift into an address targeted at some 
presumptive Everywoman” (240).  
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and therefore undesirable to even the thirstiest of men.  Even if women could feel and 
express anger in a way not fundamentally construed as self-polluting, self-disfiguring, 
and ultimately (socio-sexually) self-destructive, their physical weakness relative to men 
would render such an expression, at best, a treasonous waste of time.  That is, because 
men, for the “maintenance” of women, can and do commit their bodies to the “painful 
labours” of the harsh and threatening natural elements, they are, by natural, self-evident, 
physically demonstrated right, dominant, sovereign, princely, caring, and benevolent.  
Therefore, any opposition to such “honest will” would be doomed to fail as the act of a 
“foul contending rebel” or a “graceless traitor.”  Indeed, as weaker vessels, as soft, weak, 
smooth worms “unapt to toil and trouble in the world,” women are “bound to serve, love 
and obey” and would be well-advised to accept as inevitable the reality of their 
subservient and supportive role in the safe confines of the home: to accept, in other 
words, “that [their] soft conditions and [their] hearts/Should well agree with [their] 
external parts” (5.2. 171-172).125  In short, as dramatically represented by Katherine’s 
concluding hand-under-foot gesture of submission, the might of male physical superiority 
makes right in every aspect and in every sphere of early modern life.    
As I have been suggesting, her rhetorical self-abnegation results from and 
ventriloquizes Petruchio’s appropriation of Vives’s ethically framed misogynistic 
materialization of male and female bodies.  In other words, her disquisition represents a 
symbolic dying and death— like a rhetorical, self-abnegating bleeding out— of the 
shrewishness that defines her as a disruptive force at the beginning of the play.  But if 
                                                 
125 See Pierre Bourdieu’s Masculine Domination for a sociological analysis of the way in which these 
spatial restrictions (field) are internalized as a non-male and therefore an inferior habitus in the  peasant 
women of Kabyle society.  For a complicating critique of Bourdieu’s extrapolation of these findings to 
urban society, see McNay’s “Gender, Habitus, and the Field.”      
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that is the case, we are left to consider what about her shrewishness— which, as I have 
pointed out, articulates a defense of her chastity— authorizes or legitimates such an 
honor-resurrecting symbolic act.  Near the middle of the act 4 scene 3 fitting scene, after 
Petruchio rejects the small fashionable cap that he ordered the Haberdasher to make for 
Katherine, she opposes him: “I’ll have no bigger.  This doth fit the time,/And 
gentlewomen wear such caps as these” (4.3. 69-70).  She then continues with what 
amounts to her most assertive response before the final-scene disquisition: 
Why, sir, I may have leave to speak, 
And speak I will.  I am no child, no babe. 
Yet betters have endured me say my mind, 
And if you cannot, best you stop your ears. 
My tongue will tell the anger of my heart, 
Or else my heart concealing it will break, 
And rather than it shall I will be free 
Even to the uttermost as I please in words.  (4.3. 73-80) 
 
This is indeed the kind of assertive speech-defending speech that one would expect from 
a liberally and independently educated woman exposed to models of women’s rhetorical 
agency found in several Ovidian texts, especially the Heroides.  We can also hear in its 
insistent first-person pronoun echoes of  Lucrece’s “My tongue shall utter all” (1076).  
However, the problem is that the anger in her heart as well as her passionate insistence on 
verbalizing it has nothing to do with Ovidian questions of violated chastity or infidelity.  
Rather, it has only to do with her desire to wear a fashionable cap.  Interpretively framed 
within Petruchio’s Vivesian anti-materialism, this speech either represents a corrupt 
transformation of Katherine’s earlier resistance to the sexist commodifying corruption of 
the Paduan patriarchy or the revelation that that resistance was always already motivated 
by and implicated in that corruption.  In other words, it was always about her freedom to 
indulge in Padua’s corrupt consumer culture.  Like the powerful purgative that Rabelais 
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gives Gargantua as part of a reformed educational program, Petruchio’s taming method is 
suppose to cleanse Katherine’s embodied mind of these perverse materialistic desires.  
And, in the final scene, when she unhesitatingly obeys his command to throw her 
fashionable cap underfoot, it appears that his method has worked.   In any event, if the 
final-scene disquisition that follows this anti-materialistic gesture represents a kind of 
rhetorical suicide, then her earlier materialistic opposition might be understood as a self-
inflicted first blow that authorizes Petruchio to impose the symbolic violence of his 
taming method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 207 
 
Epilogue 
“Can the [Renaissance Woman] Speak?” 
 
 The specific question of the embodied and therefore constrained nature of 
Katherine’s rhetorical agency, of course, suggests a general criticism of simplistic and 
celebratory readings of women’s— and indeed all oppressed people’s— rhetorical 
agency.  While, as I note at various points in this study, my own critical tendency is a 
pessimistic one, shaped by the harsh realities of American racism and capitalism, it is not 
my contention that rhetorical agency is impossible— only complex, difficult, and 
unlikely.  Avoiding these characteristics in favor of simplistic and celebratory readings of 
speech, any and every speech, as subversive, empowering, or transformative actually 
supports systems of oppression, because it lazily fails to encourage, demand, and instill 
the kind of discipline and hard work that “real” change requires.  In that regard, Gayatri 
Spivak’s influential essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?”— which questions the ability of 
Indian women facing sati or “widow burning” to speak as autonomous individuals within 
the contexts of traditional Indian society and British colonial rule— provides an 
instructive  model of the type of demanding critical and theoretical inclusiveness required 
to understand and potentially change complexly resilient systems of oppression. 126 
During the early period of Shakespeare’s career, around the time he is writing The 
Taming, he asks the early modern version of Spivak’s question in two texts: The Rape of 
Lucrece and Titus Andronicus. In The Rape of Lucrece, Shakespeare again explores the 
vexed question of women’s rhetorical agency in terms of the psycho-somatic implications 
of sexual violence.  Illustrating the interconnected politics of the domestic or the 
                                                 
126 Spivak’s essay was original published in Wedge and then republished as a longer essay in the anthology 
Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture.  See chapter 10 (“Postcolonial and Race Studies”: 255-262) of 
Robert Dale Parker’s How to Interpret Literature for a summary of the essay’s key arguments.      
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domesticity of the political, the story of Lucrece’s violation enables Shakespeare to think 
of political corruption and tyranny in terms of the home and specifically the female body.  
As I have already discussed in terms of other tragic heroines, this interpretive framing 
defines Lucrece and implicitly all women as responsible for both inciting and thwarting 
those corrupt erotic and political desires threatening the body politic, a political collective 
which Shakespeare, like Livy and Ovid, eroticizes as the “real” material body of a 
virtuous noble woman left vulnerably at home by a husband committed to the outwardly-
directed military orientation of an imperialistic ethos.   
Of course, Lucrece fails as defender of her country, her home, and her own 
chastity.  However, because “one of Shakespeare’s motives for writing The Rape of 
Lucrece,” as Enterline speculates, “is the desire to give Ovid’s silent Lucretia a speaking 
voice” (168), Shakespeare’s version of the story significantly represents that failure as a 
gendered failure of rhetorical agency with serious political implications.  Right before the 
rape, Shakespeare describes Lucrece’s rhetorical skills as Orphic “modest eloquence” 
(563) and then illustrates her wide-ranging use of it against Tarquin’s threatening sexual 
advance over twelve consecutive stanzas.  Although she starts her defense by appealing 
to Tarquin’s sense of domestic hospitality and friendship, she eventually assumes the role 
of a political counselor: 
‘In Tarquin’s likeness I did entreat thee. 
Has thou put on his shape to do him shame? 
To all the host of heaven I complain me. 
Thou wrong’st his honur, wound’st his princely name. 
Thou art not what thou seem’st, and if the same, 
    Thou seem’st not what thou art, a god, a king, 
     For kings like gods should govern everything. 
 
‘How will thy shame be seeded in thine age 
When thus thy vices bud before thy spring? 
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If in thy hope thou dar’st do such outrage, 
What dar’st thou not when once thou art a king? 
O be remembered, no outrageous thing 
    From vassal actors can be wiped away 
    Then kings’ misdeeds cannot be hid in clay. 
  
‘This deed will make thee only loved for fear, 
But happy monarchs still are feared for love. 
With foul offenders thou perforce must bear 
When they in thee the like offences prove. 
If but for fear of this, thy will remove; 
   For princes are the glass, the school, the book 
   Where subjects’ eyes do learn, do read, do look.’ (596-616) 
The classical context notwithstanding, Lucrece’s advice echoes Erasmus’s to the future 
Charles V in The Education of a Christian Prince.  Specifically, her argument is that 
rape, like any other act of tyranny, is incompatible with the godlike (and specifically for 
Erasmus, Christian) behavioral ideals of monarchical selflessness and benevolence that 
legitimate and secure political power in the form of loving consensual rule: “He who is 
feared by all must himself be in fear of many,” Erasmus warns Charles, “and he whom 
the majority of people want dead cannot be safe” (231).  In other words, to violate that 
loving trust, as Tarquin ultimately does, would both turn that love into fear and give those 
now fearful subjects a dangerous pretext for and example of potentially subversive 
corruption.  Of course, the reason Lucrece’s political rhetoric fails is that it articulates a 
political philosophy too idealistic to be of any earthly use.  Even Erasmus acknowledges 
that the ideal prince “complete with all the virtues” (231) is unlikely and that a hybrid 
form of government— “a monarchy checked and diluted with a mixture of aristocracy 
and democracy” (231) — will most likely be necessary to prevent tyranny.  In short, real 
kings or princes are not gods, for as much as they may try to be godlike; and not even 
God enjoys humanity’s unfaltering obedience.  Indeed, Tarquin is just a man, and despite 
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the despicable nature of his crime, Shakespeare’s complex psychological portrait of him 
captures the moral struggle of any and everyman in a fallen world.  Therefore, the 
question that’s inconceivable to Lucrece before the rape and only tragically answerable to 
her after it is, “Is ethical rule and character possible in a fundamentally unethical world?” 
 This is the political question behind the question of women’s rhetorical agency 
that Shakespeare and several other early modern writers wrestled with throughout the 
sixteenth century.  Whether More’s utopian dialogue, Eramsus’s Christian Prince, 
Wyatt’s epistolary satires, Spenser’s The Faerie Queene and Colin Clout, or several of 
Shakespeare’s plays (Henry V and Hamlet are perhaps the most famous), we see these 
writers urgently attempting to reconcile the tension between the highest of sociopolitical 
ideals and the corrupt realities of early modern society.  And it is likely that the cynical 
realpolitik of Machiavelli’s The Prince or at least the cynical spirit that it powerfully 
articulates intensified that tension; that Machiavelli’s revolutionary elimination of 
imperative moral ideals from matters of political strategy forced those writers to confront, 
in practical ways, the difference between the way “we really live and the way we ought 
to live” (42; my italics).   
In The Rape of Lucrece, as I have begun to point out, that confrontation begins 
with Lucrece’s failed articulation of Erasmian political theory.  In a creative revision of 
this classical narrative, Shakespeare, in a sense, represents Lucrece as a naïve early 
modern political counselor completely unaware that Machiavelli, like a cynical early 
modern social psychologist, has challenged her optimistic assumptions about humanity’s 
capacity for goodness and the effectiveness of loving political rule by asserting, 
[I]f you have to make a choice, to be feared is much safer than to be loved.  For it 
is a good general rule about men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, liars, and 
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deceivers, fearful of danger and greedy for gain. . . .  People are less concerned 
with offending a man who makes himself loved than one who makes himself 
feared: the reason is  that love is a link of obligation which men, because they are 
rotten, will break any time they think doing so serves their advantage; but fear 
involves dread of punishment, from which they can never escape.  (46) 
          
For Lucrece and Erasmus, these negative characteristics belong to the common people, 
and it is the responsibility of the monarch to teach them, primarily by example, how to 
live moral and obedient lives.  For Machiavelli, on the other hand, this pedagogical 
orientation to political rule is dangerous, because it fails to accept that people are by 
nature immoral or, as he bitterly states, rotten.  And if a monarch wants to achieve and 
maintain power over them, he will have to accept as much and be able to act and, indeed, 
be as immoral as they are.  For instance, in chapter XVIII entitled “The Way Princes 
Should Keep Their Word,” he asserts simply that they shouldn’t, if doing so would go 
against their interests: “Doubtless if all men were good, this rule would be bad; but since 
they are a sad lot, and keep no faith with you, you in turn are under no obligation to keep 
it with them” (48).  He also bluntly concludes, “it is necessary in playing this part that 
you conceal it carefully: you must be a great liar and hypocrite” (48). 
  The ruthlessness of the Tarquinian family exemplifies this Machiavellian 
philosophy, and Tarquin’s rape of Lucrece specifically literalizes that philosophy’s 
prescriptive misogynistic orientation to the shifting and uncertain nature of sociopolitical 
time.  “But I do feel this,” Machiavelli concludes, “that it is better to be rash than timid, 
for Fortune is a woman, and the man who wants to hold her down must beat and bully 
her. . . .  Like a woman . . . she is always a friend of the young, because they are less 
timid, more brutal, and take charge of her more recklessly” (69).   It is as if Tarquin’s 
rash and reckless disposition blinds him to Machiavelli advice about how to be feared but 
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not hated: “it is perfectly possible to be feared but not hated, and this will be the result if 
only the prince will keep his hands off the property of his subjects or citizens, and off 
their women” (46).  In any event, in terms of this misogynist construction as well as 
Machiavelli’s politics of deception and hypocrisy, it is as if Tarquin sees Lucrece’s 
resistance as a mere pose; that, on some level, she, like Fortune, actually respects and 
desires his sexual aggression as consistent with ambitious and powerful men. 
Therefore, the rape forces her to realize that Tarquin is Machiavelli’s— not 
Erasmus’s—  prince and that she lives in a world where one cannot trust what people say 
or that physical appearance accurately reflects true character, good or bad. That is, this 
classical instance of “a boy being a boy” and “no means yes” violently forces on Lucrece 
the confusing circumstances of a fallen political world, and she experiences that world as 
an epistemological crisis of linguistic and visual representation that, in effect, renders her 
Orphic rhetorical eloquence powerless against threats to her bodily chastity.127  Almost 
immediately after the rape, she despairingly concludes, 
 ‘Out idle words, servants to shallow fools, 
 Unprofitable sounds, weak arbitrators! 
 Busy yourselves in skill-contending schools, 
 Debate where leisure serves with dull debaters, 
 To trembling clients be you mediators; 
      For me, I force not argument a straw, 
      Since that my case is past the help of law. 
 
 ‘In vain I rail at opportunity, 
 At time, at Tarquin, and uncheerful night. 
 In vain I cavil with mine infamy, 
                                                 
127 That crisis and its irresolvability are perhaps most powerfully dramatized at the end of her mournful 
perusal of a painting depicting the whole ten-year history of the Trojan War.  After attempting to “feelingly 
. . . [weep] Troy’s painted woes” (1492) and specifically give Hecuba a grieving voice to match her grief-
worn face, Lucrece focuses her attention on the painter’s rendering of a figure who reminds her that such 
psychological ventriloquism— such narrative and rhetorical supplementation— amounts to nothing more 
than a tragically unreliable interpretive approximation: that figure is the Greek spy Sinon:  
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 In vain I spurn at my confirmed despite. 
 This helpless smoke of words doth me no right; 
      The remedy indeed to do me good 
       Is to let forth my foul defilèd blood.’  (1016-1029) 
 
While it is clear enough that her rhetorical failure exacts a devastating psycho-somatic 
toll, it is not at all self-evident why such failure means or should mean that suicide is her 
only “remedy.”  In “Taking Tropes Seriously: Language and Violence in Shakespeare’s 
Rape of Lucrece,” Katherine Maus offers one of the most perceptive and interesting 
explanations.  Specifically, Maus points out that “Lucrece thinks about her body in terms 
of” (70) protective and enclosing architectural and arboreal metaphors— house, fortress, 
mansion, temple, tree bark— that “imply the dependence of the soul upon the body” (71). 
With that in mind, she argues that Lucrece is “drawn” (71) to such literalizing metaphors, 
because “she cannot tolerate . . . the possibility that there are no constants, that the 
relationship between body and soul is simply arbitrary.  Thus her suicide can be seen as a 
desperate attempt to resist the possibilities of contradiction and inconsistency to which 
Tarquin’s violence has introduced her” (72).  While Maus’s argument is persuasive, it is 
also important, I think, to contextualize more fully Lucrece’s intolerance for psycho-
somatic inconsistency conveyed in her attraction to literalizing, or, as I have termed them 
throughout this study, materializing metaphors.  That is, her insistence on the chaste 
consistency of her mind and her body crucially reflects the gendered mind-body unity of 
Galenic materialism as well as the related humanistic view, as I explore at length in the 
previous chapter, that chastity and moral probity are sine-qua-non preconditions for 
women’s learning.  So, despite the Augustinian claims of Lucrece’s male relatives that 
her chastity is a matter of her will and therefore remains untouched by Tarquin’s 
violation of her body, the rape, as defined by medical and educational discourses, 
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irreparably destroys her identity as a learned and therefore eloquent Roman noblewoman.  
In both Ovid’s and Shakespeare’s versions of the story, there is ultimately no legitimate 
constitutive language or position for a raped noble woman, and the question that most 
powerfully captures that tragic reality would be something like, “What is the Roman 
patriarchy supposed to do with Lucrece if, as she assumes, she’s pregnant with Tarquin’s 
child?”  That possibility indeed represents the messy reality of the Roman reproductive 
politics that forces Lucrece to move past a faith in the power of rhetoric to the tragic 
necessity of suicide, for, as she vows, “This bastard graft shall never come to growth” 
(1061) to embarrass and dishonor herself by embarrassing and dishonoring her husband 
and father.  Therefore, her suicide functions essentially and necessarily as an honor-
saving method of abortion.  
One of the most significant ideological moves of the poem is the transformation 
of rhetorical eloquence into a powerful and empowering tool that belongs exclusively to 
men.  In that sense, Tarquin’s violation of Lucrece as well as Lucrece’s rhetorical failure 
is also a critique of the masculine military ethos constitutive of Roman imperialism, 
which fundamentally defines men as warriors so committed to the violent expansion of 
the empire that they neglect domestic politics and the rhetorical skills so necessary to it.  
In other words, Lucrece’s rhetorical failure ironically interpellates her male relatives (and 
implicitly all Roman men) back home, where they must figure out how to redefine 
masculinity in such a way that allows them to stay there without sacrificing their 
traditional identities as imperial men.   
Such a redefinition, such an ideological compromise, is no easy task, and, as 
illustrated by the self-absorbed and strangely competitive mourning of Collatine and 
 215 
 
Lucretius, not all Roman men are exactly equipped to handle it.  Shakespeare devotes 
several of his plays to the affective and performative struggle of military men unable to 
transition from the battlefield.128  And although he begins to powerfully represent that 
struggle in The Rape of Lucrece, the political theme of the narrative seems to compel him 
to move fairly quickly to the solution that Brutus exemplifies and motivates.  In a sense, 
Brutus’s example synthesizes Erasmus’s political ideals and Machiavelli’s realpolitik in a 
way that shows us how one might nonviolently preserve and forward an ethical agenda 
within a dangerously uncertain unethical world.  Hiding the “deep policy” (1815) of his 
“unsounded self” (1819) behind a façade of stupidity, Brutus employs Machiavellian 
deception to protect himself and those ideals from Tarquinian tyranny.  Significantly, 
Brutus’s redefinition begins with him removing the knife from Lucrece’s body and 
figuratively “[b]urying in Lucrece’ wound his folly’s show.”  This symbolic gesture 
illustrates the way that her violated body functions for him as a transformative and 
materializing agent that significantly provides both a grave-site for his feigned stupidity 
(his “sportive words and utt’ring [of] foolish things” [1813]) and the tragic somatic pre-
text for his ostensibly miraculous emergence as a powerful revolutionary political 
speaker.  In other words, her body provides the materials or substance to express his 
wits— his anti-Tarquinian/ anti-Machiavellian ideals— in a way that Roman subjects 
will understand, accept, and act on.  The materializing function of her body, therefore, 
allows the narrator to think of Brutus’s eloquence in comparable material terms: that is, 
Brutus “[b]egan to clothe his wit in state and pride” and “armed his long-hid wits 
advisedly.”  As these analogies suggest (and especially the second militarizing one), 
                                                 
128 Several of Shakespeare’s plays explore the tragic inability of military men to transition from the 
battlefield to the home: Titus Andronicus, Julius Caesar, Coriolanus, Othello, Macbeth, Antony and 
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rhetorical eloquence no longer amounts to the “helpless smoke of words” that failed 
Lucrece.  But rather, out of Brutus’s mouth, it now materializes into a weapon of 
revolutionary thought and action, which, in effect, allows traditional military men to stay 
home and attend to the domestic politics of the home and state and still feel like they are 
“real” men.  
Brutus’s solution also importantly represents that rhetorical violence as an 
alternative to the “real” violence of war.  It is indeed striking and perhaps somewhat 
anticlimactic that his stirring call for Roman men to take up arms against the Tarquins 
only concludes with “Tarquin’s everlasting banishment” (1855).  But while a bloodless 
coup d’état may seem (perhaps may be) an unjust and unsatisfying punishment for 
Lucrece’s violation as well as the accumulated crimes of the Tarquinian regime, it is, 
however, consistent with the pacifistic strain of the humanistic ideals that, in part, make 
up Brutus’s/Shakespeare’s ideological compromise.129  In the poem, predictably enough, 
Lucrece offers the purest expression of that strain in her denunciation of Paris for inciting 
the Trojan War: “Why should the private pleasure of someone,” she asks, “Become the 
public plague of many moe?”(1478-1479).  In that sense, we might understand her 
suicide as a sacrificial gesture that spares Rome a long and bloody civil war.  That is, her 
wounded and violated body along with the story of violation that Brutus attaches to it 
constitutes too powerful and persuasive a rhetorical materialization for anyone to verbally 
or physically oppose.  However, as represented by the oath that Brutus and the other 
Romans take over Lucrece’s body and specifically on her bloody knife, that violence-
averting consensus also depends on making sure that the symbolic violence of political 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cleopatra, etc.   
129 See note 12.  
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speech is always figuratively charged with the real threat of violence, the real threat of 
war.  In the spirit of Foucault’s dictum that “politics is the continuation of war by other 
means” (15), the Lucretia story and specifically Shakespeare’s version of it illustrate the 
extent to which those means include rhetorical materialization as a way of allowing noble 
warriors to retain their definition of masculinity, even though political necessity has 
forced them off the battlefield and into politics. 130  
In the second instance, Titus is fundamentally about a failure of political rhetoric 
or diplomacy in a stubbornly violent militaristic society and the way that that failure 
plays out tragically in an especially brutal act of sexual violence against the titular 
character’s daughter: Lavinia.131  By cutting off Lavinia’s hands and cutting out her 
tongue, by violently removing the somatic instruments of complex distinctively human 
communication, Demetrius and Chiron attempt to trap their identities as her rapists within 
her silent mutilated body. Confident that they have done so, they cockily and sarcastically 
challenge her to figure out how to communicate their identities to her family.  Of course, 
as the stupid former grammar-school students that Aaron identifies them as later in the 
play (4.2. 25), they fail to realize that they are part of a revenge plot that is a composite of 
several commonly assigned classical stories in early modern grammar schools, and that 
                                                 
130 Foucault examines the implication of that dictum in his series of lectures entitled “Society Must Be 
Defended.”  Perhaps his most powerful expression of the link between war and politics comes in the form 
of two rhetorical questions: “Is the power relationship basically a relationship of confrontation, a struggle 
to the death, or a war?  If we look beneath peace, order, wealth, and authority, beneath the State and State 
apparatuses, beneath the laws, and so on, will we hear and discover a sort of primitive and permanent war?” 
(146-147). 
131 This failure pervades the play: first, Tamora’s eloquent plea for Titus to spare her eldest son (Alarbus) 
from gruesome death and dismemberment as part of a military ritual falls on deaf ears; in turn, Tamora 
attempts to ignore and ultimately dismisses Lavinia’s plea to be spared the indignity of rape at the hands of 
Tamora’s remaining sons (Demetrius and Chiron); and, after two of Titus’s sons (Martius and Quintus) are 
falsely condemned to death for the murder of Bassanius, Tribunes ignore his shameless impassioned plea 
for them to spare their lives.  See chapter 3 (“‘Their Tribune and their trust’: Political Representation, 
Property, and Rape in Titus Andronicus and The Rape of Lucrece”: 101-139) of Oliver Arnold’s The Third 
Citizen   
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Lavinia’s rape and mutilation derive specifically from the story of Philomela as retold in 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses.  In other words, they fail to realize that she, as a resourceful 
educated Roman woman, will figure out how to identify them, because Ovid and other 
classical authors have already told different aspects of her story and therefore have 
already spoken for her.  Her alternative means of speech, therefore, begins with her 
desperately chasing down her nephew, Young Lucius, for his copy of Ovid’s text and 
then proceeding to direct her father and other male relatives to Philomela’s story— her 
story— in Book VI.  Once Titus realizes that she, like Philomela, has been raped, he 
instructs her to write the names of her rapists in a plain sandy plot by guiding his staff 
with her feet and mouth.  And with this improvised method, she manages to write 
“‘Stuprum [which translates as “defilement”]—Chiron—Demetrius’” (4.1. 79).   
A somewhat pathologically optimistic way of reading Lavinia’s determined 
expressive resourcefulness is to assert simply that, despite it all, she finds a way to speak 
and therefore assert and preserve her rhetorical agency.  But that, of course, would 
require blinding oneself to Shakespeare’s as well as Ovid’s exploration of the traumatic 
costs and constraints that such agency often entails.  For instance, in Ovid’s version of 
the story, Philomela’s threat to expose Tereus’s crime against her— the threat that incites 
him to cut out her tongue— is significantly qualified by a profound sense of shame and 
responsibility: “Ay,” she initially castigates him, “would that you had killed me before 
you wronged me so.  Then would my shade have been innocent and clean” (327).  Ovid 
repeats this sense of her responsibility, when he describes her first encounter with Procne 
after the rape: “But Philomela,” Ovid tells us, “could not lift her eyes to her sister, feeling 
herself to have wronged her.  And, with her face turned to the ground, longing to swear 
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and call the gods to witness that that shame had been forced upon her, she made her hand 
serve for voice” (331).  Even Procne, despite her extreme and, as I will discuss, 
illegitimate and alienating thirst for vengeance, expresses a sense of her own 
responsibility for Tereus’s crime: “See the kind of man you have married, daughter of 
Pandion!” she exclaims and continues, “You are not worthy of your father!” (333). 
Indeed, in a patriarchal system, women are often, if not always, blamed for the inability 
to check the male desires threatening their chastity.  And in the specific case of Procne, 
the psycho-somatic tensions of such a position for herself and especially Philomela 
arguably explain the “inward rage” that pushes her as well as her sister past the point of 
understandable or justifiable vengeance to the ghastly alienated point of slaughtering her 
own son (Itys) and feeding him to his father.  In that regard, Ovid renders women’s 
speech— and the potential for collective agency that results from it— as disturbing and 
as criminal as the crime of rape, if not more so.  And the eventual metamorphosis of the 
major characters only heightens the sense of the story’s unresolved moral ambivalence. 
For as bloody and morally confused as Titus is, Shakespeare’s version of the 
Philomela story suggests that rhetorical agency as well as the responsibility to resolve 
such moral confusion belongs to the father.  In a sense, Shakespeare casts Titus in the 
role of paternal victim and avenger as a way of re-casting the father, Pandion, as the main 
character of the narrative and, in turn, as a way of replacing and displacing Procne and 
Philomela as both primary victims and moral agents.  In Shakespeare’s version of the 
story, there is no clear equivalent to Procne, and that absence, in turn, marginalizes 
Lavinia as the Philomela figure in an all-male family.  Although Tamora’s thirst for 
vengeance in many ways parallels Procne’s, her foreignness, adulterous relationship with 
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Aaron, and role in Lavinia’s rape and mutilation all put her on the wrong side of the 
moral divide and therefore clearly disqualifies her vengeance as well as her agency.   
Also, as I began to discuss, Shakespeare arguably translates the patriarchal fear of 
women’s (collective) agency into the panicked flight of Young Lucius from his muted 
and mutilated aunt.  Ironically, the very book that he carries and the one for which 
Lavinia desperately pursues him has taught him to run from her: “And I have read that 
Hecuba of Troy,” he explains to Marcus and Titus, “Ran mad for sorrow.  That made me 
to fear,/Although, my lord, I know my noble aunt/Loves me as dear as e’er my mother 
did” (4.1. 20-23).  The reading that Young Lucius is likely referring to is Ovid’s story of 
the maddening confluence of metamorphotic grief and rage that drives Hecuba along with 
the other captive Trojan women to attack the King of Thrace, Polymestor, and 
grotesquely blind him for the murder of Polydorus, Hecuba’s youngest and last-living 
son:132 
She grimly eyed him as he spoke and swore his lying oaths.  Then did her rising 
wrath boil over, and, calling the captive [Trojan] women to attack, she seized 
upon him, dug her fingers into his lying eyes and gouged his eyeballs from their 
sockets— so mighty did wrath make her. . . .  The Thracians, incensed by their 
king’s disaster, began to set upon the Trojan with shafts and stones.  But she, with 
hoarse growls, bit at the stones they threw and, though her jaws were set to words, 
barked when she tried to speak. (269) 
                                                 
132 Here is a brief summary of the story for context: After Agamemnon sacrifices Hecuba’s only daughter, 
Polyxena, in a bid to get the ghost of Achilles to calm the sea and provide a friendlier wind for the journey 
of the Greek forces and their Trojan captives from Troy, Hecuba, one of those captives along with several 
other Trojan women, mourns the loss of her daughter as deeply as she has been mourning the loss of her 
country, her sons, and her husband.  And just when the dispossessed former queen identifies her last 
remaining child, her son Polydorus, as her only reason to live, she finds his body washed up just off  the 
coast of Thrace riddled with the wounds of Thracian spears.  “The Trojan women shrieked at the sight; but 
[Hecuba] was dumb with grief; her very grief engulfed her powers of speech” (267).  During the war, 
Priam secretly sent Polydorus to Polymestor, the King of Thrace, to keep him safe, and the Thracian-spear 
wounds clearly indicates to Hecuba that, once Troy fell, the greedy Polymestor killed Polydorus for the 
wealth in his possession. 
 221 
 
Although Hecuba’s vengeance is focused and arguably justifiable, for Young Lucius to 
reference it as an explanation of his fear of Lavinia suggests that there is nonetheless 
something deeply unacceptable about it.  As we saw with the Philomela story, it appears 
that the capacity and/or desire of victimized women to turn (independently or 
collectively) their rage into action is too disturbing to the patriarchal order to justify 
vengeance, even against a male villain as unambiguous as Polymestor.  In fact, despite 
the central role of women in Young Lucius’s education and the clarity of Polymestor’s 
villainy, the logic of Young Lucius’s fear still results in an identification with Polymestor 
and thereby a strangely implicit identification of Polymestor with Itys. 133  Significantly, 
this ability to see oneself simultaneously as villain and victim illustrates just how much 
classical and early modern male psycho-social development depended on the complex 
but ultimately alienated presence of women.  Specifically, much like Procne and 
Philomela’s misdirected and therefore alienating rage against Itys, Ovid’s metamorphosis 
of Hecuba into a mad dog— physically unable, despite its efforts, to speak— fantastically 
and frighteningly alienates her from grammar-school boys like Young Lucius.  In short, 
as indicated by the phallic symbolism of Lavinia’s improvised efforts to write with 
Titus’s staff, speech and agency belong to men and specifically the father.  And that is 
why Lavinia’s speech-depriving mutilation and her efforts to speak despite it frighten 
Young Lucius134 and ultimately lead to Titus drawing on the story of Virginius and 
                                                 
133 Marcus compares Lavinia’s devotion to Young Lucius’s education to Cornelia at 4.1. 12-15 and Young 
Lucius identifies his book as a copy of Ovid’s Metamorphoses that his mother gave him at 4.1. 42.   
134 Although over the course of the play, Titus kills one of his sons, Mutius, cuts off one of his own hands, 
and exhibits the signs of madness, Young Lucius never fears him or runs from his him. 
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Virginia, a father-centered classical story justifying post-rape euthanasia, to deny 
Lavinia’s rhetorical agency by ending her life.135 
So, the answer to the question of whether or not in these specific texts 
Shakespeare thinks that classical or early modern women can speak is a complex yes and 
no.  Yes, as long as their speech is limited to the domestic sphere.  Yes, as long as their 
speech focuses exclusively on ideals that match their psycho-somatic purity.  Yes, as long 
as their vulnerable chaste bodies are protected from the messy and violently threatening 
realities of male erotic desires and Machiavellian politics.  No, if we define speech as 
rhetorical eloquence able to effect political change within that world.     
In an attempt to counter the type of disciplinary, theoretical, and political  
antagonisms that often results in simplistic and celebratory readings of women’s speech 
and agency, this study, which might be described as a profeminist study of early modern 
masculinity,136 has been devoted to such complexity.  That is, by relating issues of male 
children’s embodiment and the expectations of performative masculinity to the embodied 
nature of women’s rhetorical agency, I have attempted to show that such disciplinary and 
theoretical inclusiveness is crucial to understanding the complex and interrelated 
constructions of both men and women.         
  
                                                      
 
 
                                                 
135 The story of Virginius and Virginia: the story of a Roman father who kills his own daughter, as Titus 
explains, “[b]ecause she was enforced, stained, and deflowered” (5.3. 38). 
136 For an informative collection of essays that identify and attempt to advance profeminist masculinity 
studies, see Judith Kegan Gardiner’s Masculinity Studies and Feminist Theory. 
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Figure 2.  Hans Holbein, the Younger.  Erasmus with a Renaissance Pilaster, 1523   
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Figure 3.  Andrea Alciati.  Eloquentia fortitudine praestantior (Eloquence is more 
efficacious than force).  Livret des Emblemes, 1536.   
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Figure 4.  Agnolo Bronzino.  Portrait of a Young Man with a Book, 1530-32 
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Figure 5.  Holbein.  Henry VIII and the Barber Surgeons, c. 1543 
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Figure 6.  Holbein.  Edward, Prince of Wales, (fourteen months) c.1539 
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Figure 7.  Attributed to William Scots.  Prince Edward, c. 1546 
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Figure 8.  Attributed to William Scots.  Princes Elizabeth, c. 1548-49 
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Figure 9.  Rope climbers.  Woodcut illustration from Girolamo Mercuriale’s Arte de 
Gymnastica. 601 
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Figure 10.  Woodcut illustration from George Turberville’s The Booke of Falconrie Or 
Havvking. 
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